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PREFACE 
Initial acquaintance with the philosophies of c. J. 
Ducasse and J. B. Pratt gives one the impression that the 
two philosophers are closely akin. This impression, doubt-
less, stems from the fact that both authors are prominent 
Realists, outspoken Dualists, and widely recognized writers 
on religion. 
But, given this impression, certain important ques-
tions may well be asked: Are Ducasse and Pratt, in fact, 
presenting the same basic views? Are they, in respect to 
particular problems of philosophy, saying essentially the 
same thing? And, granted certain terminological similarities 
between them, are the two authors, 1n actualitY, always 
"closely akin 11 as regards their solutions to the traditional 
problems of philosophy? 
In this dissertation, I intend, directly or indirectly, 
to answer these questions. In short, I propose to compare 
systematically the views of Ducasse and Pratt in selected 
aspects of their philosophies. Specifically, I intend, 
first, to contrast the contentions of the two authors regard-
ing the nature and method of philosophy, and, then, to com-
pare their views concerning Substance, Existence, Causality, 
the Mind-Body problem, Morality, and Religion, respectively, 
iii 
iv 
With regard to these latter topics, ay intention in this 
comparative study is not solely to delineate the similarities 
and differences between the relevant theories of Pratt and 
Ducasse, but also to analyze and account for any basic dif-
ference which I might find between them. In so doing, I 
hope to uncover the source or sources from which flow the 
basic disagreements, if any, between Ducasse and Pratt. 
In other words,I intend, in this dissertation, to 
inquire into the very workings of these two ostensibly similar 
philosophical. systems, to ascertain whether or not they actu-
ally are in fundamental harmony, and to determine the basis 
for any essential difference which might arise in my compari-
son of them. But within the context of this investigation, 
I shall ~confine my attention to a historical and compara-
tive scrutiny alone. Rather, I shall take advantage of my 
detailed comparative analysis in order to bring out my basic 
criticisms of the two sets of views under examination. That 
is to say, although my dissertation will be prirnaril~ inter-
pretative and comparative in its intentions, it will also 
involve, as a kind of secondary endeavour, an attempt to 
criticize the general approach and position taken by each 
philosopher. 
It is my hope that this venture will contribute to the 
understanding and assessment of two of America's most competent 
20th century philosophers, and demonstrate the importance of 
going beyond philosophical labels and terminological simi-
larities in one's comparison of philosophical theories. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
PREFACE • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I. NATURE AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY •• • • • • • • • 
1. Philosophy is potentially a science for 
2. 
Ducasse • • . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . 
i. The problems of philosophy • • • • • • 
ii. The subject-matter di,stinctive of 
philosophy • • • • • • • • • • . . . 
iii. The scientific method in semantical 
inquiry • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . 
Pratt's empirical approach to philosophy . . 
PAGE 
iii 
1 
1 
2 
8 
11 
15 
3. Critique of 'Philosophy as a Science' • • • • 20 
II. SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33 
1. Historical introduction to the problem of 
Substance • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
2. Ducasse's application of his method to the 
problems of Substa~ce and Existence • • • • 39 
i. The problem of Substance for Ducasse • 39 
ii. Ducasse's hypothesis concerning the 
iii. 
nature of 3ubstance .••••• 
What it means 'to exist' ••• 
• • 
• • • • 
3. Pratt's interpretation of Substance and 
Existence • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v 
40 
44 
48 
CHAPTER 
vi 
PAGE 
49 
58 
III. 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
Pratt's characterization of 'substance' 
Reality and Being ••••••••••• 
Pratt's view of 'Existence' • • • • • • 
iv. 'Existence' in contrast • 
4. Critical Remarks ••••••• 
CAUSALITY • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
62 
71 
77 
86 
1. Ducasse's Analysis of the Causal Relation • • 86 
2. 
i. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
ii. The data and the problem as Ducasse 
sees them • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 87 
iii. Ducasse's hypothesis • • • • • • • • • 88 
(1) Causality is a triadic relation • • 90 
(2) Distinction between 'cause of' and 
'condition of' ••••••• 
(J) Causality is a relation between 
• • 92 
concrete individual events • • • 93 
(4) Causation is Uniform and universal 95 
Pratt's View of the Causal Relation • • • • • 
i. Pratt's approach to causality • • • • • 
ii. Causation is not invariable sequence 
iii. Causation is continuity of process • • 
iv. 
v. 
Causation does not mean mere temporal 
continuity • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Is causa.til:m uniform and universal? 
• • 
97 
97 
99 
100 
102 
106 
J. The ~wo Views in Contrast • • • • • • • • • • 109 
vii 
GRAFTER PAGE 
4. Objections to Dueasse's Analysis . • • • • • 114 
5. Evaluative Oomments on Pratt's Approach to 
Causation . • • • • • • • . . • . • • 122 
IV. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 126 
1. The nature of the problem • . • • . . • • • 127 
i. Ducasse . • • • • . • . • . . • • • . 127 
i1. Pratt • . • • • • • • • • . . • • • . 128 
2. The meaning of 'mind 1 . • • • • . . • • 130 
i. Ducasse: mind as 'substance' • • • • • 131 
ii. Pratt: mind as 'self . • • • • • • • • 136 
3. The Mind-Body relation • • • . • • • • • • . 145 
i. Ducasse • . • • • • . • . • . • • • • 146 
(1) Which huraan body is one's own? • • 147 
(2) Interaction between IIlind and body 
is, then, analytically true . • 150 
(3) The fundamental relation between 
a i:Iiind and its body • • • • • • 151 
ii. Pratt • • • • • • . • • • . • • . • • 153 
4. The difficulties of interactionism • • • • • 160 
(1) Pratt 
• • • • • . • • • • • • • • 163 
(2) Ducasse • . . . • • . . • . • • . 167 
5. The two views in contrast • • . • • • • . • 171 
6. Critical collliilents • • • • • . • . • . • • • 181 
i. Ducasse . • . • • • • . . • • • • . • 181 
11. Pratt • • • • • • . • • • • . . . • • 187 
7. Recapitulation • • • • • . . . . . . • . • • 190 
CHAPTER 
viii 
PAGE 
193 V. DUALISM AND MORALITY ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 
VI. 
1. Dualism of 'Substance' and Dualism of 
'Process'--a significant distinction • 
Ethics and the scientific method • • • • 2. 
• • 
• • 
193 
197 
i. Ducasse's approach • • • • • • • • • • 197 
ii. A Utilitarian 'criterion' of morality 203 
3. 
4. 
iii. The notion of 'moral obligation' • • • 
Critical comments: Ducasse 
Ethics and Rationality •• 
• • 
. . . 
• • • • • • 
• • • • 
1. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
Pratt's approach ••••••••• 
A Utilitarian 'theory' of moralit~ 
• • 
• • 
A Utilitarian 'criterion' of morality? 
The meaning of 'value' •••••••• 
The concept of 'obligation' ••••• 
Do Pratt's ethical views reflect his 
209 
212 
218 
218 
222 
225 
228 
230 
'dualism of process'? • • • • • • • 232 
5. Critical comments: Pratt • • • • • • • • • 234 
6. 
7. 
The ethical views compared • 
Final remarks • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
RELIGION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • . . -
1. Ducasse's Examination of Religion 
• • • • • 
i. The problem and Ducasse's approach 
to 1 t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ii. Religion is to be defined only in 
terms of its functions ••• • • • • 
237 
247 
249 
249 
249 
251 
CHAPTER 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
?. 
1x 
PAGE 
iii. The importance of 1belief' in religion 256 
iv. Religious beliefs are ultimately 
matters of faith •••••• • • • • 
v. Belief in God not necessary to 
Ducasse's view of religion • . . • • 
vi. Religion vis-a-vis science •••••• 
Pratt's Consideration of Religion ••••• 
i. His approach ••••••••••••• 
i1. Religion as an 'attitude' • • • • • • 
257 
260 
261 
264 
264 
266 
iii. Does Pratt ignore the 'functions' of 
religion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 268 
iv. The significance of 'belief' in 
religion ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 
v. Belief in God not essential to 
Pratt's view of religion ••• 
Religious beliefs are ultimately 
• • • 
vi. 
matters of faith •• . . . . . . • • 
vii. Religion vs. science • • • . . . . . . 
Ducasse's criticism of Pratt's view • • • • 
Religion and Pratt's mind-body dualism • 
A review of the preceding comparison 
• • 
. . 
i. Similarities ••••••• • • • • 
ii. Differences ••••••••••••• 
Are Duoasse and Pratt talking in the same 
philosophical posture? •••••••••• 
Final remarks 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
271 
272 
273 
275 
278 
280 
283 
284 
286 
288 
295 
CHAPTER 
CONCLUDING COMMENTARY • 
• • • • • • • • • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . • • • . . . . . . 
ABSTRACT 
• • • • . . . . . . . . • • 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
• • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • 
. . • • • 
. . . . • • • 
. . . . • • • 
X 
PAGE 
297 
307 
310 
315 
CHAPTER I 
NATURE AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY 
1. Philosophy ~ potentially ~ science for Ducasse. 
One of the most persistent themes dominating the writings of 
c. J. Ducasse is the basic assertion that philosophy, as a 
knowledge-seeking endeavor, is by intent a science. This 
repeated contention is invariably accompanied by the corol-
lary view that, as a potential science, philosophy must adopt 
a scientific; that is, a knowledge-yielding, method. "For " , ' 
says Ducasse, "both (science and philosophy) seek knowledge, 
and no matter of what sort the entities concerning which 
knowledge is sought, scientific methods, that is, the methods 
which yield knowledge instead of vague opinion, remain the 
same." 1 However, the "inadequate realization of what spe-
cifically constitutes the subject-matter of philosophy" for 
Ducasse, combined with possible uncertainty concerning the 
"specific forms which scientific method, as applied to that 
subject matter, must take," 2 might cloud the significance and 
understanding of Ducasse's allegations. For this reason, a 
1 ' ' c. J. Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1924), p. 121. 
2 ' c. J. Ducasse, "Reality, Science, and Metaphysics," 
Synthes~ 8 (1950-1951), 10. 
1 
2 
concise, yet detailed account of Ducasse's conception of the 
problems, subject matter, and task of philosophy will be 
offered, with the expectation that it will bring out Ducasse's 
scientific aspirations for philosophy, and suggest how phi~ 
losophy, so con~eived, entails a scientific method of inquiry. 
i. The problems of philosophy. In the second chapter 
of Ducasse's painstaking work, Nature, Mind, and Death, 1 a 
distinction concerning the problems of science paves the way 
for a subsequent differen~ion in regard to the problems of 
philosophy. Ducasse distinguishes between the problems 
"for" and the problems "of" a science. The problems "for" a 
science are practical problems "which happen not to be solu-
ble without knowledge more recondite, exact and systematic 
than ordinary experience or 'on the job' reflection pro-
vide." The problems "of" a science are theoretical problems 
implicit in the practical problems--implicit "in the sense 
that the possibility of solving the latter depends on prior 
solution of the former." 2 More specifically, according to 
Ducasse, a problem is practical, or is "for" science, if it 
is a problem •as to means or ends,~., a problem as to 
means to a given end ('how to do it'), or as to results 
1c. J. Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death (LaSalle: The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1951). 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 19. 
attainable with given means ( 1what can be done with it?)."1 
Ducasse calls scientific, epistemic, or theoretical those 
problems not concerned with means or ends, but which seek 
information more technical than ordinary observation would 
yield. 2 
Ducasse carries to his survey of philosophical prob-
lems the same theoretical-practical distinction which sepa-
3 
rates the problems of science. According to him, there is 
in philosophy, as in any of the natural sciences, a specific 
set of problems related to means or to ends. He categorizes 
these problems as the npractical problems of philosophy,n 
and notes that they differ from the practical problems of the 
natural sciences in that they are not primarilY concerned 
with the adequacy of certain means for a given end, nor with 
the attainability of certain ends by given means, but with 
the value; that is to say, the goodness or badness,3 of the 
means or ends considered. •These problems thus are, or 
involve the question, as to whether a proposed sufficient 
means ought to be employed or whether a proposed attainable 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 20. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 19 and 21. 
3
"Goodnessn and "badness" are not to be understood 
here in their moral connotation, but in a general sense that 
would.include obligation and value of an aesthetic, logical, 
sentimental, economic, or any other nature. See Ducasse, 
p. 28. 
end ought to be pursued--either at all or in preference to 
other sufficient means or attainable ends." 1 
Further, they may be characterized by two· other fea-
tures which differentiate them from the practical problems 
of the natural science: (1) The doubt involved in these 
4 
problems is not initiated by ignorance or misinformation 
concerning the nature of the proposed means or end, but is 
related specifically and entirely to yalue; and (2) •common 
wisdom," that is to say "wisdom already possessed," is insuf-
ficient to solve them. 2 The first of these features, the 
understanding of which is essential to the comprehension of 
Ducasse's view of philosophical reflection, requires an 
added note of elucidation. The point is that, for Ducasse, 
philosophical reflection or genuine philosophizing can never 
spring from doubt "due to factual misinformation or ignorance 
about the cc·ncrete, individual means or end appraised.") If, 
for example, a person begins to doubt the value of a recently 
approved property law, and if his doubt is due to ignorance 
or misinformation regarding the various contexts or provi-
sions of that law, then the doubt, even though associated 
with value, does not call for philosophical reflection, but 
for additional information concerning the conditions, 
clauses, contexts, or provisos ·of that law. What must be 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 27. 
2 
Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 27-28. 
3nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 29. 
5 
noted, attentively, then, is Ducasse's insistence that the 
practical problems of philosophy entertain doubt directly · 
and only as to values, and that any conflict soluble in terms 
of additional information--hitherto disregarded, distorted, 
or not known--is not a genuinely philosophical problem. 
Implicit in the above account of the practical prob-
lems of philosophy is Ducasse's conception of the theoretical 
problems of philosophy. Consistent with his expressed view 
of the relation between the theoretical and practical prob-
lems of science is his contention that the practical problem 
of philosophy is pregnant with the theoretical problem. The 
first point to notice "is that if a person is faced with a 
conflict of appraisals 1 that is, of value judgments and he 
proposes to deal with it rationally, then philosophical 
reflection is the process by which he spontaneously attempts 
to settle the conflict."2 Or, put another way, the attempt 
to solve rationally practical problems of a certain sort 
leads one automatically," according to Ducasse, "to engage 
in theoretical philosophical reflect1on."3 
An illustration may shed light on the contention that 
Ducasse is making. Suppose, for instance, that a disagreement 
1 Note, also Ducasse's subsequent preference of the 
latter term on page 75 of his article, "Scientific Method in 
Ethics," Phil. Phen. Res., 14 {1953). 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 28-29. 
3nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 36. 
7 
solution of which the practical problem is said to be incap-
able of rational solution. We may note first that the above 
disagreement between Terrence and Brian came to involve a 
conflict of opinion concerning the alleged value, V, of the 
proposed employment of means M. In other words, the dis-
agreement came to focus on a particular formulation of the 
general question, "Does this (given thing) of kind K have 
1 
value V or not?" and this question, according to Ducasse, 
represents the general form of the practical problems of 
philosophy. However, contends Ducaase, the form question of 
the practical problems cannot be answered until another 
question is answered; namely, "What exactly does it mean to 
say of something that it has value V?" 2 And this latter 
question represents, for Ducasse, the general form which the 
theoretical problems of philosophy invariably take. Hence, 
to revert, once more, to the illustration above, an answer 
to the question as to whether or not the employment of the 
proposed means would be immoral requires a prior answer to 
the question as to what it means to say of something that it 
is "immoral." In other words, the stipulated practical prob-
lem implies a more basic theoretical one; and the practical 
problem is insoluble without the prior solution of the 
theoretical. 
1 . 6 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 3 • 
2 Ducasse, Nature_, Mind, and Death, p. 37. 
8 
An emphasis which pe~meates Ducasse's treatment of 
philosophical problems is the contention that'' "every genuine 
problem has data, that is, facts not themselves then ques-
tioned, about which the problem is, and by reference to which 
any proposed solution of it can be empirically tested."l 
Accordingly, we may now ask the question, what is the nature 
of the data of the initial theoretical problems of philoso-
phy? To ask this question, declares Ducasse, is to ask 
significantly: 11 From what kind of observable facts can one 
obtain inductively an account of what 1 having value V1 ~~ns 
as predicated by a given person or group?" 2 And, in view of 
the fact that the question is concerned with primitive, 
directly observable, empirically basic facts, Ducasse 1 s 
answer to the question will, on his own premises, bring to 
light his own conception of the distinctive subject-matter 
of philosophy. 
ii. The subject-matter distinctive of philosophy. 
Ducasse submits that the data of the initial theoretical 
problem, that is, of the primitive, observable facts, can 
consist only of 11 other evaluative statements by P (the 
speaker},3 but ones that are beyond question." And a 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mil:ld, and Death, p. 11. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 37. See also, 
for example, Ducasse's article, "Reality, Science, and Meta-
physics," p. 11. 
3Parentheses are my own. 
9 
statement asserting value is "beyond question if and only if 
it constitutes a definition-by-type, that is, a standard 
1 
example of what T means 1 by having value 111 For example, 
standard statements or defining instances of moral evalua-
tion by Terrence, in our illustration above, might well be 
along the following line: "This act, which is one of murder, 
is a sample of what I call an immoral act;" 11 This act, which 
is one of theft, is a sample of what I call an immoral act;" 
"This act, which is one of alleviating unhappiness, is a 
sample of what I call a moral act," "This act, which is one 
of assisting a neighbour, is a sample of what I call a moral 
act," etc. A collection of such standard appraisive state-
ments is, according to Ducasse, "the kind of datum, and the 
only kind, from which it will be possible to obtain induc-
tively2 a definition of what 'to be moral' means as applied 
by P."J And such statements, Ducasse contends, are "the 
1 Dticasse, Nature, Mind, ~Death, p. 37. 
2 We shall see later that Ducasse ·uses the term induc-
tive to characterize the philosophical procedure of "compar-
ing and analyzing concrete cases of the admittedly proper 
use of the term • • • investigated. 11 See Causation and the 
Types of Necessity, p. 120. The appropriateness of his use 
of the term inductive, here, will not be considered. Surely, 
in the light of Mill, his usage is questionable. But in our 
attempt to understand Ducasse, here, we shall not quarrel 
over words. Later in this dissertation, however, we shall 
submit critical questions regarding Ducasse's so-called 
inductive process of semantical analysis. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 37. 
data of the primitive, initial, empirically basic facts of 
philosophy." As such "~ constitute ~ subJect matter 
which ultimately differentiates philosophy from the other 
1 
systematic knowledge-seeking enterprises.• 
10 
In passing, a few implications of this view may be 
mentioned. First, it is to be noted that, in accordance with 
this particular conception of philosophy's subject matter, 
the task of philosophical reflection, among other things, 
turns out to involve the construing of the primitive data of 
which the subject matter is constituted. 2 Secondly, it is 
to be noticed that these representative sample statements 
are discerned in an effort to ascertain the meaning of a 
value-predicate as used by a particular person or group, 
and in so doing, to solve rationally some particular prob-
lem of philosophy. This implies a contention which Ducasse 
subsequently makes; namely, that the theoretical problems of 
philosophy are, by nature, semantical.3 And this latter 
contention, itself, has the significant consequence that a 
genuine theoretical philosophical problem is solved auto-
matically when purged of its semantical obscurity. Finally, 
according to Ducasse, "The essentially semantical character 
of the theoretical problems of philosophy entails that the 
1Ducasse, Nature,~, and Death, p. 38. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 38. See also 
"Reality, Science, and Metaphysics," p. 10. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 54. 
method of inquiry appropriate to them will be that which 
scientific--that is, knowledge-yielding--inquiry employs 
when its object is discovery of the meaning of a term." 1 
To a further consideration of the specific form which the 
11 
scientific method allegedly takes in philosophy, we must now 
turn. 
iii. The scientific method 1n semantical inquirY. 
The above accounts of the problems and subject-matter of 
philosophy have, I believe, brought out the general Ducassean 
conception of the nature of philosophy; namely, that phi-
losophy is inquiry concerning value-judgments or appraisals, 
or, to use Garvin's words, "that philosophy is a semantical 
inquiry aiming at explicating value terms.• 2 We are now to 
see, in a more explicit manner, the basic scientific ingre-
dients of the method which Ducasse believes such a seman-
tical inquiry to entail. 
The scientific method, in general, is broadly char-
acterized by Ducasse "as involving scrutiny of data • • • 
empirical generalization, explanatory theorizing, empirical 
testing of the theories constructed, and organization of the 
validated theories belonging to the given field of inquiry 
into a logically complete whole.• 3 According to Ducasse, 
1 Ibid. 
2 L. Garvin, "Due as se 1 s Car us Lee ture s , " Phil. Ph en. 
Res., lJ (1952), 58. 
3c. J. Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science (N.Y.: Oskar 
Piest, 1941), p. 217. 
12 
this same fundamental inductive method must be respected by 
any semantical inquiry which has a knowledge-yielding func-
tion; and, to this extent, science and philosophy walk hand 
in hand. 1 To begin with, then, in theoretical philosophy or 
semantical inquiry, as in any natural science, there is no 
genuine problem or subsequent reflection without data. More 
specifically, it is Ducasse 1 s belief that inquiry into the 
meaning of a term is futile if the term is taken out of all 
context and, consequently, that a typical philosophical prob-
lem is amenable to scientific solut1on only "when one takes 
as d~tum a list of statements employing the term and consti-
tuting a representative sample of the particular usage of it 
to be analyzed." 2 This belief prescribes the first precept 
of the method of knowledge in theoretical philosophy; namely, 
to specify the data of the problem, or, in other words, "to 
list the applications of the given term, and the applications 
of the contrary term from which we seek to distinguish it, 
that are to be explained."3 For, Ducasse claims, without 
this specified list, the validity of any definition offered 
of a term could not be tested. The focal question of seman-
tical inquiry, then, is not, simply or insolubly, "What does 
the term mean?" but "What~ it mean §:.2. employed in the 
1 Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 121. 
2 Ducasse, Natur~, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
3Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science, p. 229. 
13 
1 
statements listed?" Further, the data of the problem hav-
ing been expressed explicitly and having been scrutinized 
empirically, a characteristically scientific induction, in 
the form of a hypothetical definition, is offered in answer 
to this leading question. 
Next, the requirements of scientific procedure demand 
a test by which the validity or invalidity of this general-
ized hypothesis or generic definition may be determined. 
Accordingly, Ducasse maintains, the second methodological 
precept of theoretical philosophy suggests itself. This 
precept states: "In the listed applications, substitute for 
the term the proposed definition of it." 2 This is prescribed 
with the intention of seeing whether or not the proposed 
definition is substitutable in the listed applications without 
changing any of their standard implications. If this sub-
stitution is possible, the definition offered may be said to 
be empirically confirmable or valid in proportion to the 
extent of the random samples, and the divergence of the 
standard implications recognized. If, however, the sub-
stitution is not possible, the proposed definition may be 
taken to be erroneous, hence demanding amendment or rejec-
tion. This test, Ducasse insists, is objective--objective 
in the sense that it can be carried out by persons other 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
2Ducasse, Philosophy as ~ Science, p. 229. See also 
"Reality, Science, and Metaphysics," p. 13. 
14 
than the one who made the listed statements--and represents 
a verifiability criterion for philosophy that is just as 
"scientific" as those appealed to by the natural sciences. 
These two fundamental precepts summarize for Ducasse 
the essential components of the method of •empirical inquiry" 
into the meaning of terms. That is to say, they are the 
basic methodological principles "by compliance with which 
the status of knowledge--probable knowledge--can be obtained 
for the definitions which theoretical philosophy is so 
largely occupied in seeking.•1 The probable nature of the 
findings yielded by this method must be noted seriously, and 
yet not be taken as a major defect of semantical inquiry. 
Rather, like the findings of empirical inductive inquiry into 
matters of the natural sciences, the philosophical results 
obtained by the method stipulated above will not constitute 
absolute knowledge, but knowledge genuinely probable in the 
light of attained evidence, and subject to the test of sub-
sequent evidence. 
Finally, this method of empirical inquiry in philoso-
phy does not ignore, but, on the contrary, must be completed 
by, the application of what Ducasse calls "the formal tests 
of validity" to its findings; "viz., that of internal consis-
tency of each of the definitions empirically reached and that 
of consistency of these with one another." 2 Hence, concludes 
1 Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science, p. 231. 
2 
Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 56. 
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Ducasse, all of this indicates "that the method of research 
by which philosophy attempts to answer her problems" is "as 
authentically scientific as any other science." 1 Or, put 
another way, in respect to method, philosophy, as conceived 
by Ducasse, cannot be distinguished from the natural sciences. 2 
2. Pratt's empirical approach to philosophy. J. B. 
Pratt, in his most comprehensive work, Personal Healism,J 
indicates a general approach to philosophy which bears 
marked similarities to the Ducassean view outlined above. 
To a consideration of Pratt's conception of the nature of 
philosophy, and the extent to which this general view con-
curs with that of Ducasse, we now turn. In line, of course, 
with one of the pervading, though generally tacit, questions 
of this dissertation, we shall not fail to take note of any 
differences which suggest themselves. 
Pratt approaches philosophy by offering an initial 
differentiation between two main views of the nature of phi-
losophy; namely, the rationalistic and the empirical. The 
former view, according to Pratt, finds its basis entirely in 
logical necessity and~ priori considerations; and is prima-
rily interested in what might be called the logical structure 
of the Universe. Hence, philosophy becomes a type of cosmic 
1 C. J. Ducasse, "Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie?" 
Synthese, 8 (1950-51), 274. 
2 Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 127. 
J J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism (N. Y.: The Macmillan 
Company, 1937). 
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logic by which the universal concepts or categories of Being 
may be disclosed. Philosophy, so conceived, differs from 
science only in method and not in content; and has for its 
goal absolute certainty. On the other hand, the empirical 
view of philosophy, while recognizing the logician's right 
to the ~priori, has for itself a much wider scope of inter-
est. An exclusive interest in the world of concepts is 
replaced by a more general interest in the world of empirical 
facts; a fundamental concern for the concepts of universal 
incidence is replaced·by a basic concern for the empirical 
and the existent. Philosophy, so conceived, has the task of 
explaining experience; and, in the performance of this task, 
it neither ignores the laws of logic nor fails to avail 
itself of any method which may be of assistance to it. 
Finally, having recognized the fragmentary and partial 
nature of empirical information about the real at any given 
moment, this view of philosophy contends that the only goal 
which philosophy may reasonably establish for itself is 
1 probability, and not certainty. 
Early in the work cited, Pratt clearly aligns himself 
with the empirical view, as generally characterized above. 
He feels that •two good and sufficient reasons" justify his 
acceptance of the empirical approach: first, that the word 
"philosophy" as used historically by "the best writers of 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 1-6. 
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English" has had a much broader connotation than as employed 
by the rationalist; and, secondly, that human nature "is so 
constituted that man is bound to seek for ultimate explana-
tions of his experiences and existent things and events 
which surround him." 1 Further, although science endeavours 
to provide some explanations, there remain specific problems 
so complicated and ultimate "that no science does or can 
attempt to solve them;" hence, philosophy becomes "the 
•unusually obstinate attempt' to get at the answer to these 
deep questions with the help of every device" available. 2 
With this background in mind, we may now compare the 
basic points of Pratt's acknowledged empirical position to 
the corresponding elements of Ducasse's view. The first 
observation to be made is that Pratt's acceptance of the 
empirical approach to philosophy parallels Ducasse's insist-
ence that the inquiry of which philosophy consists must be 
empirical in nature. Philosophy, for Pratt, must begin with 
the "many and diverse experiences" of which individual human 
beings are certain, and must endeavor to explain rationally 
and completely the totality of experience.3 Philosophy, for 
Ducasse, "born of the desire to settle doubts of our apprais-
als rationally, 114 must begin with empirically primitive and 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. ). 
2Ibid. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 2. 
4 Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science, p. 142. 
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unquestionable data, and must endeavor to establish empiri-
cally confirmable hypotheses or theories. As seen above, 
these proposed hypotheses turn out, in philosophy, to be 
definitions. Hence, Ducasse's repeated contention that the 
pressing problems of philosophy are, either directly or 
1 indirectly, problems of definition in no way contradicts 
Pratt's assertion that philosophy seeks "clear definition of 
all relevant matters." 2 Further, it is to be noted that 
Pratt's contention that any distinction between science and 
philosophy must be in content, not method,J bears striking 
resemblance to Ducasse's constant allegation that philosophy 
"is to be distinguished from natural science not at all in 
point of method, but only in point of subject matter.• 4 
While Pratt affirms that philosophy, like science, "makes 
use of the ••• method of rational procedure," that is, the 
method which seeks clear definition and is guided by "the use 
of self-consistent thought,•5 Ducasse contends that philoso-
phy has a distinctive method which involves the same procedure 
of observation, generalization, conjecture, and verification 
as accepted by the natural sciences. Next, in reference to 
1 Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 126. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 4. 
3Ibid. 
4 
e. g. Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, 
p. 127. 
, 5 
Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 4. 
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the possibilities of philosophy, Pratt's optimism concerning 
the knowledge-yielding capacity of philosophical inquiry1 is 
in complete accord with Ducasse 1 s persistent claim that phi-
losophy, like any of the natural sciences, is a knowledge-
seeking and knowledge-yielding enterprise. Moreover, Pratt's 
admission that "a balance of probability is the most that a 
philosopher can claim for many of his theories" 2 is in com-
plete agreement with Ducasse 1 s view that the knowledge which 
philosophy claims is probable and not absolutely certain.3 
Finally, neither Pratt nor Ducasse considers philoso-
phy's modesty of claim a source of embarrassment. Pratt 
pointedly observes that "the best that any of the sciences 
can do or ever. ·will be able to do is to point out the balance 
of probability."4 Ducasse similarly remarks that "this is no 
more a defect in philosophy than elsewhere;" that the find-
ings of philosophy are as genuinely probable as the findings 
of the natural sciences.5 
In conclusion, then, one cannot fail to recognize 
certain general resemblances which Pratt's empirical approach 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 9. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. ?. 
3Ducasse; Philosophy~~ Science, p. 231, and Nat~r~, 
Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
4 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 9. 
5nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 55-56. 
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to philosophy1 bears to that of Ducasse. The extent, if 
any, to which these likenesses may effect a sameness of 
opinion in respect to the solution of particular traditional 
problems of philosophy will, doubtless, come to light in the 
comparative discussions of the subsequent chapters. Or, to 
put the matter a little differently, Pratt's contention 
that the choice of one's view of philosophy "will determine 
in advance one's attitude toward many metaphysical problems 112 
remains to be tested. However, before proceeding to a 
critical consideration of the answers which the two philoso-
phies offer regarding specific philosophical issues, I now 
propose to offer a short critique of Ducasse 1 s conception of 
the nature and method of philosophy, in particular, and of 
the so-called "empirical inquiry" in general. 
3. Critique pf'Philosophy ~~Science'. We have 
seen above that, for Ducasse, philosophy is a science in the 
same sense in which any of the natural sciences is a science; 
namely, that the method which it espouses is capable of 
yielding the genuine knowledge which it, in fact, seeks. We 
have seen, further, that for Ducasse, philosophy as a science 
has for its primitive subject-matter, appraisals; and, hence, 
--"-- ------------------
1 Note that I am not saying that the scope of philoso-
phy is the sa~e in each. For, as we shall see, the scope is 
almost entirely semantical in Ducasse; but this is not the 
case in Pratt. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 3. 
turns out to be a kind of semantical inquiry aiming at the 
explication of value terms. 
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This scientifically-o.riented conception of philosophy 
has not gone unchallenged. To begin with, critics have been 
quick to contend that this Ducassean view of philosophy 
excludes from the realm of philosophical investigation and 
analysis, such commonly recognized "philosophical" problems 
1 
as "causality" and "reality." These terms, it is argued, 
are not ordinarily regarded as being appraisive or valua-
tional in nature and thus cannot, on Ducasse's own premises, 
be accepted as topics for philosophical scrutiny or theoriz-
ing. The question immediately arises, then: Is Ducasse 
willing to accept the point of this criticism as a legitimate 
implication of his metaphilosophy? 
Ducasse's reply, it seems to me, is an unambiguous 
"No"! Both in his fourth chapter of Nature, Mind, and Death 
and in his reply to Mr. Ledden, 2 he refuses to acknowledge 
the validity of the criticism offered. In these works, he 
points out, with his usual clarity, the frequent philoso-
phical importance of non-appraisive terms. He contends, in 
effect, that there are numerous non-appraisive terms the 
definitions of which are absolutely essential to the analysis 
1 See, for instance, the article by J. E. Ledden, 
"Questions Concerning the Metaphilosophy of C. J. Ducasse," 
Phil. Phen. Res., 6 {1946). 
2 . ~ . c. J. Ducasse, "The ~Ubject Matter Distinctive of 
Philosophy," Phil. Rh..ru!. Res., 6 (1946). 
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of other appraisive terms. The necessity for prior under-
standing of these non-appraisive terms gives rise to what 
Ducasse calls "the derivative problems of philosophy" and 
endows the same with serious philosophical significance. 
Hence, because certain non-appraisive terms represent "cate-
gories implicit in an appraisal," 1 they are, according to 
Ducasse's own hypothesis, legitimate topics for philoso-
phical investigation. 
Further, it is Ducasse's observation that there are 
many terms which, though not explicitly appraisive or evalua-
tive, turn out, on certain occasions or in specific uses, to 
function definitely, even if tacitly, as appraisive. As an 
example of this, Ducasse considers the statement that the 
style of a certain book is repetitious. The term "repeti-
tious" is not ordinarily accepted as being appraisive by 
nature: yet in this particular case, namely, as applied to 
the literary style of a given book, it may, tacitly, be 
assumed, by both hearer and utter~r, to indicate or connote 
a "bad" feature of the book's literary style. Similarly, as 
Garvin points out on Ducasse's behalf, 2 the term •real," 
though appearing unquestionably non-appraisive, sometimes 
has the signification n interesting" or ''important," and. in 
that use functions clearly as a value predicate. Thus, 
1 . Ducasse, "The Subject Matter Distinctive of Philoso-
phy, .. p. 419. 
2Lucius Garvin, "Ducasse's Carus Lectures," Phil. 
Phen. Res., 13 (1952), 58. 
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reason that Garvin suggests that "some criterion of relevance 
beyond that of use in defining value predicates is required 
for distinguishing 'derivative' philosophical questions from 
others that also arise in the process of explaining apprais-
als."1 In summary, then, it would seem that Ducasse 1 s answer 
to the initial criticism considered, though representing for 
him an apparent "way out," generates a further unexpected 
criticism, the seriousness of which challenges Ducasse 1 s 
basic view in regard to philosophy's subject-matter. 
At this point, one cannot refrain from recalling 
Ducasse's general methodology, 2 and noting, in particular, 
the deference which Ducasse pays to ordinary, commonsense 
usage of terms. As already seen, it is the examples illus-
trative of common usage which become, for Ducasse, the data 
for "empirical inquiry into the meaning of terms."3 Along 
this line, it may be pointed out, for instance, that, in the 
thir4 part of Nature, Mind, and Death, Ducasse rejects 
behaviourism principally because the word "observation" as 
defined by the behaviorists fails to include the element of 
4 introspection recognized by commonsense usage. But, ironi-
cally, the question immediately arises: In respect to 
1 Garvin, "Ducasse's Carus Lectures,~ p. 59. 
2 See section iii, part 1, of this chapter. 
3For example, see Ducasse, Nature,~~ and Death, 
4 Raphael Demos uses this example, for other purposes, 
in his critical discussion of Nature, Mind, and Death, Rev. 
~., 6 (1954), 563-582. 
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philosophical problems, does not Ducasse find himself in a 
position conspicuously comparable, if not identical, to the 
position (of the behaviourist) which he is attacking? More 
specifically, do not Ducasse's premises lead him to a concep-
tion of "primitive philosophical problems" and "derivative 
philosophical problems" hardly tolerable to the "common-usage" 
approach which he espouses? Consider, for example, the above 
hypothesis that the understanding of the term •sense-organs" 
is prerequisite to the understanding of the term "beauty. • 
As already indicated, on Ducasse 1 s premises the defining of 
"sense-organs" consequently takes on the status of a 11 deriva-
tive problem of philosophy." But, is this in keeping with 
the common usage approach? Or, to put the matter a little 
differently, if Ducasse himself were to embark upon his swn 
methodological inquiry into the meaning of "the derivative 
problems of philosophy," would be accept as a representative 
or common sample of this expression, the problem of sense-
organs? I think not. In fact~ I should venture to submit 
that, at this particular point, Ducasse•s respect for common-
sense, on the one hand, and his earlier premises concerning 
the primitive problems of philosophy, on the other, are clearly 
at odds. Respect for common usage preyents a consideration 
of "sense-organs" from entering the orbit of Ducasse•s genu-
inely philosophical problems: attention to Ducasse•s concep-
tion of primitive philosophical problems makes possible the 
related consideration of "sense-organs• as a "derivative 
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problem" upon whose solution primitive problems might seman-
tically depend. How these two implications can be reconciled 
is, I believe, a serious problem in Ducasse. 
Another pointed question concerning Ducasse 1 s attempt 
to give to philosophy a scientific methodology is raised by 
Cornelius Benjamin in his rather extensive discussion1 of 
Nature, Mind, and Death. He begins by supposing that he were 
to offer to one of Ducasse•s scientifically-oriented philoso-
phers a list of statements in which he uses a specific word 
repeatedly. Ducasse's philosophical analysis would, sub-
sequently, according to Benjamin, presume to tell him what 
meaning of the repeated word would best explain his usage. 
"But," says Benjamin, "suppose I ins 1st that this meaning is 
quite other than I had supposed myself to have in mind when 
I employed the word." "Or, more desperately," continues 
Benjamin, "suppose I insist that the meaning he proposes does 
not make sense." In the case of the latter, let us assume, 
further, says Benjamin, that the proposed definition neither 
explains "my former usage," nor explains "the usage of any-
one, except perhaps that of the philosopher who is making 
the proposal." With these hypothetical considerations in 
mind, Benjamin then asks the question which concisely sum-
marizes his difficulty with Ducasse: "Must I meekly accept 
the results of his analysis, even though it makes my former 
1 
A. Cornelius Benjamin, Phil. Rev., 61 (1952), pp. 
551-556. 
statements appear absurd; or am I permitted to insist that 
he provide me with some meaning more in accord with common 
usage?" 1 
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It seems to me that, from the point of view of 
Ducasse's scientific methodology, the answer to this ques-
tion is quite clear. Ducasse 1 s methodology would, techni-
cally, refuse to acknowledge the validity of any definition 
which eould not be substituted for the word under analysis, 
in the statements offered as "data." In Ducasse 1 s own words, 
"a definition is good if and only if it is exactly equivalent 
to the term defined; and "the test of the adequacy of any 
definition that occurs to us will consist in the possibility 
of replacing the term defined by the definition proposed, in 
any of the sample statements taken as 1data. 1 " 2 Hence, in 
Benjamin's example above, if the philosopher's hypothetical 
definition is not substitutable for the term under scrutiny, 
in all the statements offered as data, then it would, unam-
biguously, fail to meet Ducasse 1 s criterion of adequacy; and, 
accordingly, there would be absolutely no need, on Benjamin's 
part, to "accept meekly" the results of the philosopher's 
analysis. In fact, on the contrary, consistency with Ducasse 1s 
1 . Quotes in this paragraph are all taken from article 
cited, pp. 554-555. 
2 
Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 65. 
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premises would compel Benjamin to reject the arbitrary defini-
1 tion proposed. 
In passing, it is interesting to note the readiness 
with which Ducasse's premises have afforded an answer to 
Benjamin's problem. To Benjamin's concluding question, for 
instance, "Am I permitted to insist that he provide me with 
some meaning more in accord with common usage?", Ducasse has 
implied an emphatic affirmative reply. Theoretically, in 
fact, it might fairly be said that Ducasse's proposed method-
ology has necessitated, on his part, the upholding of a 
position that would refuse to accept as valid any defini-
tion which failed, during methodological analysis, to take 
into account "common usage" of the term. In his exemplary 
analysis of the term "cause," for instance, this point comes 
out clearly: "I take it," he says, "that the usage of the 
term 1 cause 1 we are now interested to analyze is not any of 
1 I am aware of the fact that the answer which I pro-
pose does not seem to be in accord with Ducasse's own reply 
to Benjamin, in the Philosoohical Review, LXIII (54), pp. 
88-91. I believe, however, that the perspective from which 
I see Benjamin's question and rejoinder justifies the rather 
simplified answer offered. My answer, despite Ducasse's 
earlier claim that his test is objective, is based on my 
impression that Ducass~'s test of "substitutability" or 
"adequacy" could not be performed without giving an ear to 
the intended meaning of the term under question, in the data 
offered. To put the matter in the form of a rhetorical ques-
tion, How could the analytic philosopher determine whether 
or not his prooosed definition could be substituted for the 
term under consideration in all of the data, unless he first 
inquired as to the intended meaning of the term as used by 
the utterer in those data, that is, as to whether or not the 
proposed definition "makes sense" in the standard examples 
analyzed? 
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the odd usages it may happen to have in the language of 
crude or careless speakers or of deliberate innovators, but 
is its ordinary, common usage.• 1 In view of this, and to 
revert to the point of an earlier criticism, is it not per-
plexing that Ducasse, having indicated so lucidly the alleged 
place of common usage in philosophical analysis, should turn 
up with a definition of "primitive philosophical problems, • 
for instance, neither consistent with, nor explanatory of, 
common, ordinary, usage? 
To elucidate would involve unnecessary repetition. 
But, in conclusion, might we not simply suggest that, in 
regard to his consideration of philosophical problems, in 
general, Ducasse, himself, seems inadvertently to have assumed 
the rqle of "deliberate innovator?" Which brings to mind a 
rather relevant comment which Ducasse makes in the final 
chapter of his first book, Causation and the Types of Neces-
sity. Says he, "It is one thing to be able to describe 
scientific method, or even to be able to use it in the field 
of the sciences, and quite another thing to practice it in 
the field of philosophy.•2 
Before ending this short critique of Ducasse's meta-
philosophy, I should like to challenge Ducasse's claim, on 
page 55 of Nature, Mind, and Death, 3 that his 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 103. 
2 Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 122. 
3Quotes in this paragraph are taken from this page. 
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"substitutability" test of the validity of any proposed 
definition is an objective one. "Let it be noted," he says, 
"that this test is objective in that it can be performed by 
persons other than the maker of the listed statements. •• As 
implied in my long footnote on p. 28, I cannot see the basis 
or justification for such an allegation. My question, in 
brief, is this: Assuming that the data for a particular 
semantical analysis are the listed statements of a given 
person X, on what grounds can any person other than X qualify 
to determine whether or not a hypothetical definition "is 
substitutable for the term in those statements without alter-
ing any of their standard implications?" It would seem to 
me that only X, the maker or utterer of the listed statements, 
would know the meaning which·he had attached to the term used 
in the selected samples; and, hence, that he alone could 
ascertain definitely whether or not the proposed definition 
would 11 fit 11 in all his statements. If this assumption is 
valid, it is my contention that Ducasse 1 s so-called test of 
validity is clearly subjective, and not entitled to the mark 
of scientific objectivity. 
Ducasse, of course, would refuse to accept my objec-
tion. He would hurriedly point out his subsequent conten-
tion, on the page cited above, that X's "own possible declara-
tion of what he means b.r the term concerned is a declaration 
only of the sense in which he intends to use it or believes 
he has used it, and does not guarantee that his actual usage 
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of it will or did conform to his declared intention.u But, 
to my mind, this allegation does no more than to invite a 
further, though obviously parallel, critical question, 
namely, On what basis or by what philosophical prerogative 
can an objective spectator Y presume to tell X whether or 
not his uactualu usage of a term conformed to his "intendedu 
usage of it? Indeed, it would seem to me undeniable that X, 
as utterer or maker of the statement(s), would himself be 
the authoritative judge as to whether or not his "actual" 
usage of a term happened to accord with his "intended" usage 
of it. And, for tv:is reason, I should think that, upon 
examination, Ducasse's proposed reply does little to cor-
roborate his contention, but, ironically, represents a 
further basis for calling into question the legitimacy of 
his allegedly "objective" test of validity in semantical 
inquiry. 
In terminating, I should like to say that I have 
tried to indicate and evaluate some of the representative 
criticisms which have been, or may be, directed towards 
Ducasse's conception of the nature and method of philosophy. 
Although I have had, and still have, serious misgivings con-
cerning the complete soundness and practicability of Ducasse's 
proposed methodology, I do not fail to recognize the out-
standing contribution which Ducasse has made to the search 
for a scientifically precise and verifiably accurate phi-
losophical method. Contemporary philosophy, in particular, 
has been conspicuous in its demand for such a method. Ducasse 
has, painstakingly, endeavoured to devise a scientific 
procedure for philosophy, and his result is hardly without 
respectability and worth. Further, as Murphy has pointed 
out, his "philosophy as a science" represents "a proposal 
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to use procedures warranted as scientific to solve the hard 
but perennial problems of philosophy, not to provide excuses 
for ignoring them. 111 The subsequent chapters will, I think, 
give substance to this contention. 
l . . A. E. Murphy, "Ducasse 1 s Theory of Appraisals 11 Phil. 
Phen. Res., 13(1952), l-14. Note that Murphy's remark here 
is also intended to disparage the approach of the logical 
positivist. 
CHAPTER II 
SUBSTANCE AND EXISTENCE 
As indicated in the previous chapter, J. B. Pratt has 
c c;ntended that one 1 s choice of one 1 s general view of philoso-
phy "will determine in advance one's a ttl tude toward many 
metaphysical problems." 1 Having seen the approach to phi-
losophy adopted, individually, by Ducasse and Pratt, we 
shall, in this chapter, begin to test the soundness of 
Pratt's assertion. More specifically, having observed some 
marked similarities between the metaphilosophies of the two 
men, we shall be interested in learning whether or not, as 
Pratt would lead us to expect, their subsequent views regard-
ing metaphysical problems also bear conspicuous resemblances. 
The problems, the proposed solutions to which we shall be con-
sidering in this chapter, have, historically, been referred 
to as the problem of Substance and the problem of Existence. 
Hence, in keeping with the general approach of this disserta-
tion, this chapter will, primarily, involve an expositton and 
critique of the two writers' answers to these problems. 
1. Historical introduction to the problem .of Substance. 
As Pratt points out in his introductory remarks concerning 
2 substance, there is, perhaps, no term in the history of 
1 Pratt; Personal Realism, p. 3. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 64. 
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philosophy which has stood out so prominently, which has had 
such an eventful history, which has been subjected to such 
striking contrasts, as the term "substance." Generally 
speaking, in all major philosophical writings from Aristotle 
to Kant, no one term seems to have commanded more attention. 
In brief, the concept of substance is that of a per-
manent substratum preserved through all changes; and this 
concept seems clearly to owe its origin to common sense 
observation and reasoning. For, as Pratt indicated, "as 
soon as men got beyond the perceptual and purely practical 
stage and began to reflect upon their experiences they were 
faced with what seemed to be two undeniable and puzzling 
facts. II "The first of these was the observation that . . . 
things have qualities, and the second the conviction that 
change involves something that changes." Now if it is true 
that things do have qualities, a distinction between the 
things and the qualities is suggested; and if there is some-
thing that changes, that something must be at least relatively 
1 permanent. 
Substance first receives its name in the philosophy 
of Aristotle. Aristotle seems to think of a substance as an 
individual thing--an individual thing entire with its quali-
ties. Substance, for Aristotle, implies qualities but these 
qualities "are not something outside it which it needs in 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 64. 
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addition to itself;" 1 rather, they are mere abstractions 
which can exist only in a substance. This does not mean, 
however, that a substance ~ exist without qualities while 
qualities cannot exist without substance. For, as Ross so 
pointedly puts it, "A qualityless substance (in Aristotle) 
is as impossible as a quality which does not presuppose a 
substance." 
Concerning the traditional debate as to whether or not 
substance implies an "unknown somewhat" underlying all quali-
ties, Aristotle clearly sides with the "plain, common sense 
man," so to speak. A substance is for him "a unity involving 
not only qualities but also a surd or unknown element which 
he calls matter or substratum." And it must be noted that 
it is the fact of change which impels Aristotle to differ-
entiate between quality and substance. A quality cannot 
change: it simply is what it is and cannot become anything 
else. Only another quality can succeed it. Hence, for 
Aristotle, "if there is such a thing as change, as distinct 
from bare succession, there must be substance as distinct 
from qualities." 
Generally speaking, the scholastic view of substance 
is a prepetuation of Aristotle's conception. Only in the 
earlier philosophies of the Continent do we find a decisive 
1 . William D. Ross, Artstotle (London: Methuen & Company, 
Ltd.), pp. 165-167. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations 
on Aristotle are taken from these pages. 
turn as regards the doctrine of substance. For one thing, 
the Continental philosophers emphasized progressively the 
function of substance as substratum. For Descartes, a sub-
stance is "an existent thing which requires nothing but 
itself in order to exist." And, "to speak truth, nothing 
but God answers to this description as being that which is 
1 
absolutely self-sustaining." However, Descartes adds, mind 
and mat_tu may also, in a sense, be regarded as substances, 
since they need only the concurrence of God in order to exist. 
Both mind and matter are complete and self-sustaining, and 
each has a fundamental, principal attribute, respectively 
thought and extension. Moreover, both mind and matter are 
created by God and are continually dependent on Him for their 
existence. Hence, we have a distinction in Descartes between 
an absolutely independent substance,God, on the one hand, 
and two relative, created, dependent substances, mind and 
matter, on the other hand. 
Another significant turn is given to the problem of 
substance by the critical analysis of cognition which begins 
with the British philosophers Locke and Hume. The character-
istic of this turn lies in the fact that the weight of the 
problem is transferred from the realm of metaphysics to that 
1R. Descartes, Selections (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1927), p. 275. 
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of epistemology." The general contention of this new 
approach is that the concept of substance is not derivable 
from experience. 
Locke begins with the assumption that "simple ideas•• 
are the atoms of which all our knowledge is constituted. 
These simple ideas are either ideas of sensations (for 
example, colors, sounds, tastes, etcJ, ideas of reflection 
(for example, thinking, doubting, believing, etc.), or ideas 
of both sensation and reflection (for example, pain, pleasure, 
unity, etc.). The mind can neither create nor destroy these 
simple ideas; but it is able to combine them. Locke calls 
the resulting combinations 0 complex ideas.•• And the concept 
of substance, Locke insists, is representative of such a 
combination. Says Locke: "Our specific ideas of substances 
are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of 
2 
simple ideas, considered as united in one thing." 
But it must be noted that, according to Locke, our 
"complex idea" of a substance includes within its combina-
tion a simple idea about whic;h little or nothing can be said, 
namely, an idea of an "unknown substratum0 in which all quali-
ties inhere. In other words, Locke contends that if we think 
1E. Cassirer, "Substance," Encycl. Brit. 21 (1956), 
501. See also Cassirer 1 s book, Sub§tance and Function and 
Einstein 1s Theory of Relativity (Chicago: The Open Court 
Publishing Co., 1923). 
2J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Book 2, chapter 23, section 14. 
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of any object whatever as existing by itself and not as a 
quality of something else, we will immediately ascertain that 
our complex idea of it includes not only a combination of 
various simple ideas considered as qualities, but a simple 
idea of a substratum in which the qualities inhere. 1 
Carrying Locke's empiricism to its logical extreme 
Hume denies entirely the reality of substance. If the idea 
of substance were a genuine idea, it would have to be 
derived from either the impressions of sensation or the 
impressions of reflection. But clearly, asserts Hume, the 
idea of substance does not come from any of the senses (for 
example, it is neither a sound nor a taste nor a color.) 
And, on the other hand, the "impressions of reflexion resolve 
themselves into passions and emotions; none of which can pos-
si bly represent a substance. 11 Hence, "we have therefore no 
idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of par-
ticular qualities." Or, to elucidate: "The idea of sub-
stance ••• is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, 
that are united by the imagination, and have a particular 
name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either 
2 to ourselves or others, that collection." 
1 W. K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 15. 
2 All quotes in this paragraph are taken from: D. 
Hume, A~ Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (LaSalle: 
The Open Court Publishing Company, 1956), p. 237. 
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With the perspective of this historical background to 
the problem, we may now examine the views of "substance" 
offered by Ducasse and Pratt. Let us turn, first, to 
Ducasse's treatment of the topic. 
2. Ducasse's application Q[ hi~ method to the problems 
of Substance and Existence. Ducasse 1 s conception of philoso-
phy examined in the preceding chapter implies that the prob-
lems of Substance and Existence, like all other philoso-
phical problems, are essentially semantical and, hence, can 
re solved only by application of what Ducasse has offered as 
It the method of empirical inquiry into the meaning of terms .•• 1 
Accordingly, in the exposition which follows, the attempt 
will be made to relate, as much as possible, the particular 
problems being considered to the principles of this proposed 
methodology. In tnis way, it is hoped that the modus 
2perandi of Ducasse's method will be further illustrated. 
i. The problem of Substance for Ducasse. Although 
Ducasse does not preclude the possibtlity of eventually 
adopting a traditional definition (e.g. Aristotle's) of 
substance, he readily recognizes the fact that his "scien-
tific method" refuses to allow the uncritical acceptance of 
any definition which represents only a purported solution to 
the problem. In non-arbitrary, scientific investigation, we 
must begin with data, not purported solutions; and the data 
of any genuine philosophical problem, according to Ducasse, 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
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must be statements involving •standard" usages of the term 
to be analyzed. Hence, in reference to the problem of sub-
stance, Ducasse points out that the data must consist of 
standard statements such as "Water is a substance," "Copper 
is a substance," "Education is not a substance," and the 
like. On the basis of these data, it is Ducasse's expressed 
task "to discover a definition of the term Substance that 
will explicate the meaning it has when applied to and denied 
of things of the kinds those standard predications of it 
exemplify." 1 In short, then, it might be said that, for 
Ducasse, the ba_sic problem in regard to substance might be 
expressed by this question: What precisely does it mean, 
in, ordinary language, to call something a "substance?•2 
ii. Ducasse's hypothesis concerning the nature of 
~ubstance. Immediately, it must be noted that a precise 
hypothesis concerning the "meaning" of "substance" is nowhere 
to be found in Ducasse. To Ducasse's allegedly essential 
question: What exactly does it mean to call something a 
"substance?", Ducasse offers a hypothesis concerning the 
nature of a substance. Without embarking upon a painstaking 
analysis of the meaning of "meaning," and without questioning 
the interchangeability of the words "meaning" and "nature," 
we must, I believe, simply assume that, in respect to the 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 162. 
2 Ducasse, Na_ture, Mind, and Death, p. 163. 
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problem of substance, Ducasse is using the two words syn-
onymously. However, the legitimate question concerning the 
justification for such an identification will appear in a 
later section of this chapter. 
What then is the nature of substance for Ducasse? 
Ducasse summarizes his view very concisely in the following 
words: "The hypothesis I offer is that the nature of a sub-
stance, irrespective of whether instances of 1i exist QL not, 
analyzes into properties and ~elations of properties; and in 
substances that have parts, the properties of the substance 
depend on the properties and relations of its parts.•1 Of 
course, the key to the understanding of this hypothesis is 
the meaning of the word "property." Hence, for the sake of 
clarity, we must endeavour to discern the specific sense in 
which Ducasse uses that word. 
Ducasse makes it clear that he does not follow those 
writers who use the term 11 property"_to designate anything 
predicable of a substance. 2 Rather, respecting the usage of 
it adopted by the natural sciences, he chooses a narrower 
sense of the word. He says, "It is that in which, for 
instance, ductility is said to be a property of silver, com-
bustibility a property of paper, hardness a property_of 
diamond, bitterness a property of quinine, and so on.•3 
1Ibid. 
2 Nature, Mind, and Death, 163. Ducasse, p. 
3nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 164. 
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Properties used in this sense turn out, essentially, to be 
"causal capacities." This may be illustrated by the follow-
ing examples: To say of a substance (e.g. quinine) that it 
possesses the property of bitterness, is to say, in effect, 
that the contact of that substance with the tongue, under 
normal conditions, causes the person involved to experience 
1 the taste-quality called "bitter." To use another illustra-
tion, to say of carborundum that it is abrasive is to say, in 
effect, that under specified conditions, friction of it 
against certain other solids causes those solids to wear 
2 away. Clearly, in each of these examples, the property 
ascribed to a particular substance represents more than an 
unqualified predicable; it represents a predicable the dif-
ferentia of which is a capacity 1Q cause in stipula-
circumstances, a specific effect. It is exactly this con-
notation which Ducasse gives to the term "property." 
Hence, having gained light on Ducasse•s meaning of the 
word "property," we may now infer that, for Ducasse, sub-
stance turns out to designate a system) of inter-related 
causal capacities. And, in line with the hypothesis as 
expressed above, it may be noted that, according to Ducasse, 
in those substances which have parts, the parts themselves 
1 Ibid. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 165. 
J"Some Observations Concerning Particularity8 Phil. 
Rev., 53 (1949), 613. 
. 1 
must also be acknowledged in terms of systematically con-
nected properties. For example, the parts of a piece of 
chalk are themselves pieces of chalk, and thus, substances. 
Further, the parts of a typewriter, for instance, though not 
themselves typewriters, are still individual substances, 
analyzable into their own individual properties and the rela-
tions of these properties. 2 Finally, it is to be noticed 
that Ducasse•s hypothesis maintains that in both of these 
exemplary cases, that is to say, more generally, in both 
the homeomercus and the heteromerous substance, the proper-
ties of the whole are dependent on the properties and rela-
tions of its parts.3 
Prior to the conclusion of this exposition, addi-
tional emphasis must be focused upon one other aspect of 
Ducasse•s hypothesis concerning •substance.• It must be 
understood that, for Ducasse, a substance is not necessarily 
an existent. 4 The fact of the matter is that Ducasse 1 s 
conception of the nature of substance is entirely indifferent 
to existence; or, put another way, his hypothesis concerning 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 165. 
2These two examples are intended to bring out Ducasse's 
distinction between divisive (or homeomerous) and indivisive 
(or heteromerous) whole substances. See Ducasse, Nat~, 
Mind, and Death, p. 166. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 166~ 
4 The meaning of "to exist" for Ducasse will be made 
clear in the next subheading •. 
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any given particular substance is completely independent of 
whether or not that substance exists. Says Ducasse, 
'Gold, 1 'horses, 1 'water,' are the names of kinds of 
substances, and instances of each of these exist. On 
the other hand, 'phlogiston,• 'centaurs, 1 'the elixir 
of life' are likewise the names of certain kinds of 
substances, but no instances of any of them exist. Yet, 
in both cases equally, it remains possible to define, 
in terms of certain properties systematically connected, 
the kinds of substances meant by those words.l 
This point, namely, that a substance is not necessarily an 
existent, cannot be over-stressed; for it is crucial to the 
comprehension of Ducasse 1 s notion of substance, and, as we 
shall observe within the development of this chapter, pro-
vides a serious challenge to the view of substance upheld by 
Pratt. 
Of course, this rather unorthodox aspect of Ducasse 1 s 
view of substance leads one to ponder the sense in which 
Ducasse is using the verb "to exist." Is it possible that 
Ducasse is employing the term in an unusually narrow, arbi-
trary, or unconventional sense? To a methodological account 
of Ducasse 1 s view of existence, we may now turn. 
iii. What it means •to exist.• Ducasse is quick to 
point out that the question "What is it 1 to exist'?" is too 
often presumed to be synonymous with the question °What is 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 166. The 
underlining is my own. 
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it 'to be real'?", 1 and that his proposed scientific method-
ology refuses to accept such an arbitrary identification. 2 
To him, the meaning of "to exist" represents an autonomous 
and distinct problem, requiring a methodological scrutiny of 
sample statements in which "exists" has occurred in "ordinary 
English" usage.3 
Ducasse begins his empirical inquiry into the meaning 
of "to exist" by restricting his initial attention to those 
cases which refer, specifically, to physical existence, as 
distinguished, for example, from mathematical or psychologi-
cal existence. Illustrations of the data to be analyzed, in 
increasing degrees of determinateness, might be the following: 
Brick buildings exist; a library exists on the other side of 
the street; a wooden table exists here (in this specific 
place) now. 
On the basis of such data as these, it is Ducasse's 
hypothesis that to assert "that there exists something of a 
1 It is to be noted that an empirical inquiry into the 
meaning of "to be real" leads Ducasse to recognize that •ito 
be real" is often used synonymously with "to exist" {e.g. 
"The fountain of youth is not real• is intended to mean "The 
fountain of youth does not exist.") Ducasse's point, here, 
however, is that the two expressions cannot be equated prior 
to an empirical inquiry into their meanings. It turns out, 
moreover, that, generically speaking, Ducasse means by "being 
real," "having existence in an order-system relevant to some 
specified interest." ("On Our Knowledge of Existents," Pro-
ceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, 
p. 2. 
2Ducasse, Philosophy~£ Science, p. 235. 
3oucasse, "Reality, Science, and Metaphysics," p. 13. 
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(physical) kind K is ••• exactly synonymous with the 
assertion that something of that kind~ somewhere; that is, 
occupies~ place in space at~ time." 1 In other words, 
it is Ducasse 1 s contention that existential assertions of the 
type illustrated above invariably assert that a given "what" 
is ~ at, or ~ obtains at, a given spatial location (a 
"where••) which has varying degrees of determinateness. 2 
Accordingly, physical existence turns out, for Ducasse, to 
be, essentially, spatiotemporal ubiety.3 
Ducasse next considers cases where what is in view is 
clearly mathematical existence rather than physical. That 
a square root of 9 exists, that a square root of 5 does not 
exist, that a cube root of 27 exists, that a cube root of 11 
does not exist, are assertions exemplary of these cases. And 
it is Ducasse 1 s claim that the meaning of existence here is 
closely analagous to the meaning of physical existence. The 
only significant difference, Ducasse maintains, is that the 
"place• involved in mathematical existence belongs to some 
order other than the spatiotemporal order. Hence, the joint 
assertion that the cube root of 27 exists, while the cube 
root of 11 does not, mean~ that the character "being cube 
root of 27• characterizes a definite locus or position in 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 71. 
2 Ducasse, 11 Reality, Science, and Metaphysics, 11 p. 14. 
3nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 71. 
4? 
the order of whole numbers; namely, the determinate place 
called 3, while the character "being cube root of 11" does 
not characterize any place in the series of whole numbers. 1 
In a manner which hardly seems in keeping with his 
proposed methodology, Ducasse uses these limited considera-
tions as the sole basis for his hypothesis concerning exist-
ence, in general. That is to say, on the strength of his 
scrutiny of existential assertions referring to physical and 
mathematical existence alone, Ducasse, with questionable 
presumption, proffers a &tn_erJ..Q. view of existence. He says: 
In any assertion of existence, thus, no matter whether 
it be more particularly one of physical existence, or of 
mathematical, or psychological, or other existence, two 
components always essentially are involved, namely a what 
and a where. And generally a where or place is the sort 
of thing specifiable in terms of ordinal relations; that 
is, of relations such as between, next to, beyond, among, 
outside of, and so on, which logically, are not specifi-
cally either spatial or temporal, since there is such a 
thing, for instance, as qualitative betweenness. _The 
colour orange is qualitatively between red and yellow, 
even when it is not placed spatially between them.2 
Accordingly, to the question, What_doe~ it mean "to 
exist?", Ducasse may be said to answer, "• •• To say that 
something exists means that some set of characters specified 
in a definition is present at some place in an indication 
system.") Or, more generally, to say that something exists, 
means, for Ducasse, that it obtains in some order-system--
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, ~Death, p. 72. 
2Ibi,d. See also -"Reality, Science, and Metaphysics," 
p. 14. 
3oucasse, "On Our Knowledge of Existents,M p. 4. 
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and that order-system need not be a space-time one. To the 
question: What exactly does Ducasse mean when he maintains 
that instances of a substance need not exist?, Ducasse might 
be reported to reply, "I mean, essentially, that the proper-
ties of capacities in terms of which certain kinds of sub-
stances are individually defined, do not necessarily have a 
1 place in any ordfnal system. 
In conclusion, then, for Ducasse, existence generally 
means "presence at a place in an order-system, of a set of 
characters." 2 And it must be noted, in passing, that Exist-
ence is not to be equated with Reality in Ducasse. Existing 
and Being Real are distinct notions. "Being Real is a status 
always relative ~o gn interest, and consists in existence3 
in an order-system relevant to that interest."4 
2. Pratt's interpretation of Substance and Existence. 
The Ducassean conceptions of Substance and Existence having 
been exposed, we shall now proceed to a consideration of the 
same topics in Pratt. Our examination shall be approached 
in such a way as to bring out the significant similarities 
and differences between the hypotheses of the two men. 
1 See Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 167; also 
"On Our Knowledge of Existents, • p. 3~ 
2 Ducasse, "On Our Knowledge of Existents," p. 5. 
)Underlining is my own. 
4 Ducasse, "On Our Knowledge of Existents," p. 4. 
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i. Pratt's characterization of •substance.• Very 
much in evidence during a study of Pratt's view of substance 
is a pervading Aristotelian influence. 1 In contrast to 
Ducasse's conception of "substance," i.e., to the view that 
the nature of substance analyzes into properties and rela-
tions of properties, it is Pratt's hypothesis that "the two 
essential differentia" of substance "are existence and sub-
stantivity.2 Following Aristotle, Pratt's contention is, in 
other words, that a substance is not an essence, but an 
existent, not an adjective or quality, but a substantiye. 
In fact, Pratt offers, a "substance" might well be defined 
as an "existent substantive" or a "substantive existent." 
And, moreover, Pratt asserts, "Unless we use the word exist-
ent in some unusual sense, we may properly equate existent 
thing with substance, and say that all existent things are 
substances and all substances existent things.3 
To grasp adequately Pratt's definition of substance, 
one must first understand the specific senses in which the 
key words "existent" and "substantivett are employed by Pratt. 
Pratt's view of "existent" will be examined under the next 
subheading of this chapter division. Pratt's connotation of 
substantive is, hence, oun immediate concern. 
1 For Aristotle's view of substance, see historical 
introduction to this chapter. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 67 . 
• 3Ibid. 
It is quite clear that Pratt's attraction to the 
Aristotelian conception of substance leads ~im to use the 
word "substantivity" to signify the characteristic "inde-
pendence" of a substance. In fact, Pratt affirms that all 
substantives possess a certain "degree of independence" 
which enables Pratt to speak of "degrees" or "varying 
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grades" of substance. Two remarks bear this out rather well. 
On the one hand, Pratt says, "In existence, of course, sub-
stances do not differ from each other; there are n2 degrees 
of existence." On the other hand, Pratt submits: 
Plainly substances differ in the degree of independ-
~ they possess. 'This white• or this 'peal of 
thunder' have barely enough of independence~ be called 
substantive and to be substances. They are what I shall 
call substances Of a-very low grade.l 
Hence, it appears entirely unambiguous that by substantivity 
Pratt means, to use his own words, "relative independence 
requisite to substantiality," that is to say, fundamental 
independence without which any alleged "substance• would 
not be a substance. 2 
At this point, however, one must be careful not to 
misinterpret Pratt's theory of substance. The identification 
of substantivity with independence might, all too easily, 
be taken to imply the possibility of a "qualityless sub-
stance" in Pratt. In other words, Pratt's contention to 
the effect that substances can, in varying degrees, "stand 
1 Underlining is my own. 
2All quotes in this paragraph are taken from Personal 
Realism, p. 68. 
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on their own feet," might hurriedly be inferred to represent 
substance as a fundamental, and perhaps unknowable, X, which 
stands under or holds up its attributes, but which might be 
separated from its attributes and replaced by another sub-
stance. Yet this inference would involve a serious misin-
terpretation. For Pratt unequivocally disassociates himself 
from such a view. He writes, "The view I am suggesting • 
• • 
does net identify substance with an unknowable X divorced from 
qualities •••• There is no qualityless substance. A sub-
stance is always at least an existent group of relatively 
unified and existent qualities.• 1 That is to say, for 
Pratt, as for Aristotle, a substance is a thing entire with 
its qualities, and never exists without qualities. Hence, 
it must be concluded that when Pratt asserts that every sub-
stance can be differentiated by the independence (sub-
stantivity) it possesses, he is by no means intending to sug-
gest that the independence of which he speaks involves exist-
ence apart from qualities. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the precise 
sense in which Pratt does ascribe independence to substance 
is neither clear nor explicit. Nowhere does he give a 
detailed account of what it means for a substance to "stand 
on its own feet," or to have independence. One rather 
indirect illustration provides some enlightenment. Pratt 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 70. 
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points out that qualities--such as blue--are not substances 
because they are not existent, but that this patch of blue, 
or, even more simply, this blue, is a substance because it 
is an existent. 1 From this, we may also derive that the 
quality blue_, for example, is not independent; that, rather, 
it is an essence or universal, dependent entirely on its 
being exemplified or being exercised, so to speak, by an 
existent thing. In contrast to blue, on the other hand, 
this blue, or, more definitely, this patch of blue, is an 
existent, is an exemplification in the realm of existence 
and, as such, 1£ "relatively independent.• Moreover, there 
is also reason to believe that Pratt's use of "relatively 
independent," herP, might, at least partially, connote 
"relative completeness;" for Pratt maintains elsewhere that 
the only "fully independent" substance is the "Whole of 
Reality." It alone, he maintains, is an "absolutely com-
plete2 substance;" it alone (to use Spinozistic terminology) 
is "in itself and is conceived through itself.") 
Despite this lack of clarity concerning Pratt's 
notion of "independence" as applied to substance, we are 
still able to see a number of basic points of comparison 
between Pratt's and Ducasse's conception of substance. 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 67-68. 
2Underlining is my own. 
)Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 68. 
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First of all, as already noted, Pratt's making "exist-
1 
ence" a necessary characteristic of substance differs 
radically from the relevant position taken by Ducasse. 
Ducasse, it may be remembered, affirms emphatically that his 
definition of a substance is entirely irrespective of 
whether or not instances of it exist. Fut another way, 
then, for Pratt existence is, by his own contention, a dif-
ferentia of substance, while for Ducasse it clearly is not. 
Of course, we have not, as yet, examined Pratt's view of 
"existence." We must not, therefore, preclude the .12.Q§.-
sibility that differences concerning the two authors' views 
of existence may make inevitable their disagreement concern-
ing the relation between substance and existence. 
Next, it must be pointed out that Pratt's assertion 
that "A substance is always at least an existent group of 
relatively unified and existent qualities," 2 and Ducasse's 
statement that "· •• the nature of substance analyzes into 
properties and relations of properties,.".3 are much more 
compatible than one would hurriedly infer them to be. My 
point may be made clearer by another quotation from Pratt. 
Immediately following the statement quoted above, Pratt 
says, in reference to substance, "The qualities or characters 
1 Pratt's view of "existence" Will be considered in 
the next subheading. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 70 • 
.3Ducasse, Natur~, Mind, and Death, p. 16.3. 
which belong to it are of two sorts--intrinsic and rela-
tional."1 Now, taking both of Pratt's remarks together, I 
find that, overlooking terminological differences, Pratt's 
analysis of substance bears marked resemblances to Ducasse 1 s 
property--relation analysis. It is true that Ducasse dis-
tinguishes sharply between a "property" and a "quality," that 
he repudiates the assignment of "qualities" to substance, 
and that he does not call relation a ~quality." But this 
does not mean that Ducasse and Pratt are necessarily in 
fundamental disagreement. In fact, there is evidence to 
indicate that, to a noticeable degree, Pratt characterizes 
11
,quali ty," as it applies to substance, in a manner reminiscent 
of Ducas se 1 s characterization of "-property." More precisely, 
Pratt calls the non-relational •qualities" of substance, 
"intrinsic characters."2 Ducasse would not disagree. He 
would simply go further. Specifically, he would define 
even these "intrinsic characters" by their "capacity to 
cause." 
Further, the fact that Pratt explicitly refers to 
relations as "qualities" and Ducasse does not, is hardly of 
primary importance. The more basic consideration is certainly 
whether or not Pratt and Ducasse are using "relation" in the 
same sense. And, in a general way, it ~ight be said that for 
both philosophers "relation" represents part of the analytic 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 70. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 29-30. 
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structure of substance and designates an entity in terms of 
which "qualities" (in Pratt's sense) or "properties" (in 
Ducasse's sense) of a substance may be said to be inter-
connected or unified. 
However, a more detailed comparison of "relation" in 
the two philosophers is hardly feasible. Although the natu~e 
of relation is scrutinized rather painstakingly in Pratt, it 
is simply taken for granted in Ducasse. It is Pratt's con-
tention "that to understand what a relation ••• is, we 
must go to experience." And in going to experience, Pratt 
maintains, "we find that terms not only have intrinsic 
qualities but that they are somehow different when taken 
with other terms than they would be all alone; different in 
one group from what they are in others." To illustrate, we 
find that a pencil is shorter than when experienced next to 
a yardstick but longer than when found next to a rubber 
eraser. On the basis of this type of "experiential" exam-
ination of relations, Pratt indicates his support of Royce's 
commended description of relation; namely, that "a relation 
is a character which a term gets by being a member of a 
1 group." 
It must be noted, however, that this form of express-
ing the nature of relation is not accepted by Pratt as a 
definition of "relation." For definition, in Pratt, means 
1All quotes in this paragraph are taken from Pratt, 
Personal Realism, p. 33. 
either "analysis into ultimate qualities (which are univer-
sals) or indication by means of relations." 1 In view of the 
fact that "relation" is here the definiendum, "relation" 
obviously cannot be defined according to Pratt's second mean-
ing of definition. Further, since relation is taken, by 
Pratt, to be an experiential ''simple," and since simples are 
unanalyzable "for the very reason that they are simple," 
then relation is not definable in Pratt's "strict sense of 
definition as analysis." 2 Hence, relation in Pratt is 
incapable of definition in either of his two accepted mean-
ings of definition. 
Ducasse, on the other hand, nowhere attempts a 
detailed scrutiny of "relations." He says very clearly, 
"In my attempt to analyze the meaning of 'substance,' I have 
not found any need of an analysis of the generic term, 
'relation.'" However, he does indicate that, if pressed for 
a generic definition of relation, he would be willing to 
accept "Alonzo Church's definition on p. 268, Art. Relfl,-
tio~ in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy ••• ; vi~., 'a 
propositiona~ function of two or more variables.•) 
Finally, one other point of comparison may be brought 
out. Both writers agree as to the basic status of the parts 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 53. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 32. 
3Both quotes in this paragraph are taken from my 
private correspondence with Dr. Ducasse. 
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of substance. Ducasse affirms directly, "Parts of a sub-
stance ••• are themselves substances.•1 Pratt asserts less 
directly, "Parts of things may be called substances," but 
they are "of lower grade than the wholes of which they are 
parts. •• 2 As already seen, this difference in gradation 
between a substance and its parts stems directly from Pratt's 
rather nebulous notion of "substantial independence." 
Ducasse, by not making "substantivity" or "relative inde-
pendence" a differentia of substance, is not called upon to 
postulate such a gradation. And, of course, in failing to 
admit of this or any other ontic reference, Ducasse 1 s view 
of substance is, without question, much closer to Hume 1 s 
than to Aristotle's conception of substance. 
Pratt's view of existence remains to be examined. 
Fo~ clearly, an understanding of existence, as the other 
distinguishing characteristic of substance, is essential to 
the understanding of Pratt's doctrine of substance as a 
whole. What then is Pratt saying when he contends, in sharp 
contrast to Ducasse, that "existence" is a differentia of 
substance? Does Pratt's view of "existence" concur with 
Ducasse's hypothesis? What, in general, is Pratt's view of 
"existence?• 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 166. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 68. 
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These questions must be considered carefully. How-
ever, for the sake of clarity in the exposition of Pratt's 
view of Existence, two preliminary notions must first be 
examined briefly. They are the notions of "Reality" and 
"Being" as used by Pratt. It is hoped that this preliminary 
examination will serve, subsequently, to provide a basis for 
differentiating Pratt's conception of existence from both 
reality and being. 
ii. Reality and Being. Neither Reality nor Being is 
clearly defined by Pratt. Scattered through his considera-
tion of Universals, Substances, Existence, however, are suf-
ficient references to suggest hypothetically Pratt's inter-
pretation of each concept. To a report on these references 
I now turn. 
(1). Reality. Pratt seems to begin on the assumption 
that "all thinking about the real • • • presupposes that 
what is necessary to thought is necessary to Reality." 1 
From this premise, "it follows that the necessities of 
thought give us a kind of framework for the real world, a 
certain amount of ~priori knowledge concerning it which can 
be denied only at the price of denying all possibility of 
knowledge, and therefore all justification for discussion, 
assertion, or denial. 112 It is on this basis that Pratt next 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 47. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 47. 
asks the fundamental question: "What must we think about 
the Real if we are to think at all?• 1 
In answer to this question, Pratt points out2 that 
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several different kin_ds of categories may be said to char-
acterize our thinking-about the Real. The most obvious of 
these kinds of categories are the strictly logical categories 
pointed out by Aristotle--namely, the laws of Identity, Non-
Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. Although none of these 
can be proven, Pratt insists that the denial or failure to 
make use of them would make discussion, affirmation, or 
denial, impossible. And, further, as Aristotle has pointed 
out, the very denial of them involves an appeal to them. 
It is Pratt's second class of categories which is of 
particular interest to our present investigation.) Accord-
ing to Pratt, they "deal with what might be called the 
metaphysical nature of reality, and point out necessary ways 
of thinking of the real world if there is to be any real 
world to think about.• 4 Two of these necessary ways of 
thinking are "things" and "relations." Thought cannot be 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 48. Note similarity of 
this question to Bowne's question on page 5 of his Metaphysics. 
Bowne puts the matter this way: "How must we think about 
reality on the basis of ••• experience as interpreted by 
thought?• 
2 Ibid. 
3That is, it is of particular interest to our endeav-
our to differentiate Reality from Existence or Being. 
4 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 48. 
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exercised unless there are "things" to think about and 
"thinkable relations between them." And the acceptance of 
things and relations implies necessarily for Pratt, the 
further category of Order; for things or terms of a group 
must always have some arrangement. Inseparably connected 
with this category of Order are the categories of Space and 
Time; for, Pratt asserts, "The coexistence of things pre-
supposes space and the possibility of events presupposes 
time. 111 Another pair of metaphysical categories--and these 
bear important relevance to the present inquiry--are essence 
and existence. According to Pratt, "They are necessary 
modes of thought if we are to think a temporal world at 
all." 2 Although there are many other members on Pratt's 
list of metaphysical categories, the present discussion 
requires neither a scrutiny nor an enumeration of them. The 
preceding exposition, alone, permits us to draw a few infer-
ences concerning Pratt's notion of Reality. 
1. ll it is true that "the necessities of thought 
give us a kind of frame-work for the real world, a certain 
amount of~ Priori knowledge concerning it,•3 and that the 
"laws of thought" are "necessities of thought,n then it fol-
lows that the "laws of thought" provide us with "a kind of 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 49. 
2Ibid. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 47. 
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framework for the real world, a certain amount of ~ priori 
knowledge concerning it." To put the inference in Pratt's 
own pointed way, "We must ~ •• presuppose that what is 
impossible for consistent thought is impossible for reality.nl 
That is to say, for instance, Reality for Pratt cannot be 
contradictory. 
2. Granted the assumptions that "what is necessary 
to thought is necessary to Reality,n and that "things," 
Relations, Order, Space and Time, Essence and Existency, 
represent necessary ways of thinking, then it must be con-
cluded that Reality is characterized by, or in some way 
includes, "things," Relations, Order, Space and Time, Essence 
and Existency, etc. 
J. If, as the above indicates, essence and existence 
are "necessary ways of thinking the real, that is to say, 
two of the many categories of Reality, then clearly Reality 
canpot be identified with Existence alone. That is~ to 
say, however, that Existence is nQi part of Reality. For 
Pratt states very explicitly that Existence ~ for him a 
part of the Rea1, 2 that "concepts or definable natures are 
not the whole of the real.nJ And in so doing Pratt takes an 
emphatic stand against those extreme rationalists who insist 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 46. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 62, 52. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 55. 
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"that there are no existent entities but only conceptual 
natures (i.e. essences)."l In conclusion, then, it must be 
reaffirmed, if only in a general way, that, for Pratt, 
Reality is not identical with, but, rather, inclusive of, 
Existence. And it is expected that the relation between 
Existence and Reality will come out more clearly in the sub-
sequent analysis of Pratt's notion of Existence. 
(2l Being. Pratt appears to use Being and Existence 
interchangeably. On page 55 of Personal Realism, for 
instance, he says: "This does not mean that being (or 
existence) 2 is unreal or unimportant." In another of his 
rare references to Being,3 Pratt indicates that only "special 
usage" would permit a distinction between Being and Existence. 
And he at least implies that he does not ascribe to this 
"special usage." Hence, it would seem that "to be" and "to 
exist" are one and the same in Pratt, and, consequently, 
that in presenting Pratt's view of Existence, we shall at 
the same time be presenting Pratt's view of Being. 
iii. Pratt's view of 'Existence.• Early in his 
Personal Realism, Pratt writes: "For positive facts about 
the universe, we must go to experience.•4 For Pratt, as we 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 62. 
2 Underlining is my own. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 51. 
4 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 46. 
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shall see, Existence turns out to be a "positive fact about 
the universe," and is indeed found in "experience. 11 
Existence, claims Pratt, 16 undeniable. "Not even 
the solipsist or the extreme skeptic can successfully deny 
1 
existence, for at least his doubt exists." And his doubt 
is "not merely a definable nature but an actual experience; 
if it be not, his skepticism is not actual and he has nothing 
to talk about." 2 
This appeal to the actual experience of doubt, or, put 
more generally, to thinking experience, is clearly an appeal 
to the Cartesian cogito. And, indeed, Pratt finds Existence 
here. I think; therefore, I exist. The doubter doubts; that 
is, he has thinking experience; therefore, he exists. "Exist-
ence," says Pratt, "is known to us directly (in the sense of 
•acquaintance with 1 ), in all our various direct experiences 
taken as present psychoses."3 
Bergson has told us that the essential element of time 
(as duree) cannot be confined to a definition, but can be 
known only by direct experience of it. Any attempt to ration-
alize duree falsifies it by turning it into another dimension 
of conceptual space. 4 So it is with Existence, according to 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 51. 
2 52. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 57. 
4 Personal Realism, 52. Pratt, p. 
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Pratt, Existence can be known only by directly experiencing 
it. Any attempt to define it inevitably falsifies it by 
transforming it into an essence, or concept, or ideal nature, 
or some other object of analysis. Existence, unlike logical 
natures (i.e. essence), defies definition or conceptualiza-
1 tion: for, as we have seen, definition, for Pratt, involves 
analysis, and no simple experience (such as Existence) is 
analyzable "for the very reason that [it] is simple." 2 
In recognizing.Existence as "experiential" and indefin-
able, Pratt is admitting, in effect, that the world to which 
he ascribes is not a world of "pure rationalism.") "A world 
of pure rationalism," he says, "which recognizes no brute 
fact given by experience, no existence as distinct from 
essence, can have no place for real time [i.e. directly 
experienced dur(e or duration] and hence none for motion or 
any other kind of change."4 For "all real change, as all 
real duration, supposes something that changes and endures, 
and only an existent entity--not an essence or ideal nature--
can do this."5 
Moreover, Pratt contends, not only change and duration, 
but also individuality, is precluded by any philosophy which 
1 See preceding consideration of "relations." 
2 Personal Realism, 32. Pratt, p. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 72. 
4 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 52-53. 
5Ibid. Underlining is my own. 
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reduces all of Reality to the rational, that is, to logical 
natures or essences. And this represents all the more reason 
for Pra.tt 's rejection of a world of pure rationalism. "For 
the touchstone of the individual," says Pratt, "is uniqueness. 
An individual is a being of which there can be no duplication • 
• • • No argument is then needed to show that an individual 
in this sense cannot belong to the realm of universals, and 
that if philosophy be refused the right to deal with existents 
it can take no cognizance of individuals." 1 For, to put the 
matter a little differently, an individual can never be com-
pletely defined, in Pratt. Even after all its qualities have 
been abstracted.and labeled, there always remains "a residue 
which is not identical with any quality or nameable essence," 2 
a residue "not susceptible of exact definition."3 This 
"residue," according to Pratt, is, of course, Existence, 
which can be grasped only by experience. Or, put another 
way, (this residue] "can be known only in the form of direct, 
existent experience by some existent experiencer."4 
What, then, does Pratt contend to be the necessary 
aspects of any existent? In answer to this question, it 
may first be said that, for Pratt, any given existent must 
1 Ibid. Underlining is my own. 
2Ibid. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 55. 
4 
Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 56. 
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possess two aspects: one, its description and definition, 
and two, its simple gi veness. "No one," says Pratt, "has 
expressed the situation better than Bradley." And Pratt 
proceeds to present in full the oft-quoted passage. 
If we take up anythin! considered real (i.e., what 
I have called existent), no matter what it is, we 
find in it two aspects •••• There is a 'what' and a 
'that, 1 a content and an existence, and the two are 
inseparable. That anything should not qualify and give 
character to anything, is obviously impossible. If we 
try to get the 1 that 1 by itself we do not get it, for 
either we have qualified it or else we fail utterly. 
If we try to get the 1what 1 by itself, we find at once 
that it is not at all. It points to something beyond, 
and cannot exist by itself and as a bare adjective.2 
Hence, in appealing to Bradley, Pratt is saying, in effect, 
that nothing may be said to be an existent unless it pos-
sesses not only a what but a 1bal, not only a definable 
character, but an indefinable givenness. And this allega-
tion quite clearly involves a reaffirmation of Pratt's view 
that "there is in existence a non-rational but purely 
empirical element. 11 3 
What else might be said to characterize Pratt's view 
of the existent? I think that two other characteristics 
need be brought out. First, an existent, in Pratt, must be 
"capable of making a difference to experience,"4 that is, to 
1 These parentheses are Pratt's. 
2 Personal 56. Pratt, Realism, p. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 58. 
4 Personal Realism, 57-58. Pratt, pp. 
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~mind. If it is not capable of making a difference to 
some mind, it does not possess the indefinable, purely 
empirical "that" or givenness which can be grasped only by 
some mind, and which is the very heart of existence. This 
characterization of the existent (namely, as "that which is 
capable of making a difference to experience") "is intended 
to include experience itself, wherever found; and also any 
combination of ~hal, and th~t which actually can affect 
experience.'' Says Pratt emphatically: "An asserted existent, 
on the other hand, which under no circumstances, directly or 
indirectly, could make any difference to any experience [i.e. 
to any min~ could not in any significant sense be called 
existent."1 
Secondly, it must also be noted that, for Pratt, every 
existent must have some duration. It is not enough to say 
that every existent must have a locus in real time. As 
Pratt points out, for instance, a "mere mathematical cut in 
time could not be said to exist: "it would be conceptual 
(i.e. an essence) rather than existent." 2 In other words, 
an existent, for Pratt, is, of necessity, a continuant or 
what I might label a "durant," that is to say, something 
which continues or endures in the Bergsonian sense. Change 
is possible only because of this continuity or duration of 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 58. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 71. 
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the existent. For as Pratt points out, "Change as distinct 
from mere succession involves something which for the time 
being retains its identity, and its character." 1 
By way of summary, I think it best to reproduce two of 
Pratt's illustrations. 2 On the one hand, let us assume that 
George Washington once had a servant whose name has long 
since been forgotten, and about whom we now know nothing. 
On the other hand, let us assume that Mrs. Nickleby, the 
Dickens' character, was definitely an invention of Dickens 1 
imagination. Let us further note that we know much about 
Mrs. Nickleby: we are able to converse about her; we are 
able to discuss her peculiarities; we are able to predict 
her conduct in specific situations; we are able to describe 
' 
her. _Now the question arises, "What exactly does it mean 
to assert that Washington's servant existed, but that Mrs. 
Nickleby did not exist?M 
First of all, to say that Washington's servant existed, 
means, for Pratt, that Washington 1 3 servant "had a stream of 
experiences of his own,"3 each experience of which had a 
that as well as a what. In other words, Washington's servant 
1 Pratt, Pe~son~l Realism, p. 71. 
2 Pratt, Person~l Realism, pp. 59-60. 
3 Unless otherwise stated, quotes in the next few para-
graphs are taken from Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 59-60. 
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might be said to have had a collection1 of experiences, each 
experience of which not only had a character but also "did 
be. 11 
Secondly, to say that Washington's servant existed, 
means, for Pratt, that the experiences and acts of Washing-
ton's servant did, in fact, make a difference, either directly 
Or indirectly I II tO the experienCeS Of many Other real peOple • II 
Pratt's point is that the experiences of Washington's servant 
"were not merely possible objects of thought or imagination: 
rather, "they had the tang of reality, of givenness about 
them, the sort of 1 thisness 1 which we feel in our own private 
experiences." Or, to put the matter in another way, the 
experiences of Wash:ngton's servant were not mere concepts or 
essences, but were "actually given;" that is to say, they had 
a sense of indefinable "brute fact" or "givenness" about them. 
Thirdly, to say that Washington's servant existed, 
means, for Pratt, that Washington's Servant not only had a 
locus in real time but some duration. In other words, as 
an existent, Washington's servant, according to Pratt, not 
only had a~ in real time, but had at least some degree 
of 2ermanence in it. 
Now, in regard to Mrs. Nickleby, it is Pratt's conten-
tion that, despite the precision with which we can conceive 
or define Mrs. Nickleby, the stubborn fact remains that she 
1 Collection is here used in Pratt's sense of "causal 
nexus." 
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~v~r did exist. All that we know about Mrs. Nickleby, all 
our definitions and conceptions of Mrs. Nickleby, all our 
successful predictions about Mrs. Nickleby 1 s behaviour do 
not, in any way, guarantee her existence: for they "give 
status" only in the realm of "essence;" and what belongs to 
the realm of "essence," alone, is not "existent."1 
More pointedly, in saying that Mrs. Nickleby never did 
exist, Pratt is asserting, in effect, that Mrs. Nickleby, 
unlike Washington's servant, never had any experience of 
her own, "never affected anyone or was ever capable of 
influencing actual physical or psychical reality. 11 Moreover, 
Pratt is saying that all the alleged "experiences" of Mrs. 
Nickleby were but the objects or constructs of Dickens' 
imagination; and that, being only concepts or essences, they 
had no sense of "givenness" or "brute fact" about them; they 
did not possess that "tang of reality" or "thisness 11 which 
seems to characterize the experiences of non-conceptual, 
real people. Put more briefly, there is in Mrs. Nickleby 
only a what, a content, a character, completely divorced 
from a that or existence. 
And, finally, of course, Pratt is saying that Mrs. 
Nickleby never had a "duration" or what might be called a 
continued "locus" in real time. Also, not having had what 
Pratt calls a "stream of experiences of her own," Mrs. 
1 See Personal Realism, chapter 4; also p. 51. 
Nickleby was never able to know that "sense of duration" 
1 
which can only be grasped by "directly experiencing it." 
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In view of this preceding consideration of Pratt's 
notion of Sxistence, it would surely be redundant to pro-
vide a detailed answer to the remaining question formulated 
at the outset of this discussion; namely, "What is Pratt 
saying when he contends • • • that •existence' is a dif-
ferentia of substance?" Suffice it to say, in passing, that 
for Pratt, as for Aristotle, substance cannot be restricted 
to the realm of essence, to the realm of concept or form. 
Substance has not only a what but a that (to employ, again, 
Bradley's terminology), not only a form but a non-rational 
surd which can be known (in Pratt 1 s sense of 'acquaintance 
with') only by directly experiencing it. This indefinable, 
experiential, brute fact is, of course, the essential char-
acteristic of what Pratt calls "Existence." 2 
iv. 'Existence' in contrast. In the last chapter, 
marked similarities were noted between the philosophical 
approach of J. B. Pratt and that of c. J. Ducasse.3 Moreover, 
Pratt's subsequent contention that one's selection of a phi-
losophical approach "determines in advance one's attitude 
toward many metaphysical problems" was emphasized. 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 52. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 72. 
3see part 2, chapter I of this dissertation. 
72 
However, simply to assume that the expressed similari-
ties in the general philosophical approach of Pratt and 
Ducasse lead to a basic likeness in their views of Existence 
would be embarrassingly unwarranted. So, having examined 
both views of Existence, we are now in a position to take 
note of some of their basic differences. 
First, it may be observed that while for Pratt Exist-
ence, meaning existential. thatness or empirical g1venness, 
is declared to be simple, unanalyzable, and, hence, indefin-
able, for Ducasse Existence, meaning having a locus in some 
indication system, is both analyzable and definable. This 
difference, I think, stems at least partly from their dif-
ference,in methodology noted in the previous chapter. 
Ducasse 1 s methodology involves an inquiry into the meaning 
of a given term; its data are representative samples of the 
usage of the term; its process is one of semantical analysis; 
its end is definition; its test is the possible substitut-
ability of the proposed definition in assertions employing 
the term in a representative manner. And for Ducasse, so 
long as a term has been used, it can be subjected to seman-
tical analysis and defined. 
As already seen, as regards Existence, Ducasse 1 s 
method requires that he ask the basic question, "What defini-
tion of 'existence' or 'to exist' would explain our representa-
tive assertions that, for example, black swans exist but green 
swans do not, that a square root of 9 ~~sts but a square root 
of 3 does not?•1 Assertions such as these represent the 
data of Ducasse's inquiry into the meaning of 'to exist,• 
and it is these data that Ducasse's definition must fit. 
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Having analyzed the usages of •to exist" in his representa-
tive data (which, as I shall indicate later, are both skimpy 
and arbitrary), Ducasse proposes a generic definition of 'to 
exist,' which, he contends, is substitutable for the term 
'exist' or 'exists' in all those statements taken as repre-
sentative samples of its usage. The definition to which 
Ducasse feels he is necessarilY led by way of semantical 
method of inquiry may be summarized as follows: To say 
that X (e.g. the square root of 9) exists is to say that it 
obtains in some order-system and that order-system need not 
be a space-time one. 
Given the method of "semantical inquiry into the 
meaning of a term," it is not difficult to understand the 
basis for Ducasse's contention that existence is both 
analyzable and definable. For clearly, from a semantical 
point of view, one is able to analyze usages of any given 
term, and, on the basis of this analysis, offer a hypothetical 
generic description or definition of how the word~ used in 
a limited number of statements. 
However, Pratt does not adopt Ducasse 1 s distinctively 
semantical method in dealing with all the theoretical proe-
lems of philosophy. And, in connection with Existence, Pratt 
1 • 
Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science, p. 235. 
does not appear even slightly interested in linguistic or 
semantical analysis. As already shown, Pratt finds Exist~ 
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ence in thinking experience. "Existence is known to us 
directly (in the sense of 'acquaintance with'), in all our 
various direct experiences taken as present psychoses." 1 It 
is what Pratt refers to as an experiential "simple,•2 amd 
can be grasped only by some experiencing mind. Any attempt 
to define Existence is futile; for, according to Pratt, 
definition involves analysis, and no "simple" is analyzable 
(and, hence, definable) for the very reason that it is simple.3 
At this point, however, a remark or two concerning the 
general notion of "analyzability," as used by the two authors, 
needs to be made. Clearly, when Ducasse says "Existence" ~ 
analyzable and Pratt says it is not, the two authors are not 
speaking in the same universe or discourse, and, hence, are 
not necessarily contradicting one another. When Ducasse con-
tends that "Existence" is analyzable, he is simply stating 
that the meaning of Existence, as used representatively in 
ordinary language, can, in fact, be ascertained, at least 
hypothetically, by an analysis of those statements constitut-
ing representative samples of the usage under consideration. 
Pratt, on the other hand, is not talking about semantical 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 57. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 32, 37. 
3lliQ.. 
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analyzability of the Ducassean order. (Indeed, he would 
probably agree that, within the framework of Ducasse's seman-
tically oriented methodology, an analysis of the word "Exist-
ence" is possible). Rather, Pratt seems to be speaking in 
terms of what might be called qualitative analysis. Analysis, 
for him, is analysis into "ultimate qualities (which are uni-
versals).111 Accordingly, Existence, being an experiential 
simple, cannot be resolved (i.e., analyzed) into qualitative 
parts; for it goes without saying that a "simple," by virtue 
of its being a "simple," has no parts. 
Now, essentially, it is my contention that, as regards 
Existence, Ducasse and Pratt are in two very different pos-
tures, so to speak. Ducasse views "Existence" semantically; 
the problem of Existence, like all theoretical problems of 
philosophy, is, for him, the problem of defining what the 
word connotes or intends in common, ordinary usage. So it 
is not at all surprising that he should come up with a con-
notative definition of Existence. Pratt, on the other hand, 
starts with the data of human experience2 rather than with 
the data of linguistic usage, and it is here that he finds 
Existence (Indeed, Pratt calls Existence a fact of experi-
ence.) Consequently, Pratt views Existence empirically, or, 
if you like, experientially, rather than semantically or 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 53. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 2. 
l1n~uistically: Pratt's approach to Existence is the 
approach of what we might call a "metaptwslcian of experi-
ence111 rather than the approach of a scientific linguistic 
inquirer. His characterization of Existence is simply an 
attempt to point to the distinctive, indefinable, character 
of Existence, and not a rash, futile attempt to define what 
for him is, by nature, indefinable. 
Put another way, for Pratt, Existence can be known 
only by direct acquaintance with it. All the attempted 
analyses or definitions in the world will not give you aware-
ness of Existence. This is the posture in which Pratt speaks. 
It is the posture to which contemporary Existentialists might 
be attracted. It is a posture in which, however, Ducasse's 
starting-point and subsequent inquiry have no place. For 
Ducasse does not begin or speak in the posture of what might 
be called "direct acquaintance or experience;" rather, he 
starts and ends in the posture of semantics or language. 
Hence, in conclusion, it must be emphasized that 
although both authors claim an empirical view of Existence, 2 
they are by no means saying the same thing. The fact of the 
matter is that they are using empirical in different ways. 
In claiming an empirical view of Existence, Ducasse is 
1 See Personal Realism, pp. 1-2. 
2
see Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 54-55, and 
Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 62, for example. 
maintaining that his hypothesis concerning Existence has 
been reached by the process of empirical or scientific 
77 
inquiry (that is, inquiry following the precepts of scientifi~ 
methodology} into the meaning of Existence. Pratt, on the 
other hand, is contending that Existence is "found" and known 
directly in "thinking experience;" and it is in this sense 
that he calls his view empirical. 1 Empirical, then, refers 
to a methodology in Ducasse, but to an indubitable experi-
ence of Existence in Pratt. 
4. Critical Remarks. 
a. My first intention is to question the way by 
which Ducasse arrives at his hypothesis concerning suQ-
stance. His treatment of substance strikes me as bearing a 
mark of arbitrariness which his accepted methodology should 
have refused to tolerate. More explicitly, after formulating 
the problem of substance, and the data of the problem of sub-
stance, in a manner consistent with his "scientific method 
in semantical inquiry," Ducasse, subsequently, gives no 
further evidence of abiding by the procedure of that method. 
His next step is, simply, the presentation of a seemingly 
arbitrary hypothesis concerning the nature of substance. At 
this point, a serious discrepancy between Ducasse's theory 
1In view of the connotation given to "empirical" by 
contemporary philosophical woodpeckers (such as the logical 
positivists), Pratt's view of Existence might more properly 
be labeled "experiential." 
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and p~actice suggests itself. And, ironically, this dis-
crepancy appears to be the one against which Ducasse sets out 
to guard himself when he says, in his first major publication, 
"It is one thing to be able to describe scientific method 
••• and quite another thing to practice it in the field of 
philosophy." 1 
Of course, there is always the possibility that Ducasse 
expects the reader, simply, to assume without question that 
his hypothesis concerning substance has emanated from a pains-
taking consideration of relevant data, and a strict adherence 
to the maxims of his scientific methodology. But, in my 
opinion, it is not probabl~ that the objective reader would, 
after studying Ducasse's examination of substance, entertain 
such an assumption. For, as my next criticism will bring out, 
there is reason to call into question the direct relevance 
of Ducasse's hYpothesis concerning substance to the question 
which formulates his problem of substance; or, put another 
way, it is by no means clear that Ducasse's proposed hypo-
thesis is the developed methodological outcome of a supposed 
inquiry into the meaning of "substance." 
b. My second criticism, then, is also directed 
towards the methodology used by Ducasse in his consideration 
of substance. As pointed out in the first section of this 
chapter, to the question "What does it .mrum to call some-
thing a 'substance'?", Ducasse responds by providing a 
1Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 122. 
79 
hypothesis concerning the nature of substance. This pro-
cedure is troublesome to the reader. The query arises: 
How can Ducasse remain consistent with his methodological 
principles, and yet go from "meaning of" to "nature of" 
within the scope of an inquiry supposedly dictated by those 
principles? I assume that Ducasse would respond by main-
taining that to say •the nature of substance analyzes into 
properties and the relations of properties," is to give the 
meaning of substance. In other words, to indicate how the 
objective referent of the term "substance" can be analyzed 
is tantamount to defining the term "substance." Supposing 
my assumption to be correct, I question, from the perspec-
tive of Ducasse's very methodology, the basis for this 
identification. According to Ducasse, the meaning of any 
term already used in ordinary language can only be ascertained 
by an empirical examination of statements in which the term 
has been used in a representative fashion, that is to say, 
can only be determined by discovering, through empirical 
inquiry, th~ prevailing semantic convention as to the use 
1 
of the term, To the best of my knowledge, Ducasse does not 
perform such an inquiry in regard to the word "meaning." 
Nor does there seem to be any evidence to indicate that 
Ducasse has, in relation to the problem of substance, 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 122. 
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prescribed Qt. stipula ted1 a particular usage of "meaning," 
such that "meaning" as applied to "substance" would be under-
stood to connote an account of how the nature of the objec-
tive referent of "substance" may be analyzed. Hence, it 
appears that Ducasse has not, either by empirical discovery 
or prescription, indicated his meaning of "meaning." And, 
in view of this, Ducasse's answer to the question, "What 
does it~ to call something a 'substance'?", seems, from 
the point of view of his methodology, to be gratuitous. In 
other words, his answer does not seem to be warranted by the 
use of either of his two methodological alternatives. 
Finally, if it is true, as we assumed above, that 
Ducasse tacitly identifies "meaning" with "analyzable nature, 11 
so to speak, then this identification is clearly arbitrary. 
For, if we are going to take Ogden's and Richards' relevant 
remarks 2 at all seriously, we cannot help but conclude that 
the meaning of "meaning" which Ducasse implies in his treat-
ment of substance clearly "clashes with preexisting commonly 
accepted conventions" as to the use of the word "meaning. "3 
1It is to be noted that Ducasse ccntends that, on cer-
tain occasions, we have the "full liberty" to define a term 
as we please, even if the term is "one already existing in 
the common language." This may be done provided that "any-
one who acquaints himself with our definition will be.in a 
position to understand the statements we make, in which the 
term figures." Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 231, 381. 
2 . c. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Mean-
ing (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, and Company). See pp. 186-187 
for instance. 
3 And this is Ducasse's criterion of arbitrariness, in 
its "condemnatory sense." See Nature, l:ll.n.Q., lUld Death, p. 
2.52. 
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c. My third criticism has already been suggested 
in my exposition of Ducasse 1 s view of Existence. 1 I ques-
tion the manner in which Ducasse arrives at his hypothesis or 
generic definition of existence. In formulating the data for 
his inquiry into the meaning of existence, Ducasse first con-
siders statements referring explicitly to Physical existence. 
On the basis of these data, he offers a hypothesis concerning 
physical existence. Next Ducasse considers statements 
referring to mathematical existence. And, on the basis of 
these, he contends that the meaning of existence as employed 
with reference to the mathematical is closely analagous to 
the meaning of existence as employed with reference to the 
physical. Up to this point he at least shows signs of 
respecting his proposed methodology. 
But it is his next step which seems to be unwarranted. 
Having examined only those data which refer either to Qhysi-
cal or mathematical existence, Ducasse proceeds to offer a 
hypothesis concerning "any assertion of existence." He says: 
"In any assertion of existence, thus, no matter whether it 
be more particularly one of physical existence, or of mathe-
matical, or psychological, or other existence, two components 
are always essentially involved, namely, a what and a where." 2 
1 See subheading iii in section 2 of this chapter. 
2 
Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 72. Underlining 
is my own. 
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I think that the "thus" in the preceding statement 
has "crept in," so to speak. For, clearly, the reference to 
"osychological or other existence" is not warranted by the 
data considered. (Ducasse scrutinizes only statements refer-
ring to physical and mathematical existence.) This being the 
case, it is my contention that Ducasse has arbitrarily i~ep-
tified the meaning of existence, as a generic term, with the 
meaning of existence allegedl; common to physical and mathe-
matical existence. Such an identification is hardly con-
sistent with the precepts of Ducasse 1 s own prescribed meth-
odology. For, according to his methodology, only a system-
atic scrutiny of cases referring to psychological or logical 
or imaginative existence can show that existence means the 
same when employed in any of these contexts as when employed 
in reference to the physical or the mathematical. To the 
best of my knowledge, Ducasse has not, at least explicitly, 
carried out such a scrutiny, and is, therefore, arbitrary in 
the formulation of his generic definition of Existence. 
d. Of course, it is probable that Ducasse would 
answer the above criticism by contending that statements 
referring to .PhY.sic.al and mathematical existence are repre-
sentative samples of the ordinary usage of existence, and 
hence serve as valuable, indeed sufficient, data for the 
problem of defining existence, as well as for the individual 
1 
"Allegedly," of course, refers to Ducasse's allegation 
based on his semantical inquiry. 
81 
problems of defining physical existence and mathematical 
existence. 
Given this reply, my question would be of a two-fold 
nature: 
1. By what criterion does one select representative 
samples of the usage of existence? Put another way, how can 
one ascertain that a given statement employing the word 
existence is a representative assertion of it? Is a state-
ment referring to physical or mathematical existence self-
evident data for one's inquiry into the meaning of the generic 
term existence? 
2. By what criterion does one establish the sufficiency 
of data for the defining of existence? How does one know when 
one has enough representative data to solve the Qroblem of 
existence?1 Is it self-evident that a conside~ation of state-
ments employing physical and mathematical existence is suf-
ficient to provide an acceptable generic definition of exist-
ence? 
I do not believe that, within his consideration of 
existence or within the expression of his methodology, in 
general, Ducasse answers these questions. 
e. In regard to Pra.tt, I have but one brief 
criticism to make, and it concerns his treatment of substance, 
1 
"Problem of existence" is, here, used in Ducasse 1 s 
sense. 
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tn general. In expounding his view of substance, 1 Pratt, I 
believe, is over-reliant on the terminology and contentions 
of Aristotle. That Pratt is not entitled to share Aristotle's 
conception of substance is no_t my criticism. My criticism, 
rather, is that he appeals to Aristotle without making clear 
the nature and presuppositions of the doctrine or views to 
which he appeals. Put another way, my contention is that 
much of Pratt's acceptance of Aristotle (in regard to sub-
stance) is left unexplained to the reader. The result is a 
lack of clarity concerning Pratt's own view of substance and/ 
or concerning hi_s reasons for accepting a basic Aristotelian 
conception. 
To illustrate, I should like, again, to mention what 
Pratt refers to as substantivity. Admittedly, following 
Aristotle, 2 Pratt makes substantivity one of the nessential 
differentia" of substance. But what he means by substantivity 
is never made clear. Within the context of Pratt's exposi-
tion, the reader is left to infer that by substantivity, 
Pratt is referring to nindependence," or to the relative 
ability of a substance to "stand on its own feet. u3 How-
ever, not even the content of this inference is clear. What 
is frustratingly lacking is a detailed account of what it 
1 See subheading i, part 2, of this chapter. 
2 6?. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 68. 
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means for a substance nto stand on its own feet," or to have 
"independence." It is not enough, simply, to refer to 
Aristotle. 
CHAPTER III 
CAUSALITY 
Both C. J. Ducasse1 and J. B. Pratt2 have given 
serious attention to the general topic of causality. More 
specifically, each has ventured to offer a detailed account 
of the so-called "causal relation." It is my purpose in this 
chapter to present, compare, and criticize these two analyses 
of causality. In doing so, I shall also continue my attempt 
to locate the basis or bases for any points of divergence in 
the views, under examination, of the two writers. 
1. Ducasse's Analysis of the Causal Relation. 
i. Introduction. Ducasse 1 s analysis of causality 
represents an attempt to invalidate Burne's official doctrine 
that causality consists in de facto regularity of sequence.3 
With the aim of obliterating this alleged misconception, 
Ducasse, initially, points out that there are conspicuous 
1 
See,·for instance, Ducasse's painstaking analysis of 
causation in Causation and the Types of Necessity, and his 
equally cogent ·treatment in Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 
101-216. 
2 
See, for example , Personal Realism, pp. 116-140. 
3 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, chapter ?. 
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examples of regularity of sequence which we judge not to be 
examples of causation, and, conversely, examples which we do 
judge to be so without observing such regularity. 1 To sub-
stantiate his criticism, Ducasse calls attention to the fact 
that Hume, himself, offers rules for ascertaining a causal 
connection by means of a single experiment, that is to say, 
without repetition of sequence or "constant conjunction." 2 
Although conflicting with any definition of cause as regu-
larity of sequence, these rules, Ducasse contends, are based 
on another conception of causation--fundamentally sound--
which conceives of causation in terms of the advent of a 
single difference in a given state of affairs. It is to 
this conception of causality that we are about to turn. 
ii. The data and the problem ~ Ducasse ~ 
them. In this characteristic fashion, Ducasse begins his 
analysis of the causal relation by formulating .his concep-
tion of the problem of causality. Consistent with his 
approach to all the theoretical problems of philosophy, 
Ducasse sees the problem of causality as that of finding the 
"right definition" of the term "cause" as it is actually and 
ordinarily used. Hence, the data of the problem--that is to 
say, 11 the empirical facts the definition sought must fit--
consist of phrases that ~ actual instances of that ~ ~ 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 93-95. 
2 Du~asse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 96. 
88 
predicate."1 And the motivating question underlying Ducasse 1s 
analysis of causality is: "What does the term 'cause' ~ 
as employed in these predicated phrases?" Put another way, 
Ducasse 1 s fundamental query regarding the causal relation 
concerns what definition of cause best fits the employment 
of the term "cause" in the sample phrases. This question, 
according to Ducasse, represents the "push-button" for his 
semantical inquiry into the meaning of the term "cause." 
iii. Ducasse's hypothesis. "Broadly stated," 
says Ducasse, "my contention is that the relation of cause 
and effect is rightly defined not, for reasons stated, as by 
Hume in statistical terms (viz., as sequence empirically 100 
per cent regular), but in terms of what is called an experi-
ment." By an "experiment• Ducasse means "the sort of thing 
we observe when we observe a state of affairs S in which 
only two changes occur: one, a change C introduced in S at 
a time Tl, and the other, a change E spontaneously following 
1 inS at a time T2." The initial change may be introduced 
either by ourselves, or by others, or even by a natural 
course of events, as in the case of an eclipse. Further, 
Ducasse notes, •a ahange in the given state of affairs at a 
given time cannot be the only change in it at that time \ 
unless it is the total change in it at that time." 2 
1 Ducas.se, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 102-103. 
2 . . All quotes in this paragraph are taken from Ducasse, 
Nature, Mind,· and Death, p. 105. 
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Accordingly, given the state of affairs S constituted 
by the set-up of the experiment, we may, Ducasse contends, 
declare that the first and single observed change supervening 
in S was "the proximate cause of the change that followed it, 
and that the latter change was the proximate effect of the 
former." 1 It is true, Ducasse admits, that we might be wrong 
in inferring that the first change we observed was the only 
change that occurred in the given state of affairs at that 
time; "but we are quite sure that if it was the only change, 
then it was what caused the change which followed it; for 
~this .1.1! what it means to say that it caused the latter." 
Moreover, "the sort of relation described is not a sign that 
a causal relation (in some other sense of the term) hiddenly 
exists between the two changes concerned. Rather, the rela-
tion described is the causal relation itself. 112 
In short, then, it is Ducasse 1 s hypothesis that, upon 
analysis, cause shows itself to be the single, antecedent, 
empirically observable change in a given state of affairs. 
Or, put another way, it is Ducasse's basic contention, here, 
that Mill's canon of difference is an accurate description 
of the specific kind of relation which is called "causation 
of a sequent event by an immediately antecedent one."3 But, 
1 Nature, Mind, and Death, 106. Ducasse, p. 
2 Mind, Death, 106-107. Ducasse, Nature, and pp. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 107. 
90 
Ducasse is quick to add that "the canon is not, as Mill 
thought, the description of a method for discovery or proof 
of the existence, as between the two events, of some relation 
other than the one that canon actually describes, such per-
haps as the relation of invariable regularity of sequence.'1 l 
"It is a description, rather than a method of discovery, of 
causality." 
With this basic hypothesis in mind, we may now seek to 
grasp some other of the essential features of Ducasse's 
analysis of the causal relation. 
(1} Causality is a triadic relation. Causality is 
often assumed to be only a dyadic relation involving cause 
and effect. According to Ducasse, Mill sees causality as a 
dyadic relation when he says: "The cause, then, philosophi-
cally speaking, is the sum total of the conditions positive 
and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies 
of every description, which being realized, the consequent 
invariably follows." 2 Ducasse refuses to accept such a 
"dyadic" view. Mill's definition, he asserts, erroneously 
"does away with the familiar distinction between cause and 
condition. 11 For Ducasse, the circumstances constitute a 
third term, which cannot conceivably be included in the 
cause, "since the latter is invariably the only change or 
unchange in the circumstances." In other words, on Ducasse 1s 
1Ibid. 
2 ,--. J. 0. Mill, System of Logic (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1869), p. 200 (Bk. III, Ch. 5, sect. J). 
view, a causal law is never expressed by saying that "An 
event of kind A always causes an event of kind B,• but by 
the statement "An event of kind A within circumstances of 
kind C always causes an event of kind B."l 
For Ducasse, then, in contrast to Mill, the "cause• 
of a phenomenon must not be looked upon as "the assemblage 
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of all its conditions" 2 or "the whole of these antecedents;"3 
nor is the causal relation to be regarded as a dyadic rela-
tion between an effect and the assemblage of its antecedents. 
Rather, Ducasse maintains, cause is the single change which 
occurs antecedently to the ..QllJJr other change in a giyen state 
of affairs, and is to be distinguished from the conditions 
or •the then existing circumstances•4 in which the effect 
occurs. 
In this general connection, the writer recalls rather 
vividly Ducasse 1 s insistence, in a graduate seminar, that 
his students chant together his favourite dictum, "Causality 
is~ triadic relation." It is, then, no surprise to find 
Ducasse asserting emphatically that "any general causal 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 130. 
2Mill, System of Logic, p. 200. 
3 Mill, System of Logic, p. 197. The full quote is: 
"The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we 
have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of 
cause to one of them, exclusively of the others." 
4 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 108. 
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proposition which • • • omits to specify what the circum-
stances at the time are assumed to be ••• is almost certain 
1 to be false. n 
(2) Distinction between 'cause of 1 and 'condition of.' 
Ducasse argues that the common-sense distinction between 
"cause of" and "condition of" is perfectly valid, and cor-
responds to the distinction between "sufficient to" and 
"necessary to." That is to say, for Ducasse an event A is 
said to be the cause of B if A, in the existing circum-
stances, is sufficient to the occurrence of B. But A is 
said to be the condition of B if A, in the existing circum-
stances, is necessary to the occurrence of B. 2 To express 
the matter in a slightly different manner, it is Ducasse 1 s 
contention that a cause necessitates its effect while a 
condition is necessary for the effect. 
It must be noted, however, that Ducasse's distinction 
between cause and condition is not intended as a denial of 
the role of condition within the causality relatlon. In 
fact, on the contrary, Ducasse makes it clear that to say 
that a "triadic relation obtains between S, C, and E is to 
say that C in S is etiologically) both sufficient and 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 115-116. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 108. 
3Ducasse uses the term "etiological" in contrast to 
the term "logical." "Etiological" is used to designate the 
relation between events as distinguished from the relation 
between timeless logical entities. Nature, Mind, and Death, 
pp. 113-116. 
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necessary toE inS (i.e., both cause of and Q.9_ndit_ipn of E 
inS) ." 1 
{3) Causality ~ ~ relatio~ between concrete indiv1d-
ual events, and never between substances Q£ forces. The 
terms of the causal relation are, for Ducasse, events, and 
never substances, "if by the latter be meant such entities 
as gold, oil, mountains" and the like, which are commonly 
referred to as "things" or "objects."2 Dueasse maintains 
that substances and only substances can either •act upon" or 
"be acted upon;" in other words, according to Ducasse, sub-
stances alone have the prerogative of being either agent or 
patient. To illustrate, Ducasse considers the statement 
that a certain man made a chair. The relation between the 
man and the lumber out of which he makes the chair is that of 
agent to patient, of creator to created. The relation of 
cause to effect, however, "is present in the example only 
between the volitions ~ the moyements of the man, and the 
changes of shape and relations of the pieces of lumber; and 
both of these are events, not substances, although obviously 
1
c. J. Ducasse, "Comments and Criticism on the Analysis 
of Causality," Journ. Phil., 54(1957), 423. See also Nature, 
Mind, and Death, p. 107, and Causation and the Types of 
Necessity, p. 62. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 131. 
these events are changes in the states and relations of the 
two substances concerned."l 
That is to say, it is Ducasse's assertion that the 
causal relation, as a relation between events, is distinct 
from, although often closely associated with, the relation 
of agent to patient, which is a relation between substances. 
There is a sense, however, in which even for Ducasse 
substance may be said to be involved2 in causation. This 
sense comes out clearly in the following quotation: 
At all events, if by 1 thing 1 one means ••• 
entities such as gasoline, billiard balls, automobile 
engines, etc., i.e., as we say substances, then I 
should not only admit but insist that an 'event' always 
in some way involves a 'thing' or 'things.' An event 
is always a change or an unchange of a thing or its 
relations, or of the changes or unchanges of either.3 
Thus, for Ducasse, 11 substance" or "thing" is always, 
at least indirectly, involved in causation, for "event" 
always involves a change or unchange of some "thing" or 
"substance." Of course, as indicated earlier, in view of 
l Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 132. It now 
becomes clear why Ducasse elsewhere maintains that "if we take 
the assertion 'X caused Y, 1 and wish to make it a meaningful 
proposition, we cannot possibly do so by substituting for X 
andY the names of things (e.g., gasoline, billiard ball), 
but must on the contrary insert terms that are names of events 
(e.g., explosion of gasoline, motion of billiard ball). See 
"Of the Nature and Efficacy of Causestt Phil. Bey. 41(1932), 
395. 
2 Note: To say that causation somehow involves sub-
stance is nQ~ to say that a cause or effect could ever be a 
substance. 
3nucasse, "Of the Nature and Efficacy of Causes, 11 
p. 395. Underlining is my own. 
95 
the conspicuously different conceptions of substance, this 
verbal similarity is hardly basic to the two views considered. 
(4) Causation ~ uniform and Universal. Ducasse 
unequivocally affirms the uniformity and the universality of 
causation. His contention is that the definition of causa1-
1ty as "the relation which obtains between ••• three terms 
of a perfect experimen~~ logically implies or "entails" the 
said uniformity and universality. 
It is to be recalled, once more, that to say, for 
Ducasse, that a relation of causality obtains between C and 
E in a given state of affairs, S, is to say that C in S is 
both sufficient and necessary (in the etiological sense) to 
E in s. Ducasse points out that this definition of causality 
is "without specification of any particular date" for either 
event C or event E. The only time specification included in 
the definition is that the event it defines as effect be 
later than the one it defines as cause of the effect in a 
given state of affairs. On this basis, Ducasse argues that 
if a difference in two instances of causality is solely a 
difference of absolute dates, then that difference is entirely 
irrelevant to causal necessitation. Hence, Ducasse asserts, 
it would be a contradiction to suppose that a change, c2 , 
having identically the same nature as c1 , and occurring in a 
state of affairs having identically the same nature as s1 , 
1 Ducasse, "On the Analysis of Causality," p. 423. 
would not similarly cause the occurrence of E2 , having iden-
1 tically the same nature as E1 • It is on the foundation of 
this fundamental argument, then, that Ducasse maintains that 
"whenever, if ever, S, and C in S recur, then E in S also 
recurs:" 2 which is, in his own terminology, an affirmation 
of the uniformity of causation. 
Ducasse's argument for the universality of causation 
is ingenious as well as interesting. In an effort to show 
that every event has a cause, Ducasse considers the contrary 
hypothesis that there is a first change in the universe (as 
state of affairs). And he asks the basic question, "Is it 
possible that the universe 'endured changeless' for any time 
prior to the alleged 'first change'?" 
Ducasse's answer is pointed and clear. "The supposi-
tion that S endured changeless for any time, long or short, 
prior toE, implies that prior toE time was 'passing'; and 
the 'passing of time' means that some 'clock' is 'beating,' 
i.e., that some succession of changes is occurring.") Here, 
then, is a change antecedent to the alleged "first change." 
And since, ~hypothesi, it is the only change preceding the 
alleged "first change," then, according to Ducasse's very 
definition of causality, it qualifies as the cause of the 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 156. 
2Ducasse, "On the Analysis of Causality," p. 423. 
3nucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 153. 
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alleged "first change. n Further, in this manner, the "beat-
ing of the clock," so to speak, might be said to be the 
cause of any supposed first change. Hence, for Ducasse no 
event is ever without cause; in other words, the so-called 
universality of causation holds fast." 1 
The above observations cover, I believe, the essential 
features of Ducasse 1 s hypothesis concerning causality. It 
is now in order to present Pratt's view of causation. Atten-
tion will, appropriately, be called to various points of 
sameness and difference in the two theories. 
2. Pratt's View of the Causal Relation. 
1. Pra.t1..!.~ apDroach to causality. It was a tacit 
implication of the preceding chapter that, in finding exist-
ence at the level of ''thinking experience," Pratt bore out 
his earlier contention that one's choice between the ration-
alistic and empiricistic view of philosophy determines in 
advance one's attitude toward many metaphysical problems. 
Again, in relation to causality, Pratt's admitted acceptance 
of Empiricism seems to influence his approach and subsequent 
answer to the issue under consideration. 2 
For, once more (and this is harmonious with his 
expressed view of Empiricism at the beginning of Personal 
1 I owe insights into the basic arguments of this sub-
heading (4) to a reading of Demos' critical study of Nature, 
Mind, and Death, Rev. Meta., 4(1953), 563-582. 
2Pratt, in fact, maintains the same on page 121 of 
Pe~sonal Realism. 
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1 Realism), Pratt begins with personal experience. He says: 
"Probably the earliest stimulus to the causal way of thinking 
is to be found in the experience of making .§:!1 effort .1Q. act 
upon things, and of feeling oneself acted upon by them." He 
continues with the following very worthwhile elaboration: 
When the infant or the grown man, straining his 
strength, succeeds in pushing some heavy object, or 
solving some difficult problem, or when against his 
will and all his efforts he finds himself pushed by 
some source he cannot resist, he has an experience 
which he knows as the exertion of power. When he longs 
for something and at length, with great exertion achieves 
it, he feels no need for further explanation. Except in 
our most theoretical moments, we all regard our active 
wills as explanation enough, and only in sophisticated 
moments wonder how the desired result came about.2 
Pratt's initial approach, then, involves an appeal to 
what might be called •• the experience of causality." It is 
an appeal to the pre-theoretical, the pre-intellectual, or 
to use Pratt's Ol-m words, to the ''merely existential.'' 3 
Causality happens; it is experienced (by acting or being 
acted upon); it is known "from within. n4 Pratt summarizes 
his approach well when he says, in reference to the activi-
ties of ''acting upon th:ngs (and in turn, of being acted upcn 
by them):"5 11 These tendencies or processes are dynamic 
my own. 
1 See page 2, for example. 
2 Pratt, Per_sonal Realism, pp. 119-120. Underlining is 
3Pratt, Fersonal Realism, p. 120. 
4 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 129. 
5Ibid. 
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rather than logical; existent rather than subsistent. We 
cannot show by pure reason why they are as they are, or how 
l they must be. We find~." 
Indeed, Pratt's earlier interpretation of Empiricism 
suggested strongly that the empiricist must look upon causa-
tion as 11 something to be learned from experience only." 2 
Certainly, as an admitted empiricist, Pratt approaches causa-
tion in this manner. 
ii. Causation is not invariable sequence. Pratt, 
following the lead of C. J. Ducasse, also objects to the 
Humean identification of causality with invariable sequence. 
At best, Pratt contends, regularity of sequence is a useful 
criterion for t·:?sting the presence of causation, but it by 
no means tells us the nature of causation. In fact, says 
Pratt, "a significant definition of causation, as Professor 
Ducasse has pointed out, should be able to define the cause 
of a particular event 'in terms of but a single occurrence of 
it, and this in no way involves the supposition that it, or 
one like it, ever has occurred before or ever will again. tn3 
Hence, for Pratt, as for Ducasse, the Humean supposition of 
recurrence or 100 per cent regularity of sequence is entirely 
irrelevant to the meaning of cause. The basic reason 
l Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 136. Underlining is my 
own. 
2 
Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 121. 
3 Ibid., underlining is my own. 
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underlying Pratt's stand will become progressively clear 
within the framework of the following subheadings. 
iii. Causation~ continuity of process. Having 
objected to the view that causation consists of de facto 
regularity of sequence, Pratt proceeds to offer his own posi-
tive hypothesis. "The essential character of causation," 
Pratt submits, 11 is • • • continuity of pro~, carried .Qll 
within substances or between substances." 1 And this "con-
tinuity of process," Pratt maintains, is precisely what 
characterizes the two types of successive2 causation known 
respectively as immanent and transeunt causation. In the 
former, "we have a continuous process going on within • • • 
a single object;" in the latter, a continuous process is 
taken up in and carried on by a continuous process in 
another. n) 
To illustrate the continuity of process in immanent 
causation, Pratt cites the motion of a stone flying through 
the air, and the changes which occur within an organism (for 
example, the processes of metabolism and katabolism). In 
each of these cases, Pratt admits, only an arbitrary 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 1)0. Underlining is my 
own. 
2 Pratt uses "successive" in contrast to what is often 
called "coincident" causation. The fundamental difference is 
that "successive" causation involves a time interval between 
cause event and effect event, while "coincidentn causation 
does not. Personal Realism, p. 118. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 118. 
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separation can be made between event and event, hence 
between cause and effect. Yet, Pratt insists, "the process" 
in either example, "is causal [that is, has continuity within 
a substance], as distinct from logical or merely temporal. 111 
Transeunt causation, on the other hand, is illustrated 
by the flying stone's impingement upon a window. According 
to Pratt, the stone 1 s motion "flows into and is carried on 
by the processes within the glass." Another example would 
be the motion of billiard ball number two subsequent to its 
being struck by a rolling billiard ball number one. In each 
of these examples, Pratt affirms, there is continuity; how-
ever, the continuity here is clearly not of a process within 
a single object, but "between what we call different processes 
within different substances. 112 
Now, in the light of this hypothesis concerning causa-
tion, it is not difficu+t to understand Pratt's objection to 
the causation--invariable sequence identification. To use 
Pratt's own words, "In all those cases where we deny to 
invariable sequence the character of causality, our denial 
is due to, and is justified by, our perception that the 
events in question are not parts of a continuous series or a 
continuous pair of series." Consider the invariable sequence 
of night and day, for instance. Despite the fact that each 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 118, 1)0. 
2 
Ibid. 
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appears to be an occurrence or event "within a continuous 
series of events involving the motions and positions of the 
sun and earth," we do not, according to Pratt, judge the 
conjunction or sequence of them to constitute a continuity 
of process. For clearly each is an individual process, not 
continuous with the other, but connected only indirectly 
with the other by virtue of a mutual continuity with a 
larger process. Similarly, in Pratt's repeated example of 
the invariable sequence between the ringing of the Amherst 
chapel bell and_the going to church of Williams undergraduates 
(50 miles away), there is no continuity of the two processes 
involved; rather, each activity belongs to a separate and 
1 completely different process. 
iv. Continuity~ not ~ ~ temporal QQn-
tinuity. It is to be noted, here, that the continuity 
referred to in Pratt's view of causation is in addition to 
temporal continuity. Clearly, any identification of "causal 
continuity," so to speak, with temporal continuity would 
involve an acceptance of the "invariable sequence" analysis 
2 
of causality to which Pratt is unambiguously opposed. This 
is not to say, however, that Pratt does not recognize the 
factor of temporal continuity in causation. On the contrary, 
he affirms that tttemporal continuity is necessary to every 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 135. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 132. 
lOJ 
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continuous process." But Pratt's point is that, as regards 
the causal process, temporal continuity is not the whole 
story; it must be 11 united with at least one other kind of 
continuity. 11 Indeed, he asserts, "something more than tern-
poral sequence would be found if one process flowed into a 
second, if the second began where the first left off, if it 
tended in what might be called the same direction in the 
sense of supplementing the first. 112 
Details concerning this "other kind of continuity,tt 
however, are scarce. Pratt just mentions) spatial continuity 
as one example. Subsequently, he mentions qualitative con-
tinuity and teleological continuity as additional examples. 
And, finally, he submits that "there are probably several 
kinds of continuity which are not immediately obvious because 
language does not happen to have provided us with names for 
them. 11 
In reference to the latter, he suggests a form of con-
tinuity which he labels biological. He says: 
If, let us say, through the various stages of evolu-
tion, natural selection had brought it about that upon 
the process of the lion's roar, air waves, and electric 
or other motion along the auditory nerve of an antelope, 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 132. Note also Pratt's 
subsequent contention that the "causal process may take a 
few seconds, or many years, but passage of time is always 
involved, 11 p •. 135. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. lJJ. 
3I use "mention" advisedly, here. 
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there followed a process of sensation, attention, 
conscious urge to flee, and that this conscious pro-
cess was in its turn followed by a process of innerva-
tion of the muscles and rapid motion of the whole 
organism, should we not be justified in calling these 
processes continuous with each other in a very real 
sense? 
He answers: 
It seems to me that in the physical, physiological, 
psychical, and (once more} physiological processes of 
my illustration we have genuine continuity, even though 
the English language has not provided us with any spe-
cific word for it. And if this is the case, I see no 
reason why we should hesitate to call the relation 
causal.l 
The above, I believe, represents the extent to which 
Pratt directly considers the "other kind of continuity." In 
effect, he is merely asserting that the other continuity 
essential to causation may be of a number of types--many of 
which, perhaps, have no name in our language. 
Despite the brevity of Pratt's treatment, here, as 
well as his subsequent contention that "Causality is not to 
be explained but to be accepted 'with natural piety, 1112 I 
think it would be unfair to suggest that Pratt offers no 
clues as to what is involved in the "other continuity." 
For, certainly, Pratt's preceding consideration of immanent 
and transeunt causation, as well as his initial statement 
of the "essential character" of causation, implies that this 
"other continuity" (whether qualitative, physiological, 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 134. Underlining is my 
own. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 136. 
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teleological, psychological, or what have you) always refers 
to a process "within or between substances." And, later, 
this implication is confirmed by Pratt's contention that 
"Substance, in some sense or other of the word, is also1 
essential to causation." 2 
Again, what Pratt essentially is saying here is that 
it would be a grave error to see in causation "merely a con-
tinuous sequence of events 1' [1. e., a mere temporal continuity). 
For the nature of substance or substances is always neces-
sarily involved in the total continuity of causation. With-
out substance, there is no causation for Pratt. Pratt 
accepts Loewenberg's contention that "causation is but a 
name for the substance of things conceived as dynamic.") And 
he argues in the following manner: 
Unless there were at the least •existent collections 
of existent qualities' there could be no change, and 
without change, of course, no continuous process. If 
there is4 to be change there must be something that changes. 
In passing, it need hardly be said that, in making 
substance a necessary factor in causation, Pratt, is, at 
least ostensibly, at variance with Ducasse. For, as we have 
seen, Ducasse's definition, in contradistinction to Pratt's, 
1 Underlining is my own. The "also" indicates that, 
besides temporal continuity, substance is necessary. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 135. 
3Ibid. (All quotes in this paragraph) 
4Ibid. 
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is, theoretically, completely independent of his concept of 
substance. (As seen in the foregoing chapter, however, Pratt 
and Ducasse do not mean the same thing by "substance.") It 
explains causation entirely in terms of the relation between 
two concrete individual events and a state of circumstances. 
v. lg causation uniform and universal? Pratt 
does not set out to "prove" the uniformity and universality 
of causation. Nor does he, in the manner of Ducasse, attempt 
to show that his hypothesis concerning causality logically 
implies or "entails" these commonly accepted "laws." To the 
contrary, in fact, he maintains that to assert legalistically 
that if X appears then Y must also appear, or that every 
event must have a cause, "is to be either ambiguous or 
dogma t i c • "1 
Pratt takes the uniformity of causation to indicate, 
generally, "the conception that there are repeatable events, 
and that these are related in uniform sequence." In so far 
as this conception represents a description of what we claim 
to find in our experience, it has, according to Pratt, an 
empirical basis. However, to the extent that this concep-
tion is accepted as a statement applying universally to "the 
whole past or whole future," it is obviously a postulate, for 
its alleged universality is plainly incapable of proof. 2 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 137. 
2This is in view of the fact that the ''whole future" 
is not open to present empirical verification. 
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It is to be noted that the word "postulate" is entymo-
logically derived from the Latin postulare, meaning to demand. 
A postulate, then, is generally regarded as a proposition, 
the truth or probability of which.cannot be proven but must 
(by demand) be assumed or granted. 1 Pratt, it is clear, uses 
"postulate" in this way. His contention is that 11 a very con-
siderable amount of regularity in the sequences of Nature is 
••• a necessary postulate if we are to predict or act with 
confidence, or to justify our trust in the explanations which 
science and philosophy proffer." In other words, Pratt is 
saying that our entire system of scientific prediction and 
explanation demands the postulation of the uniformity of 
nature; 2 indeed, we would not be able to apply our concept 
of causation unless we assume that the processes of nature 
are uniform. Therefore, Pratt continues, "we are bound to 
make the postulate, 11 (not law) partially confirmed by empiri-
cal observation, that if A causes B today, it will do like-
wise tomorrow--in other words, that causation is uniform.3 
As already indicated, Pratt is unwilling to accept 
any unqualified legalistic assertion that everything must 
have a cause. To this extent, he expresses himself against 
1 . A ( Alburey Castell, College Logic N. Y.: The Macmillan 
Company, 1935), p. 385. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 120. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 138~ All quotes in this 
paragraph are taken from this reference. 
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universality of causation as law. However, again, as in the 
case of uniformity of causation, 1 there is some other sense 
in which Pratt might be said to ascribe to the universality 
of causation. To illustrate, Pratt says pointedly that the 
assertion that everything must have a cause "is true enough 
if intended simply to mean that every event is a part of the 
general nexus of events in Nature." 2 
Now, it seems to me that Pratt 1 s contention, here, 
although expressed in the terminology of his own cosmology, 
amounts to an acceptance of what is ordinarily referred to as 
the law of universality of causation, that is to say, the law 
that everything must have a cause. It is true that he is 
openly suspicious and critical of so-called "causal laws;" 
but I do not think that he has rejected the law of universal-
ity of causation. Rather, I think, he has stipulated in his 
own terms the precise sense in which he does accept this law, 
and, hence, in his judgment, has eliminated the marked ambi-
guity commonly attached to it. 
What Pratt has rejected is not, I submit, the law of 
the universality of causation, but, as we have seen, the 
uniformity of causation, as law. He says: 
1 Pratt rejects uniformity of causation as a law but 
accepts it as a postulate. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 137. 
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But if one means by it [the law that everything has 
a cause] that every recognizable event ~ connected 
with~ other recognizable event in such fashion that 
when .QM of them appears the other must also appear:r-
[i.e., uniformity between events] either one's asser-
tion is a mere tautology or it goes beyon~ anything that 
~ priori reason or the facts can justify. 
Put another way, I contend that Pratt is nQ! here 
denying that causation is universal (indeed, he has pre-
scribed a sense in which it is) but that the uniformity of 
causation is universal, so to speak. And the latter, I 
maintain, is what philosophers generally mean by the law of 
uniformity of causation. 
). The Two Views in Contrast. 
Within the preceding exposition of Ducasse 1 s and 
Pratt's respective view of substance, a number of very 
obvious points of difference have appeared and frequently 
been noted. For example, in respect to the summary 
formulation of the two hypotheses concerning causality, 
it was observed that while for Ducasse causality is 
alleged to be always a relation between events, and never 
between substances, for Pratt causation is said to be carried 
on "within" or "between" substances. Further, it was pointed 
out that while the uniformity of causality could be "proven" 
for Ducasse, it could, at best, only be postulated for Pratt. 
Moreover, implicit in the foregoing discussion was the contrast 
1 I cannot think of any philosopher who has given this 
interpretation to the "law that everything has a cause." 
2Ibid. Underlining, except for~ priori, is my own. 
between Ducasse's view of causation as an exneriment and 
Pratt's view of causation as a continuity of process. 
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From the point of view of verbal expression, at least, 
these illustrated differences are, as I said, obvious. But 
the matter cannot rest here. The question must be asked: 
Are the conceptions of causality offered by Ducasse and 
Pratt as essentially different as terminology makes them 
appear to be? And if they are, how can their basic differ-
ences be explained or accounted for? 
In answer to this question, it is suggested that, by 
and large, these two views of causality E:.r_e as essentially 
different as they appear, and that their basic differences 
~ be accounted for by the undeniably different approach, 
perspective, posture, or mood from or in which each author 
views causality. Let me explain. 
We have heremuch the same situation as we had when we 
were considering existence. Although we are now concerned 
with causality, I think it is clear that Ducasse's approach 
here is no different from his approach to existence, and 
that Pratt's approach here is, similarly, identical with his 
approach to existence. In regard to both topics, Ducasse's 
approach is the approach of a semantical inquirer asking the 
meaning of a term in "ordinary, common usage," and Pratt's 
approach is the approach of an empiricist (in his own sense 
of the word) who begins with indubitable personal experience 
and attempts an explanation (not a definition) of it. Moreove~ 
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in respect to both topics, Ducasse 1 s proposed solution or 
hypothesis takes the form of a generic, inductive definition 
of the way in which the term under scrutiny (cause or exist-
ence) is used in statements (data) constituting representa-
tive samples of its ordinary usage. Pratt's answer, on the 
other hand, partially represents an attempt to say that the 
fundamental meaning of existence or cause can be known only 
'by direct acquaintance, by direct experience, and can never 
be exhausted in, or restricted to, a definition. 
Again, then, Ducasse's approach and interest, here, are 
basically semantical in nature, while Pratt's are what might 
be called experiential and metaphysical. Ducasse is inter-
ested in explaining the common, ordinary usage of the word 
"cause" in our language; ·Pratt is interested in coming to 
grips with the metaphysical nature of causality by way of 
experience. The posture in which Ducasse sees the problem 
of causality, as well as all other theoretical problems of 
philosophy~ is the posture of language; the perspective from 
which Pratt views causality is indubitable personal experience. 
Given these basic differences in perspective, it should 
not be surprising to discover that Ducasse and Pratt appear 
to disagree about causality. For it seems to be clear that 
the results of any investigation may reflect, among other 
things, the approach, the interests, the motivating ques-
tions, the method of investigation, or criteriology, carried 
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to the investigation.l Certainly, this ~ the case here. 
Ducasse•s conception of cause as the"only antecedent change 
in a state of affairs" 2 is, as we have seen, an attempt to 
answer the motivating question of his proposed semantical 
inquiry. It is, Ducasse contends, what people mean when they 
use ordinarily the word "cause." And Pratt's view of causal-
1ty as a "continuity of process carried on within or between 
substances" reflects his attempt to characterize an exper1-
ence which for him can only be known directly by personal 
acquaintance with it and which defies formal definition or 
conclusive explanation. Pratt is not interested in Ducasse 1s 
semantical question. He is not interested in the way "cause" 
is used in ordinary language. Rather, he is interested in 
pointing to an experience in which one is acquainted with 
"cause. 11 3 That experience, like any experience, contends 
Pratt, is always experienced as a continuous process. It is 
dynamic. Any attempt to define it is to treat it as static, 
and, hence, to falsify it. 
I submit, then, that the basic differences in the two 
views under consideration are not ~ differences in lan-
guage or terminology. For it seems to me clear that Ducasse 
1 I expect to say more about this gene ,_,al topic later 
in the dissertation. 
2 Quoted fre;·m discussion with Dr. Ducasse. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 119. 
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and Pratt are not talking about the same thing. Ducasse is 
speaking about the meaning of causality as implied in ordi-
nary language; Pratt is talking of the existential (to use 
his own term) nature of causation as "felt" in the experience 
of acting upon, or being acted upon by things. To Ducasse, 
the meaning of cause ~ be ascertained by scrutinizing the 
manner in which "cause" is employed in common usage. To 
Pratt, the way "cause" is employed in ordinary language faLLs 
to convey the fundamental existential meaning of cause, which 
refuses to be objectified by language and which can be grasped 
only by actually experiencing "the process of causing," for 
instance. 
It is not the case, then, that Ducasse and Pratt are 
simply hypothesizing about the same data in different termi-
nologies; for clearly Ducasse 1 s data are the data of word 
usage, whereas Pratt's data are the data of experience. Tre 
basic difference, here, between Ducasse and Pratt is, I main-
tain, much deeper than a terminological one; it~ a differ-
ence in fundamental meaning of causation. Indeed, an important 
.Presupposition of Ducasse's "empirical inquiry into the mean-
ing of a term" is that a term's fundamental meaning £llin be' 
discovered in the usage of it. Pratt disagrees entirely._ 
The basic nature or meaning of cause, for example, cannot, 
he maintains, be grasped in usage or language. It can be 
known only in the experience of cause. And to say, with 
Ducasse, that the meaning of the term "cause't can be defined 
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by its usage is to ignore a more basic, indefinable, meaning 
which cause has apart from usage or language. 
Hence, once more, in relation to causality, Ducasse 
is content to begin in the posture of semantics or language. 
And seeing the problem of causality as the problem of de.fin-
ing how the word is use~ in ordinary, common usage, Ducasse 
offers, as his hypothesis, an answer to this semantical 
query. Pratt, on the other hand, turning to experience and 
finding causality there, insists that causality must be 
viewed experientially, and hence goes much deeper than a 
semantical consideration. 
So, we see again, then, that Pratt's earlier accept-
ance of the "empirical view" 1 of philosophy has influenced 
his choice of data, and, consequently, his view of the topic 
under consideration. Further, we see, once more, that the 
scope of philosophy for Ducasse is primarily semantical. 
Given these differences in approach, it is, I have tried to 
show, inevitable that Ducasse and Pratt should disagree con-
cerning the bas.ic meaning of causality. 
4. Objections to Ducasse's Analysis. 
i. In a brief article entitled "A Note on Causa-
tion and the Meaning of 1Event-a,n 2 Arthur Pap makes the fol-
lowing criticism of Ducasse's analysis of causation: 
1 I use this expression in his sense. And may I say 
that it is not unlike the existential approach. 
2 . I A. Pap, "A Note on Causation and the Meaning of Event'" 
Journ. Phil., 54(1957), 155-159. 
llS 
On Ducasse's analysis it is self-contradictory to 
suppose that an event which is immediately pre ceded: bv 
more than one change in its neighborhood is caused at 
all •••• But surely the supposition is not self-
contra~ictory according to the ordinary meaning of 
cause. 
I should li~e, now, to consider the seriousness of this 
criticism, and the manner in which Ducasse might answer it. 
Pap begins on the correct interpretation that to asser~ 
for Ducasse, than an event C was the cause of an event E in 
a state of affairs s, is to assert that C was the only change 
in S immediately antecedent to E. 2 Pap's criticism is that, 
according to this interpretation of Ducasse's hypothesis, an 
event E immediately preceded by a number of concurrent changes 
in the situation S cannot, without contradiction, be said to 
be caused at all. For, says Pap, "if one antecedent event 
is causally irrelevant toE, then all of them are, since a 
change which is one of several concurrent changes in S can-
not be said to be the only change in s.n3 But, Pap chal-
lenges, the "ordinary meaning" of cause does not limit cause 
·to an "only change ... 
Ducasse 1 s reply to this objection is ingenious, though 
questionable. In reference to the problem offered by Pap, 
1 Pap, "A Note on Causation and the Meaning of 'Event, 111 
p. 158. 
2Pap, "A Note on Causation and the Meaning of 'Event,'" 
p. 156. 
3 Pap, "A Note on Causation and the Meaning of 1Event, t•t 
p. 158. Underlining is my own. 
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he insists that "what really follows from [his] analysis is 
only that the change in S, which immediately preceded the 
event, was then a complex change; for in order that at a 
time T a change C inS be the single change there, it does 
not have to be a simple change. 1 In other words, Ducasse 
is here affirming a distinction between a single change and 
a simple change, and is noting that, for him, a single 
change may well be complex. This being the case, Ducasse 
maintains that Pap's example of "concurrent changes" is but 
an example of "complex change," and, hence, does not contra-
diet either his hypothesis or common, ordinary usage of 
"cause." Such is the first part of Ducasse's reply. 
The second part of Ducasse 1 s reply concerns Pap 1 s 
contention that, on Ducasse 1 s hypothesis, "if one antecedent 
event is causally irrelevant to E, then all of them are." 
"Any appearance that this conclusion follows," says Ducasse, 
"is due only to the ambiguous phrase, 'causally irrelevant 
to,' which invites confusion between etiological sufficient 
to (i.e., 1cause of') and etiological necessary to (i.e., 
'condition of')." 2 To support his point, he emphasizes that 
to say that the only antecedent complex change, abc, in situa-
tion S, was sufficient to cause the only other single complex 
1Ducasse, "Comments and Criticism on the Analysis of 
Causality," p. 424. 
2Ibid. 
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change, def, entails that it was sufficient to cause all the 
parts of def, "but does not entail that the whole of abc was 
a necessary condition of, say, occurrence of the part d of 
def." For, indeed, adds,Ducasse, !lQ contradiction is involved 
in supposing, for instance, that if part a of abc had not been 
present, then the remaining be would have been sufficient to 
bring about1 say, de, df, ef. 2 
It seems to me that Ducasse can offer this second part 
of his reply only on the basis of~'having assumed the conten-
tion of the first part of the reply; namely, that a single 
change can be a complex change as well as a simple change. 
Otherwise, it is clear that Ducasse would not be able to 
talk about (for example) part a or parts be of a single 
antecedent change abc. In view of my impression, I should 
like to consider critically Ducasse's complete answer by 
turning directly to the first part of Ducasse's answer. 
And because of its content, my present consideration is 
intended also as a second objection to Ducasse. 
ii. In the first part of his reply to Pap, 
Ducasse makes it known, again, that a single antecedent change 
in a state of affairs need not be a simple change.3 I submit, 
1 
"Bring about" and "cause" are used interchangeably 
in Ducasse. See Ducasse, "On the Nature and Efficacy of 
Causes," p. 398. 
2 Ducasse, "Comments and Criticism on the Analysis of 
Causality," p. 424. 
3Ibid. 
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however, that Ducasse's contention may well involve a con-
spicuous departure from ordinary language. And, of course, 
as Pap himself has pointed out, Ducasse cannot afford to dis-
regard this kind of criticism, for, indeed, what he claims is 
1 precisely conformity to the ordinary meaning of words. 
To substantiate my allegation, I should first like to 
point out that, in respect to his definition of causality, 
Ducas_se seems to employ the word "event" and "changett inter-
changeably. Whereas at times he talks of cause as the only 
antecedent change in a state of affairs in which two and only 
two changes occur, he just as frequently refers to cause as 
the sole event which precedes the only other event in a given 
state of affairs. 2 
Had Ducasse defined causality solely in terms of change, 
and indicated clearly at the offset that there might be many 
events within a change, or that a change might involve a QQm-
plexity of events,3. then Ducasse's reply to Pap would have 
been well taken. But the stubborn, disconcerting, fact is 
that Ducasse also defines causality in terms of an experiment 
4 in which two and only two events occur. And it is precisely 
~Ibid. 
2
see Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 105-113, 
and page 106, especially. 
3To the best of my knowledge, Ducasse has not, 
initially or explicitly, indicated the latter. 
4 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, ~Death, pp. 106, 108, for 
example. · 
119 
this alternative expression of his hypothesis which invites 
the difficulty. For, if taken at face-value, it means that 
cause and effect are the only two events occurring in what 
we might call a "causal state of affairs," and, hence, that 
the change C referred to in the first formulation could not, 
conceivably, involve more than one event. CL;arly, if this 
be the ~, Ducasse's reply to Pap is either inconsistent 
with his own hypothesis or manifestly gratuitous. And, 
further, if it is true, as it sometimes appears, that Ducasse 
is us~ng the words "event" and "change" interchangeably or 
synonymously, and that he includes within the connotation of 
"event" the element of either multiplicity or complexity, 
then I maintain that his usage does not conform to the mean-
ing which "event" has in ordinary parlance. Noreover, if 
the latter be true, I should say that, by his own self-
imposed criterion, Ducasse has again, perhaps inadvertently, 
assumed the role of a "deliberate innovator.n Let me elucidate. 
As we have seen, in his answer to Pap, Ducasse insists 
that the single antecedent change in a state of affairs may 
be complex rather than single. He illustrates by consider-
ing the breaking of a window pane. At the very moment that, 
say, a brick hits the window pane, the pane is also struck, 
say, "by the airwaves due to the song of a canary near by." 1 
1All quotes in this paragraph are taken from Nature, 
Mind, and Death, pp. 151-152. 
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Now, as !understand it, Ducasse 1 s claim is that the cause 
of the breaking of the window pane is complex. What we des-
cribe as the impact of the brick is not the whole, entire, 
concrete event which preceded the effect, but, rather, is 
only an abstracted part of that concrete event. The approach 
of the airwaves is also a part of the whole, complex, QQn-
crete event which was sufficient to the breaking of the window. 
Put another way, then, when Ducasse refers to cause 
as an event, he by no means preclu~es the possibility that an 
event may have parts. For, in defining the causal relation 
in terms of the only two events in a given state of affairs, 
Ducasse subsequently makes it clear that he is talking about 
concrete events--"events taken each in its full determinate-
ness and entirety." That is to say, for Ducasse, these events 
"are not selected parts merely of what is occurring at a given 
4-
time or place, nor are they occu{rences considered only in so 
far as exemplifying some more or less abstract kind." Ducasse 
adds: "This entails that they are specifiable only in terms 
of their time and place, i.e., only by means of some such 
phrase as 'what is occurring here now,• or 'what occurred at 
place P at time T. '" Hence, the referents of the symbols C 
and E are, for Ducasse, the "whole completely determinate" 
events "actually occurring at a given time and place." To 
repeat the example above, the impact of the brick on the 
window was not the whole concrete event causing the breaking 
of the window; for, according to Ducasse, the approach of the 
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airwaves coming fro;n the canary's singing was also a part of 
the concrete, and in this case, complex cause-event.~ 
Now, it is precisely at this point that I say that 
Ducasse's usage of ''event" does not conform to the meaning 
of "event" in ordinary language. Ordinary language, I sub-
mit, does not use "event" in this nconcrete" sense, does not 
use "event" in such a way that both the impact of a brick on 
a window pane and the approach to the window of airwaves, 
for instance, would be included within one event. Rather, 
in my judgment, ordinary language uses "event" in such a 
way that each of these above occurrences would be termed an 
''event. 11 And this is exactly what I intend to say when I 
contend that there is no element of such multiplicity or 
complexity in the common, ordinary, usage of "event." 
My conclusion, then, is that Ducasse has defined 
causality in terms of an arbitrary meaning of event, unsup-
portable by ordinary usage, and in so doing, has ignored the 
principles of his own semantical inquiry into the meaning of 
terms. 
iii. My final criticism is, I think, obvious to 
anyone who does not share Ducass's view that the theoretical 
problems of philosophy are essentially semantical. Basically, 
I contend that Ducasse's analysis of causality does not tell 
1 All terms in this paragraph are taken from Nature, 
Mind, and Death, pp. 151-152. 
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us what causality~ but, rather, how, according to his 
interpretation, the word "causality" is used by ordinary 
language. In other words, I maintain that Ducasse 1 s seman-
tical inquiry into the meaning of causality enlightens us 
only as to Ducasse 1 s view of the ordinary meaning of causality 
and not as to the basic metaphysical nature of causality. 
And to assume, as Ducasse seems to have done, that a 
semantical analysis of causality does, in fact, disclose the 
nature of causality is, I believe, an arbitrary and question-
able assumption, the justification for which is neither 
~ Priori nor obvious nor shown. Indeed, I challenge any 
attempt on the part of Ducasse to deduce metaphysical infer-
ences (that is, inferences about the nature of causality} 
from an investigation or inquiry which is explicitly seman-
tical (or in a general sense, phenomenal} as regards data, 
intent, and scope. For to do so, I believe, involves what 
I choose to call the "fallacy of mixed postures," that is 
to say, the fallacy of confounding universes of discourse. 
5. Evaluative Comments Qn Pratt's Approach to Causa-
I find Pratt's approach to causality both commend-
able and sound. In what follows I should like to indicate 
the general basis or bases for my judgment. 
First, it seems to me that Pratt is right in approach-
ing causality at the level of experience. Indeed, I agree 
with him that "the earliest stimulus to the causal way of 
thinking is to be found in the experience of making an 
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effort to act upon things, and of feeling oneself acted upon 
by them." 1 Given this personal experience, I agree that it 
alone must be the starting-point of inquiry or attempted 
analysis regarding causality. For, as Pratt points out, our 
many and diverse experiences, though not self-explanatory, 
are 11 the things we human beings are initially sure of. 112 
And, indeed, I agree that the task of philosophy is to attempt 
to make sense out of experience, and not, as Ducasse would 
have it, to offer a generic definition of the way in which a 
term under consideration is ordinarily used. 
Secondly, it is my inpression that, unlike Ducasse, 
Pratt pointedly comes to grips with the genuine problem of 
causality. The problem of causality, as I see it, is not 
simply the problem of defining the ordinary usage of "cause" 
(which, to me, is mainly a meta-linguistic concern) but one 
of trying to characterize the nature of causation as it mani-
fests itself, for instance, in the direct, personal, dynamic 
experience of "originating movement against resistance,") 
of acting upon things and being acted upon .QI. things. And 
it is exactly to this problem that Pratt addresses himself. 
Pratt is not basically interested in either the way "cause" 
has been used in ordinary discourse or (to use Bowne's 
terminology) in the phenomenal conditions in which events 
1 
119. Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 
2 Personal Realism, Pratt, p. 2. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 129. 
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occur. 1 Rather, it seems to me, Pratt rightly confronts and 
attempts to exhibit what Bowne refers to as "metaphys ic.al 
efficiency" or "dynamic determination. 11 
My final comment is to express agreement with Pratt's 
refusal to talk as though causality could be defined, or 
exhausted within the confines of an explanation. As already 
noted, Pratt says very clearly that the causal processes 
"are dynamic rather than logical; existent rather than 
subsistent. We cannot show by pure reason why they are as 
they are, or how they~ be. We find them." On another 
occasion, he asserts that "causality is ••• not to be 
explained but to be accepted 1w1th natural piety. ru2 
Put another way, Pratt is saying, I think, that the 
"felt" dynamism or efficiency of so-called causal process or 
activity cannot be grasped by definition or explanation. I 
agree completeiy, and am almost inclined to accept Pratt's 
contention as a truism. For, as the contemporary existen-
tialist points out, to define X is to enclose it, is to put 
it in a box so to speak. And to "box" experience, or activ-
ity, or process, or the dynamic, is somehow to stop it, to 
treat it as static, and, hence, to falsify it. 
Anyone who takes seriously, as I do, the cautions of 
today's existentialist, or the philosophies of process of 
1 B. P. Bowne, Metaphysics (N.Y.: American Book Company, 
1910), p. 70. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 136. Except for must, 
underlining is my own. 
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Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne, to name but a few, will 
readily sympathize with the stand which Pratt is taking 
here. Is it extreme to say, pointedly, that experience 
defies adequate expression, let alone definition? 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
To say that the writings of c. J. Ducasse and of J. B. 
Pratt indicate an interest in the mind-body problem would, I 
think, be an obvious understatement. At least one-half of 
Ducasse's major philosophical work, Nature, Mind, and Death, 
deals directly or indirectly with the defining and relating 
of mind and bod~. And Pratt, in a book1 devoted entirely to 
an analysis of the traditional views2 of the relation between 
mind and body, refers to the mind-body problem as "one.of the 
most crucial and fundamental of all metaphysical problems.") 
In this chapter, I intend to compare the basic views 
of Ducasse and Pratt concerning this mind-body problem. How-
ever, before attempting a critical comparison of the two 
solutions to the problem, I shall, and I think advisedly, 
offer theformulation of the problem as accepted by each author. 
By so doing, I expect to ascertain whether or not the respec-
tive hypotheses offered by Ducasse and Pratt are, in fact, 
answers to the same problem, and, consequently, whether or 
1 J. B. Pratt, Matter and Spirit (New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1922). 
2For Pratt, they are three: Interaction, Materialism, 
and Parallelism. 
3 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 3. 
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not any discovered similarity or difference in the two hypo-
theses merits emphasis or de-emphasis. For, clearly, any 
similarity or difference in two hypotheses that are about 
two different issues, or that represent answers to two dif-
ferent questions, cannot be taken at face-value. 
1. The nature of the problem. 
i. Ducasse. On the opening page of Nature, Mind, 
and Death, 1 Ducasse indicates that among the chief problems 
to be investigated in his book is the problem of the relation 
between an individual's mind and his body. That this initial 
declaration of purpose, in fact, discloses Ducasse's con-
ception of the mind-body problem is pointedly brought out at 
the beginning of Ducasse 1 s chapter on "The Mind-Body Relation." 
Here he draws a sharp distinction "between the problem of how 
material things and events are epistemologically related to 
the minds which know them, and the allied yet different 
problem of the ontological relation between a mind and the 
particular material object called its body." And in a manner 
completely devoid of ambiguity, Ducasse adds: "The latter 
is the one we are ultimately concerned with.•• 2 
What Ducasse, essentially, is saying here is that the 
mind-body problem must not be mistaken for what he calls the 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. ). 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 42). 
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Mind-Matter problem; that is to say, it must not be confused 
with the problem which concerns the epistemological relation 
between a mind and the world of material events and things. 
The mind-body problem, "allied yet different, 11 concerns "the 
nature of the ontological relation between a given mind and 
the material object, unique among the many others that mind 
equally perceives, which it calls 'its own' body." 1 
ii. Pratt. As pointed out in my prefatory 
remarks, J. B. Pratt looks upon the mind-body problem as one 
2 
of the most crucial of all philosophical problems. What 
Pratt, in general, means by the problem comes out better in 
his subsequent characterization of it as "the problem of the 
relation of mind to body."3 Like Ducasse, Pratt is clear and 
explicit in his formulation of the problem. Like Ducasse, 
Pratt is quick to insist that the mind-body problem is not a 
"question of pure epistemology." 
The mind-body problem, Pratt maintains, "is not the 
purely epistemological problem of the relation of conscious-
ness to matter, or of subject to object. It may be true, as 
some idealists insist, that there is no object without a sub-
ject, or it may not be true. But the question of its truth 
is not the mind-body problem." Rather, Pratt asserts, the 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 401. 
2 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 3; Personal Realism, p. 
220. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 220. 
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Pr.oblem may be formulated in the following questions: "What 
is the relation between stimulus and sensation; or between 
brain activity and consciousness? And also, what is the 
relation between my conscious will to act and the (physical) 
action of my body?"l 
Again then, for Pratt, as for Ducasse, the mind-body 
problem is not concerned with "cognition and its object.n 2 
It is, rather, centrally concerned with what Ducasse has 
described as the "ontological relation" between a given mind 
and its so-called body. To use Pratt's own terminology, the 
mind-body problem involves a basic concern for "the nQll-
cognitive relation between a psychical existent and a .P...'ttysical 
existent."3 
Hence, it may readily be said that Pratt's view of the 
nature of the mind-body problem is in general agreement with 
the view adopted by Ducasse. The only difference to which 
~ne might point is, I think, what W. E. Johnson would call 
"a greater degree of determinateness" in Pratt's formulation. 
Whereas Ducasse addresses himself consistently to the problem 
of the mind-body relationship, Pratt more specifically ques-
tions the consciousness-brain relationship, the sensation-
stimulus relationship, the conscious will-bodily action 
relationship. 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 221. 
2 Personal Realism, 222. Pratt, p. 
3.I..:b..l4• Underlining is my own. 
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But this difference in specificity within the formula-
tion of the pro hlem is, in my judgment, without significance. 
For, as we shall see, in answer to the mind-body problem Pratt 
develops almost exclusively the less specific relation of 
mind to the entire body, 1 and Ducasse includes within his 
general view a consideration of the more specific consciousnes~ 
brain2 and volition-bodily action3 relationships. 
I proceed, then, on the assumption that Ducasse and 
Pratt are agreed as to the nature of the mind-body problem. 
2. The meaning of 1mind. 1 A consideration of the 
relation between mind and body obviously either presupposes 
or involves the conception of the two terms whose relation is 
being considered. Within the context of the problem, as Pratt 
points out, the term "body" (or more specifically, "brain••) 
is not too troublesome; for there is widespread agreement that 
"body" is "a material, relatively enduring, and space-occupying 
object.• 4 But such is not the case regarding "mind." Indeed, 
the philosophical concern for "mind" has been marked by a 
Babel of tongues--by disagreement, by ambiguity, by confusion. 
What, then, is "mind" for Ducasse and Pratt? Before 
going into a consideration of how Ducasse and Pratt, individ-
ually, conceive the mind-body relation, I think it advisable 
1see, for instance, Personal Realism, pp. 263-274. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 428-429. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 431-432. 
4 Personal Realism, 263. Pratt, p. 
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to spell out, clearly and concisely, the view of "mind" 
adopted by each author. By so doing, I expect to establish 
whether or not their views of the entity to which body is 
(subsequently) related are identical, similar, or essentially 
different. The conclusion of this preliminary inquiry is, I 
think, important to the understanding of the mind-body solu-
tions which we shall later compare. 
1. Ducasse; lJjind as '.eubstance'. In summarizing 
his view of mind, Ducasse asserts that "mind ••• is a 
substance and more specifically a psychical substance; and 
that is so in a sense exactly parallel to that in which a 
material thing ••• is a substance and ~ore specifically a 
1 physical substance." Let us endeavour to see what exactly 
Ducasse is saying in this summary assertion. 
First, it is to be recalled2 that for Ducasse any sub-
stance, by definition, is analyzable "into properties and the 
r~lations of properties." Put another way, a substance for 
Ducasse, is a system of properties.3 And properties are what 
might be called causal capacities or propensities, in the 
sense that to say, for instance, that this paper (as a sub-
stance) has the property called combustibility is to say that, 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 424. 
2see chapter II of this dissertation. 
·3 
p. 613. 
Ducasse, 11 Some Observ::l.t ions Concerning Particular! ty, u 
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in certain specified conditions, application1 of fire to it 
would cause it to burn~ 
Now, in calling mind a "substance," Ducasse is saying, 
unequivocally, that the nature of mind, like the nature of 
any substance, analyzes into a· system of "properties" or 
"capacities" in the above sense. 2 These properties, says 
Ducasse, 
are such things as aptitudes, dispositions, pro-
clivities, habits, tastes, powers, and other mental 
1 traits; 1 for all these--like combustibility, brittle-
ness, corrosiveness, etc.--analyze into 1 if ••• then 
••• 
1 causal connections. Some of them are innate, 
but the great majority are acquired by •conditioning.' 
Some apparently are permanent, or virtually sQ, but 
others change after a longer or shorter time.J 
Among the numerous types of properties which Ducasse 
attributes to mind, two, in particular, merit note here. 
They demand our attention because of the obvious relevance 
they have to Ducasse 1 s view of the relation between mind 
and body. I speak of what Ducasse, respectively, calls 
"psycho-physical" and "physico-psychical" properties. By 
the former Ducasse is suggesting that "a given mind is such 
that, in circumstances of a certain kind, a mental event of 
a cer~in kind (e.g., a volition to raise the arm) causes a 
material event of a certain kind (e.g., motion of the arm).• 
By the latter, Ducasse means that the mind has, under certain 
circumstances, the capacities "to experience sensations of 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 163-165. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 401. 
3 Nature, Mind, and Death, 402. Ducasse, p. 
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various kinds upon stimulation of the sense organs of the 
material object called its body."l To attribute these two 
kinds of properties to the mind,is, I think clearly, either 
to presuppose or to imply a mind-body interaction. 
Further, it is to be noted that, like any other sub-
stance, a mind, for Ducasse, has parts. Put another way, a 
mind, like any other substance, has "sub-systems of capaci-
ties." For the capacities of a mind "are integra ted in a 
number of sub-systems which, although normally connected and 
interacting with one another, nevertheless have each a degree 
of 1ndependence." 2 
To each of these parts, or organs, or sub-systems of 
the mind, Ducasse assigns the name ''self." Strictly speak-
ing, then, "playboy," 11 pater families," "business man," 
"poet," ''devotee," etc., are but names for various parts or 
sub-systems of various minds. And each part, "as existing, 
has its own interests, purposes, and will-to-experience-and-
expression." Sometimes, says Ducasse, one alone of these 
"role-selves" occupies the "stage of consciousness" so to 
speak. At other times, two or more may be on the stage, 
"perhaps cooperating, perhaps contending for dominance or 
1All quotes.in this paragraph are taken from Nature, 
Mind, and Death, p. 403. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 412. Underlining 
is my own. 
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exclusive possession." "At all such times," Ducasse asserts, 
"the other role selves exist only 'subconsciously. tnl 
But what does it mean to say that a role-self is 
"occupying the •stage of consciousness,'" or that the other 
role-selves are "existing only subconsciously?" 
In order to answer this question briefly, and within 
the context of our subheading, it must first be said that 
the history and existing of a mind, for Ducasse, ultimately 
consist in events of two kinds. One type "comprises the 
acquirings, retainings, or losings, of one or another capac-
ity. The other consists of the exercisings of one or another 
capacity." And, Ducasse adds, "each such exercise involves 
the occurrence of one or more intuitions," that is to say, 
one or more events "of the kind where~ is percipi. 112 
For example, when the capacity concerned is what Ducasse 
calls a "physico-psysical" one, the intuition involved is a 
sensation. Or when the capacity concerned is a "psycho-
physical" one, "the intuition involved may be of one or 
another of several kinds, but, typically, would be a volition--
a volition to perform some bodily act. 11 3 
1Quotes in this paragraph are from Nature, Mind, and 
Death, p. 413. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 294. This is 
Ducasse's definition of "intuition." 
3unless otherwise stated, quotes in this paragraph 
are from Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 405. 
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Cognizant of Ducasse's contention that, in effect, 
the existing of a mind ultimately consists in the occurring 
1 
of intuitions, we are now better able to understand Ducasse's 
own answer to this above question. To say that one role-
self or •subsystem of capacities• of the mind is occupying 
the "stage of consciousness" means, for Ducasse, that 11 the 
intuitions then occurring manifest no other." And to say 
that other role-selves are existing only subconsciously 
means, for Ducasse, "that the intuitions then occurring are 
not manifestations of them, or at least not direct manifesta-
tions."2 
So the parts, or role-selves, or subsystems of the 
mind, like members of a family or the organs of a living 
family, each have functions of their own in the life of the 
whole mind, so to speak. And, indeed, a mind, for Ducasse, 
may be said to be "literally a society of semi-independent, 
semi-interdependent role-selves, which during life all use 
the same body and get along together more or less harmoni-
ously and efficiently."3 
However, as Ducasse has pointed out, even after an 
account of the properties and parts of the mind, the question 
is frequently asked, "But what ~ this mind which ~ these 
properties and parts?" Ducasse's answer to this question 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 409. 
2 Nature, Mind, and Death, 413. Ducasse, p. 
3Ibid. 
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represents, I think, a final and essential aspect of his 
view of mind. He says: 
The answer can hardly be put more tellingly than it 
was by the Buddhist sage Nagasena when answering King 
Milindha 1 s same question. He pointed out to the king 
that a chariot, which~ wheels, axle, body, etc.,~ 
nothing other than these together in a certain relation 
to one another; and that this is true likewis~ of a mind 
and the states and other constituents it has. 
In other words, for Ducasse, as for the quoted Buddhist sage, 
what has the capacities, parts, and constituents discussed 
above, is nothing more than the whole which they, all 
together, relatedly constitute. 
Such is the case for any "substance," according to 
Ducasse. 
ii. Pratt: ~ind ~'selr. Towards the closing 
chapters of Matter and Spirit, Pratt states explicitly: 
"I see no way of avoiding some form of the age-long view of 
philosophy and of common sense which would interpret mind 
in terms of self or personality." 2 This statement is pre-
ceded by a disavowal, on the part of Pratt, of any identifica-
tion of mind with either (1) a "form of matter" or (2) "pass-
ing states of consciousness." In regard to the former, Pratt 
says: "It is not in any material realm that mind is to be 
found. What we mean by mind is surely something quite 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 414. 
2 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 172. Underlining is my 
own. 
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different from that. Why seek ye the living among the dead? 111 
The basis for his rejection of the latter identification of 
mind with "stream of consciousness" offers the key to the 
understanding of Pratt's view of mind. Let us look into 
that basis. 
Pratt first makes it clear that, in hj_ s opinion, the 
picture of "stream of consciousness" as provided by intro-
spective psychology is valuable enough as a product of 
objective, scientific analysis, but is inaccurate and mislead-
ing when taken as an account of "the actual reality of our 
inner lives." Then, in one of the most important, perspi-
cacious, and expressive passages in all of his works (and, 
indeed, one which merits quoting in its entirety, here), 
Pratt gives the reasons for his stand. He says: 
The kind of self-examination which does not cut to 
pieces, the sort of thing Bergson refers to as intui-
tion, does not reveal a stream or succession of psychic 
states or pulses, following each other like the passive 
pictures on a cinometographic film. I may analyze my 
experience into successive parts, and from these parts 
I may, for the purpose of definition, record, and com-
munication, construct "percepts" and "concepts." But 
in my living experience there are no such things. 
Here, as so often, scientific analysis transforms what 
it would describe. What we actually live through and 
immediately realize is a self acting in various 
1 Ibid. Along this line, another quotation from Per-
sonal Realism comes to mind. On page 220, Pratt says: "And 
indeed a philosophy which should assert that it could find 
no difference or distinction between what is commonly called 
body and what is commonly called mind would need no char-
acterization from its opponents; no critic could say of it 
more damning things than just that." 
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experiences: ~self, ~subject, Qr psyche, perceiving, 
conceiving, thinking, hoping, feeling, deciding, acting.l 
Again, here, then, as in the case of existence, Pratt 
is asserting emphatically that any attempt to treat mind as 
an ob.lect of analysis, as a thing which could be cut to 
pieces with objective and/or scientific clippers, falsifies 
our immediate, living, subjective experience of mind. 2 For 
what we immediately experience, endure, feel, live through, 
and £y acquaintance, directly know, is not an object, but a 
sub.lect--a subject experiencing, enduring,'' feeling," living 
through, and directly knowing. And this subject or self, 
acting in these many ways and having these diverse experiences, 
is exactly what Pratt means by "mind. 9 
Or, to put the matter in a slightly different way, 
Pratt is saying here, as he did in respect to existence, 
that the term (mind) under consideration cannot be defined.) 
It can be known only by one 1 ~ direct experience, by one 1 s 
"unspoiled intuition" 4 of it, And, in fact, this mind can 
be discerned in every act and moment of our conscious 
living. 11 5 In just living and doing, asserts Pratt, we all 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 267. Underlining is my 
own. 
2 For substantiation of my interpretation, see also p. 
310 of Personal Realism. 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 176. Note also that 
"define" is again used in Pratt 1 s sense of "analyzing into 
ultimate qualities" or "indicating by means of relation." 
4 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 177. 
5Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 316. 
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realize what a mind is. It is the self acting, so to speak. 
"It is a center of dynamic force, an actor; and it has an 
inclusiveness and unity whj_ch no passing state of conscious-
ness and no running section of the stream can possess." 1 
Or, in other words, "it is a center of psychic powers whose 
characteristics necessarily transcend any given section of 
conscious esperience, and which are essentially inexhaustible 
2 by any passing moment." It is that which wills, feels, 
thinks, perceives, conceives, suffers, strives, knows, has 
purposes, etc.J 
But care must be taken to note that, in speaking of 
mind or self as "that which," the "that which" is always in 
relation to an activity or a ttdoing." For Pratt makes it 
clear that his "self" is 11 by no means the unqualified blank 
substance of some of the scholastics, nor merely the pure 
perceiving of some of the idealists.tt Indeed, what a thing 
1§ cannot be divorced from what it does; what a self is cannot 
be separated from what it does. And it is certainly for this 
reason that Pratt subsequently says: "To perceive or find 
the self ••• , apart from its states and activities, is 
quite out of the question, and had this been all that Hume 
intended, his denial of self-knowledge would have been 
entirely justified." 4 
l P~rsonal Realism, 266. Pratt, p. 
2 Pratt, Matter and S£irit, p. 179. 
3 Matter S:Qirit, 177. Pratt, and p. 
4 
Jl4. Pratt, P~r~onal R~alism, p. 
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Hence, the mind or self, in Pratt, is neither a "col-
lection of states" nor "a blank bearer," so to speak. To 
define it as either is to rationalize it, is to objectify it, 
is to miss its essential and dynamic subjectivity, and, con-
sequently, is to falsify it. Now, let us look at this con-
tention from a slightly different perspective--a perspective 
which will shed further light on Pratt's refusal to define 
mind and which will invite comparative remarks concerning 
Pratt's and Ducasse's view of mind. 
Essentially, Pratt, in the above exposition, is saying 
that the mind is not a merely logical or perceptual construct, 
but is an existent being. And, as was pointed out in chapter 
III of this dissertation, there is in every existent (accord-
ing to Pratt) "a non-rational existential aspect which can 
never be reached by conceptual description and which can be 
realized only by intuition." 1 So, again, it is not difficult 
to see that, for Pratt, any attempt to define or describe 
rationally an existent mind would either fail miserably or 
transform its very nature. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that, as an existent, mind 
"must have character--it cannot be a merely abstract and 
colorless X. 1' This being the case, then mind or self must 
be a substance in Pratt's own sense discussed in chapter III 
of this dissertation, that is, in the sense of being "an 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 315. 
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existent substantive" or ua.n existent group of existent quali-
ties.111 Thus, despite Pratt's fundamental emphasis on the 
mind as self, mind is for Pratt, as for Ducasse, a substance 
in the very sense in which he himself views substance. And, 
to use his own words: "It is not a blank and abstract sub-
stance nor a blank unity, but a substance with qualities, a 
un~ that possesses rich variety. These qualities or char-
acters and this variety are seen in the conscious states· of 
2 the self and its activities." 
However, to say that for both Pratt and Ducasse mind 
is a substance is by no means to make identical the two 
views of mind. For, as pointed out in the earlier chapter 
on substance, although the two views of substance are, in 
some respects, at least ostensibly the same (e.g. Ducasse 
refers to substance as a "system of properties" while Pratt 
speaks of substance as a "group of existent qualities"), 
they have essential differences. While Pratt, for instance, 
sees in substance an element of existential, non-rational 
giveness which forbids a definition or analysis of substance, 
Ducasse presumes to define substance exhaustively; that is 
to say, for Ducasse, substance is nothing.more than proper-
ties and the relations between properties. 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 298. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 315-316. Underlining 
is my own. 
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Of course, the above accounts of mind bring out a 
number of other factors which would prevent the identifica-
tion of Pratt's and Ducasse's view of mind. While Pratt 
repeatedly rejects the view that mind is nothing but a stream 
of consciousness or succession of psychic states, 1 Ducasse 
explicitly refers to an existing mind as a "stream of 1ntui-
tions."2 While Pratt insists that every psychic state implies 
a mind or self which~ or has these states,3 and which is 
not just the sum of its states, 4 Ducasse maintains that the 
mind is "nothing other than these together in a certain rela-
tion to one another. 11 5 While Pratt makes clear that the 
mind or self has a unity and identity of its own, 6 Ducasse 
emphatically suggests? that there is no unity which (in 
Pratt's words) "lies beyond each mental state," and "endures 
1see, for instance, Matter and Spirit, p. 181, or 
Personal Realism, p. 266. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 409. 
)Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 174, and Personal 
Realism, pp. 314, 316. 
4 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 181. 
5Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 414. 
6Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 305. It is to be noticed, 
in fact, that, for Pratt, the self "is sui generis in pos-
sessing a unity of an inherent sort which no other substance 
possesses." That is to say, the self is the only being which 
is essentially one. It is uniquely "unity-in-variety." See 
also Matter and Spirit, p. 175. 
7Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 414. 
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in the midst of its changing acts and states." 1 Finally, 
while Pratt contends that there is no distinction to be 
drawn between a "mind" and a "self, 112 Ducasse maintains that, 
as a part or a subsystem of capacities of the mind, a "self" 
must be distinguished from a "mind.".3 
One last point, not explicitly mentioned above, may 
well be noted prior to our consideration of the view of the 
mind-body relation held, respectively, by Ducasse and Pratt. 
This point concerns knowledge of the mind. More specifically, 
both Pratt and Ducasse affirm that knowledge of the mind can 
be had by a kind of direct intuition, acquaintance, or intro-
spection. Ducasse says pointedly that "the mind is directly 
observable only by introspection," 4 that mind must be defined 
"in terms of facts introspectively observable."5 By "intro-
spection," Ducasse means •attentive intuition," 6 and, as seen 
earlier, "intuition" is used by Ducasse to designate the 
occurrence of an event of the kind where ~ is 2erci2i. 
The nature of any mental event is known to one intuitively 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, p. )06. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 266. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 41). 
4 Nature, Mind, and Death, 242, 245. Ducasse, pp. 
5Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 42.3. 
6 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 295' .300. 
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at the moment of its occurrence. 1 And, of course, as noted 
above, it is in the occurring of such intuitive events that, 
for Ducasse, the existence of a mind ultimately consists. 2 
Pratt, as we have seen, states very directly: " • • • 
I believe that we have a certain kind of direct intuition of 
the self or mind and this gives us a knowledge of it which, 
like any other knowledge of acquaintance, is incapable of 
being completely stated in descriptive terms."3 But Pratt 
makes it clear that "we do not find it [i.e., the mind or 
self] as we do its feelings and percepts." Rather "we know 
that the self is, and we know what it is by observing what 
it does." 4 Put another ~'lay, for Pratt, 
The self [or mind] is not part of the conscious con-
tent found directly as feelings and sense are. But in 
every case of knowledge we are directly aware of the 
"datum" not merely as a thing but as a datum, 1,.~., as 
something given .. The givenness is given. The datum is 
something given to us, it is an object of our awareness 
or of our thought. All experience contains the implica-
tions of §. sub.iect. The subject-object relation is one 
of the characters ~hich we find or feel whenever we are 
aware of anything. . 
To illustrate his view of the subject-object relation, 
Pratt considers a stick. No matter how often one cuts a 
1 Mind, Death, 400. Ducasse, Nature, and p. 
2 Mind, and Death, 409. Ducasse, Nature, p. 
J Personal Realism, 315. Underlining Pratt, p. is my 
own. 
4 Personal 311. Pratt, Realism, p. 
5Pra tt, Personal Realism, p. 314. 
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stick it has two ends. Similarily, in awareness, two "ends," 
so to speak, are always present, namely subject and object. 
Again, then, 11 the self [or mind] • • • cannot be found in the 
way Hume sought to find it, but the reason~ that it is 12£ 
~ to be seen. It is, of course, the very finder and we can 
never get away from it. 'When me they fly, I am the wings. 111 1 
Hence, granted the differences between their views of 
mind, Ducasse and Pratt yet agree the.t "mind 11 can be known, 
at least in part, by direct awareness or intuition of it. 
In other words, each affirms that, as regards mind, we have 
2 11 knowledge by acquaintance." For the purpose of subsequent 
exposition and understanding, we need not go into any greater 
details concerning this matter. In passing to an examination 
of the relation between mind and body, it suffices, simply, 
to note that each author claims a direct experiencing of what 
he calls "mind." 
3. The Mind-~ nelation. We saw in part I of this 
chapter that Ducasse and Pratt are in general agreement con-
cerning the nature of the mind-body problem. Each writer 
affirmed unequivocally that the mind-body problem is not the 
purely epistemological problem of the relation of conscious-
ness to matter, of subject to object, of cognition to the 
1 Ibid., underlining is my own. 
2Ducasse uses the term "experient l{nowledge 11 to express 
knowledge by acquaintance. See A Philosophical Scrutiny of 
Religion (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1953), p. 87. 
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objects of cognition, but, rather, the 11allied, yet different 
problemu of the ontological relation between a mind and its 
so-called body. We are now to look into each author's view 
of this relation. 
i. Ducasse. It is to be noted, first of all, that 
our inquiry thus far into Ducasse's view of substance, of 
cause, and of mind, has provided no evidence which would 
preclude the interaction between minds and human bodies. 
Although in his treatment of causality, for instance, Ducasse 
makes it clear that interaction between different substances 
(for example, between copper and nitric acid) does occur, 1 
yet he in no way implies that interaction between two sub-
stances can occur only when both substances involved are 
physical. In fact, to the contrary, in his consideration of 
mind as substance, Ducasse clearly suggests that certain 
psychical events may have physical, bodily causes, and certain 
physical, bodily events {e.g., blushing) may have psychical 
causes. 2 More specifically, Ducasse states unambiguously 
that minds have, amongst other properties, both psycho-
physical and 2hysico-psychical properties. In respect to 
the former, as seen earlier, Ducasse means that a given mind 
is such that, in circumstances of a particular type, a mental 
event of a·given kind (for instance, willing to raise the arm) 
1 Nature, Mind, and Death, 162. Ducasse, p. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 424. See also 
p. 426. 
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causes a physical event of a particular kind (for instance, 
the actual moving of the arm). As regards the latter, 
Ducasse means that a given mind is such that, in circumstances 
of a particular kind, it is capable of experiencing certain 
sensations (for example, pain) effected by the stimulation 
of one or more sense organs of the body. 1 And, indeed, to 
say that the mind has these psycho-physical and physico-
psychical properties is to say that causal interaction between 
mind and body actually occurs. 
Let us now turn to Ducasse's consideration of the 
mind-body relation, as such. 
(1) "Which Human ~ 1.§. One 1 s -~?" Ducasse enters 
a specific inquiry into the mind-body relation by asking the 
meaning of the assertion that a particular body is "one's 
own." He is, in effect, seeking the criteria by which I, 
for example, affirm that one particular body, amongst 
thousands of other existent and perceived bodies, is "my 
own."
2 
Without taking the reader through the formal steps of 
this inquiry, Ducasse hypothesizes four peculiarities which, 
he maintains, are criterial of ownership of the body. 
First, what I call "my body" is, according to Ducasse, 
"the only physical object in which certain activities of my 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 40J. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 425. 
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mind directly cause or inhibit movements or other bodily 
changes." In only one human body is blushing, for instance, 
effected by my feeling shame, or nausea by my worrying. And, 
most significantly, it is in only one human body that my 
mere willing to raise an arm does, in normal circumstances, 
consistently cause the arm to rise. "That the volition 
causes the movement of the arm• is, Ducasse insists, "some-
thing for which I have empirical evidence as good as, if not 
better than, for say of the other facts universally accepted 
as instances of causation." Moreover, the experimental 
evidence that my willing causes the motion of my arm is of 
exactly the same form as, for instance, "the evidence I have 
that turning the switch of my lamp causes it to light, or 
that pressing a piano key causes the sound which follows. 
The form of each, maintains Ducasse, is Single Difference, 
and Regularity of Sequence. 1 
Secondly, I call "my body" the only one, the "physical 
stimulation of which in certain manners causes in [my] mind 
sensations of certain corresponding kinds." As an illustra-
tion Ducasse offers the following case: I am perceiving, let 
us say, a half-dozen hands protruding from under a cloth, 
each hand being pricked, in order, by a pin. Which hand, if 
any, do I call "mine?" Of course, I call a particular one 
1All quotes in this paragraph are from Nature, Mind, 
and Death, p. 425. 
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of them "mine" if and only if the pricking of it causes me 
to feel pain. 1 
Thirdly, contends Ducasse, to call a body one's own 
means that "it is the only one, certain mutilations of whose 
brain or its nerve connections even directly cause alterations 
in the capacities of one's conscious mind. 11 To illustrate, 
Ducasse offers a number of examples: "The severing of 
afferent or efferent nerves destroys the mind's capacities 
to respond to the corresponding sense stimuli or to cause 
corresponding bodily acts; 11 the destroying of various cortical 
areas of the brain destroys, at least temporarily, certain 
psycho-physical skills--for example, certain linguistic 
skills; the prefrontal lobotomy rather conspicuously changes 
the conscious personality. Again, then, a body is called 
"one's own" if the former change mentioned in any of the 
above examples, for instance, brings about the mentioned 
corresponding effect. 2 
Fourthly, (to go in the converse causal direction) 
the only one body which is called "one's own" is the body 
11 in which, alone, certain changes of structure, viz., the 
more or less elaborate connections among brain neurons 
corresponding to certain habits and· skills, can be bro,;~ght 
about by persistent firm volition to acquire such habits or 
1Quotes and paraphrases in this paragraph are taken 
from Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 427. 
2A . k N 11 quotes in this paragraph are ta en from ature, 
Mind, and Death, pp. 428-429. 
~~----­
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skills; for example, some linguistic or musical skill, or 
some code of manners, or some admired and desiderated moral 
virtue. 11 Ducasse readily admits that the acquiring of any 
of these habits or skills depends on "recurrent practice,n 
but he is quick to add that the "immediate determinant 11 of 
the practising is, in all such cases, the "abiding firm pur-
pose to acquire""the habit or skill. 1 
(2) Interaction between mind and body ~, then, 
analytically true. According to Ducasse, this delireation 
of the four peculiarities criterial of the ownership of the 
body one calls "one's own 11 brings out clearly the basic mean-
ing of the. questl on as to the relation between a mind and 
"its 11 body. The question, asserts Ducasse, turns out to 
mean: "How 1a a mind related to the particular human body 
with which it alone immediately interacts? 11 And he adds 
quickly and pointedly: "This analysis of the mean1ng of the 
question makes evident the answer to the question; namely, 
that the mind-body relation, whose specific nature the ques-
2 tion concerns, is that of direct causal interaction." 
It is Ducasse's contention, then, that direct causal 
interaction between mind and body is, ttas a matter of con-
ceptual analysis, 11 the "true" relation between a mind and 
its body. 3 For this causal inter-relation between mind and 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 429. 
2Ibid., for all quotes in this paragraph. 
3Ibid. 
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body is, according to Ducasse, presupposed in the very ask-
ing of the mind-body question. In fact, he maintains, it 
would equally be presupposed or implicitly affirmed in the 
denial of a causal connection between a mind and its body; 
for, again, 11 the expression 1 its body, 1 which would figure 
in the denial as well as in the question, means 1 the body 
with which alone the mind concerned has direct causal con-
nection. 111 Therefore, concludes Ducasse, the denial would 
be implicitly self-contradictory; that is to say, the denial 
would, at once, both implicitly affirm and explicitly deny 
direct causal interaction. 1 
(3) The fundamental ~elation between~ mind and its 
~ody. Granted that direct causal interaction expresses, 
for Ducasse, the general relation between a mind and its 
body, we have yet to observe the details of this relation-
ship. Hence, let us now take note of Ducasse's specific 
formulation of both the basic mind-body relation, per se, 
and the several complex relations ultimately made possible 
by this basic relation. 2 
Ducasse expresses the fundamental mind-body relation 
in the following manner: "For each mind there is normally 
one and only one physical object called its body, which is 
such that it, or more specifically its brain, is the immedi-
ate physical patient of that mind, and the immediate physical 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 430. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 431. 
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agent upon that mind."l In other words, according to Ducasse, 
there is normally, for each mind, one and only one body, or 
more specifically brain, which can immediately act upon 
(agent), or be acted upon by (patient) that mind. 
This basic relation may, Ducasse affirms, be analyzed 
into the following statements: 
First, that, as seen earlier in this chapter, a mind 
is a psychical substance, so to speak, and the brain is a 
physical substance. 
Second, that in both of these substances various events 
or changes occur. 
·Third, that to say the brain is functioning at a spe-
ific time as physical patient of the mind means, as suggested 
above, that certain mental events are, at that time, bringing 
about certain brain events; and to say that the brain at a 
specific time 11 is functioning as physical agent upon the mind 
means that certain brain events then occurring are causing 
certain mental events." 
11 Fourth, that to say that the brain is immediate 
physical patient of, and agent upon, the mind, means that 
the causation just mentioned is direct, i.e., without inter-
mediary." 
And fifth, that to assert that "the brain is the 
immediate patient of, and agent upon, the mind," means that 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, ~Death, p. 432. 
the brain is the only physical substance which normally 
functions as such. 1 
153 
Hence, in summary, it may be said that for Ducasse a 
mind and its body are distinct substances related directly 
or immediately to one another by causal interaction. This 
view, of course, involves a reaffirmation of the classical 
Cartesian interaction hypothesis but, as Ducasse himself 
points out, (and his painstaking details leave no room for 
doubt), it "is much more circumstantial and its terms ••• 
more precisely defined than in the case of the classical 
••• hypothesis, which says little more than that mind and 
body 1nteract." 2 
We turn now to Pratt's view of the ontological rela-
tion between mind and body. 
ii. Pratt. Pratt•s approach to the mind-body 
I 
problem is, like his approach to the other topics we have 
considered, undeniably experiential. Regarding the problem 
(to use his own terminology) of the ontological relationship 
between "brain activity and consciousness," between "my con-
scious will to act and the (physical) action of my body," or 
more generally, between a mind or self and its body,3 Pratt 
is quick to turn to experience and ask: What has experience 
to say on this matter? And his answer is both expected and 
1 . Quotes in this paragraph are taken from Nature, Mind, 
and Death, p. 432. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and.Death, p. 442. 
3Pratt, Personal healism, p. 221. 
emphatic: "If I am not tremendously mistaken, experience 
speaks here in no uncertain terms." 1 
154 
Indeed, asserts Pratt, "the simplest and com::;onest 
experiences of every day" speak significantly to this problem. 2 
In sensation, for instance, we seem to find "a physical pro-
cess operating upon our consciousness." To use Ducasse 1 s 
illustration, the sensation of pain, for example, is experi-
enced by one every time a pin penetrates part of my body. 
Further, "in volition we feel ourselves,as psychical beings, 
operating upon the physical world. 1t) "I will to raise my 
hand,n for instance, "and my hand rises." 4 "Thoughts, clothed 
in verbal forms and accompanied by the urge to express them, 
fill my mind, and I speak the words and expound the thoughts."5 
All "our working life," in fact, seems to provide continuous 
examples of the direct causal influence of mind on body, and 
of body on mind. So many of our so-called mental or psychical 
events (sensations, in particular) appear clearly to have 
bodily causes, and so many of our bodily events (movements of 
the body, in particular) appear to have psych:ical or mental 
1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 139. 
2Ibid. 
JPratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 8. 
4 . Pratt, Matter and Snirit, p. 139. Again, note 
similarity to Ducasse 1 s example. 
5Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 257. 
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causes (viz., our volitions). That is to say, our "simplest 
experiences" seem to speak unambiguously for a relation of 
interaction between mind and body. So, "surely, the burden 
of proof lies upon him who would deny a view that appears to 
have such literally unlimited empirical ver1fication." 1 
Again, then, Pratt, as a self-defined empiricist, turns 
2 to "the things that we human beings are initially sure of," 
~he things" which we directly know by acquaintance, namely, 
Qg£ experiences. As we have already seen, it is at the level 
of personal experience that Pratt finds Existence and Causal-
ity. And now his coming to grips with the mind-body relation 
is at this same existential level. That is to say, it is on 
a subjective, experiential basis, na~ely, on the basis of our 
individual "experiencings," that Pratt affirms the direct 
influence of mind on body and body on mind, or, in other words, 
what Ducasse calls "causal interaction." 
Indeed, Pratt goes even further than this. Not only 
is it the case that an appeal is here made to experience and 
that our "commonest experiences" are said to testify to mind-
body interaction, but Pratt insists that the relation between 
mind and body can be directly known only by being experienced.3 
That is to say, the mind-body relation, like Pratt's Existence 
1Ibid. 
2 Personal Pratt, Realism, p. 2. 
3Pratt, PeY'sonal Realism, p. 269. 
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or Bergson's duree, can be grasped only by a mind's direct 
~cquaintance with it. To use Pratt's own characterization, 
the mind-body relation is "sui generis unique;~ and, as such, 
it cannot be enclosed within the limits of a definition, or 
essentially grasped by any way other than by direct experience. 
So, "if you ask me to illustrate the relation between them 
[mind and body] by citing some relation between other things 
in common life which it is exactly like, I cannot do it. For 
the relation between the self [or mind] and its body is not 
exactly like any other relation.• Moreover, Pratt insists, 
if you want further knowledge of the ontological relation 
between a mind and its body, •you must turn to your own body 
and your [i.e., your mind 1s] relation to it and see. That 
is what this relation is like!•2 
For Pratt, then, the mind-body relation is unique, 
sui generis, and directly known only by being experienced. 
This does not mean, however, that Pratt refuses to offer any 
hypothesis about the relation of mind or self to body. On 
the contrary, we have already seen that, on the very basis 
of experiential acquaintance with volition and sensations, 
for instance, Pratt affirms direct interaction between mind 
and body--that is, the direct influence of mind on body and 
1 In calling the mind-body relation •sui generis, 
unique," Pratt makes it clear that he is not saying that the 
relation is unique in being unique. For, indeed, as we have 
already seen, existence, mind, relation and "innumberable 
other things" can, for Pratt, be known only by being experi-
enced. Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
WE ~ 
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body on mind. And we may, further, take note of Pratt's 
subsequent attempt to suggest1 more explicitly some of the 
characteristics of this sui generis relation. He says: 
The relation of the self [or mind] to its body is 
unique. , It is not a mechanical relation. The expres-
sion which seems to me to suggest this relation most 
satisfactorily is Green's, who says that the self is 
"organic to a body 8 or, tG borrow a phrase from Profes-
sor Stout, it is th~ "embodied self" which the mind-body 
relation indicates. 
And, in another place, he states more specifically: 
This much seems plain: that the physical and 
physiological processes in a perceptual situation 
affect the self [or mind], so that it experiences 
sense by means of which it becomes aware of external 
objects. Awareness is not a mere passive beholding 
of pictures; it is an active process of the self. 
It follows upon a physiological process and accompanies 
the continuation of that process (this~ mz guess). 
He continues: 
own. 
••• The self [or mind] and its brain act at the 
same time and joLntly, just as my hand and the poker 
do when I poke the fire with it (only be it remembered, 
in a more intimate connection). The physiological pro-
cess and the activity of the embodied self are not 
identical, any more than the act of the poker and the 
act of my hand are strictly identical; yet as poker and 
hand go through one motion and perform one act, so the 
brain process and the activity of the self [or mind] 
merge in one complex total deed •••• [And) the act 
may be changed or even completely stopped ••• either 
by the inhibiting force of the willing self o) by the 
rupture of some part of the bodily mechanism. 
1 I use this advisedly. See following quote. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 266. Underlining is my 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 269-270. Underlining 
is my own. 
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But there is never any doubt that, for Pratt, these 
remarks are but "ways of speaking,"l are but "guesses" or 
"suggestions," are but inadequate attempts to exhibit various 
characteristics of a relation which ggn be known only ~ 
being directly experienced. They are by no means attempts to 
define the mind-body relation. Indeed, Pratt makes it clear 
that the mind-body relation, being an experiential "simple" 2 
and sui generis,3 cannot be defined; for definition involves 
analysis, and no •simple" is analyzable for the very reason 
4 that it is simple. Again, the only way to understand the 
nature of the mind-body relation or any other simple is by 
going to personal experience, that is, by directly experienc-
ing it.5 
Pratt, I think, summarizes his position well when, 
towards the end of a chapter on "Interaction," he makes the 
• • • Let me repeat that I do not following statement: " 
insist upon the suggestions I have made as to how the self 
and its body are related and how they co-operate. The 
important point is that they QQ QQ-operate and~ related.• 6 
1 Personal Realism, 268. Pratt, p. 
2 Personal Realism, )). Pratt, p. 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 269. 
4 Personal Realism, 57. Pratt, pp. )2, 
5Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 33, 269. 
6 Personal Realism, 272. Except for how, Pratt, p. 
underlining is my own. 
To put the matter another way, Pratt does not insist upon 
his proposals concerning the manner in which the mind and 
body, or consciousness and brain, are related; rather, 
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speaking on the basis of indubitable personal experience (e.g., 
the experience of willing to raise an arm), he asserts simply 
that they do interact. In other words, direct acquaintance 
with volitions or sensations enables the experiencer to know 
that there ~ a co-operation or causal interaction between 
mind and body, but not how the mind and body mutually influ-
ence one another. Says Pratt: • • • • I think we must admit 
that we cannot say • • • how such mutual influence occurs." 1 
And, certainly, it was for this reason that he earlier 
asserted: "I hazard my proposals for what they may be worth; 
but the larger hypothesis of interaction does not stand ~ 
fall with them. n 2 
Once more, then, Pratt,has turned to direct, personal 
experience. Experience has testified unambiguously to the 
relation of interaction or causal influence between mind and 
body, but has offered no conclusive details concerning how 
such an interaction takes place. Of course, in advocating 
this "larger hypothesis" Pratt has subjected himself to the 
classical criticisms of Interactionism. And, indeed, it is 
now for us to delineate these criticisms and examine the man-
ner in which both Pratt and Ducasse meet them. 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 258. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 269. Underlining is my 
own. 
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4. The difficulties ~f interactionism. In his very 
useful little book, Our Minds and Their Bodies, John Laird 
formulates concisely "the crucial arguments which are alleged 
to refute interaction." He states: "There are two of these 
crucial arguments, the first of them maintaining that the 
utter disparity between mind and body makes nonsense of the 
theory of their mutual action, the second that this mutual 
action, if it occurred, would contradict the physical principle 
of the conservation o'f energy."l Both Pratt and Ducasse seem, 
basically, to concur with Laird's location of the objections. 
Says Pratt: "· •• The opposition to Interaction rests 
exactly upon two philosophical opinions. The first of these 
is the theory that cause and effect must be alike, that 
things so different in kind as mind and body cannot influence 
each other. The second is the theory that the 'law• of the 
conservation of physical energy is universal and is incon-
sistent with Interaction." 2 And Ducasse proposes rejoinders 
to the same objections that (1) causes and effects must be 
similar in nature or kind3 and (2} "the principle of the 
4 conservation of energy precludes psycho-physical causation.• 
1J. Laird, Our Minds and Their Bodies (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1925), pp. 60-61. Underlining is my own. 
my own. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 257-258. Underlining is 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 239, 431. 
4 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 240. 
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Before considering the way in which Pratt and Ducasse treat 
these two main objections, let us make sure that we grasp 
the basic reasoning involved in them. 
c. D. Broad provides succinct amplification of the 
first objection. In offering the philosophical arguments 
against the kind of "two sided" Interaction we have found in 
Pratt and Ducasse, he states that "the common philosophical 
argument is that minds and mental states are so extremely 
unlike bodies and bodily states that it is inconceivable 
that the two should be causally connected." Certainly, if 
minds and mental events are exactly as they appear to be in 
introspection and nothing more, "and if bodies and bodily 
events are just what enlightened common-sense thinks them to 
be and nothing more, the two are extremely unlike." This 
fact, then, "is supposed to show that, however closely cor-
related certain pairs of events in mind and body respectively 
may be, they cannot be causally connected."! The following 
statement of w. K. Clifford aptly exemplifies this objection: 
If anybody says that the will influences matter, the 
statement is not [only] untrue, but it is nonsense. The 
will is not a material thing, it is not a mode of material 
motion •••• The only thing which influences matter is 
the position of ~urrounding matter or the motion of sur-
rounding matter. 
Broad also sheds light on the second objection. He 
says: 
1c. D. Broad, The Mind and ~ Place in Nature (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1925), p. 97. 
2 ' Quoted in Laird, Our Minds and Their Bodies, p. 61. 
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I imagine that the argument, when fully stated, would 
run somewhat as follows: "I will to move my arm, and it 
moves. If volition has anything to do with causing the 
movement we might expect energy to flow from my mind to 
my body. Thus the energy of my body ought to receive a 
measurable increase, not accounted for by the food that 
I eat and the oxygen that I breathe. But no such physi-
cally unaccountable increases of bodily energy are found.l 
Or, in the converse direction, 
I tread on a tin-tack, and a painful sensation arises 
in my mind. If treading on the tack has anything to do 
with causing the sensation, we might expect energy to 
flow from my body to my mind. Such energy would cease 
to be measurable. Thus there ought to be a noticeable 
decrease in my bodily energy, not balanced by increases 
in the physical system. But such unbalanced decreases 
in bodily energy are not found. 
Hence, it is inferred that volition has nothing to do with 
the causing of the movement of my arm, and stepping on the 
tack has nothing to do with causing the sensation of pain. 2 
The difficulty of reconciling Interaction with con-
servation of energy may then be formulated in a brief yet 
pointed question: If it is never possible for energy to be 
created or destroyed, how can the physical energy of the 
brain e~er influence the mind, or the mind affect the brain. 
Should we not have the destruction of energy in the former 
case and the creation of energy in the latter?3 
Pratt and Ducasse appear to be agreed concerning the 
two main criticisms leveled against Interactionism. Let us 
now see how they would answer these objections. 
1 Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, p. 106. 
2 Broad, The Mind and ~ Place in Nature, pp. 106-107. 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 14). 
(1) Pratt. 
(a) In ~,regard to the first argument that the 
extreme disparity between mind and body make their mutual 
influence impossible, Pratt has a number of points to make. 
He begins by noting that this particular argument is usually 
based "on our inability to say how mind affects matter or 
matter affects mind." As we have seen earlier, Pratt clearly 
admits to this "inability." But, Pratt asks, is the critic 
in any better position? Can he tell us how matter affects 
matter? "Does he see a force or something-or-other going 
over from one billiard ball to another, or from the moon to 
the tides?" 1 
Next, Pratt contends that the question of a causal 
connection between two events cannot be decided~ priori. 
"Whether one event contributes to the production of another 
is a matter to be settled by observation." For instance, 
if there appears to be an invariable sequence between two 
events, we begin to inquire as to whether or not the two 
events are causally related. twe have already seen, in our 
examination of Pratt's view of causality, that "observed 
regularity of sequence" is accepted as "prima facie evidence 
of the continuity of process which is causation.") 2 And if 
we have no good reason to believe that the two events belong 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 258-259. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 131. 
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to two obviously different and non-continuous series (such 
as day and night), we are justified in inferring that the 
relation between the two events is a causal one.l Now, 
according to Pratt, the important point to be noticed here 
is that, in certain oases of "continuity of process," physi-
cal processes are continued by physiological processes, and 
these, in turn, by "psychical processes within the correlated 
mind," 2 and the latter again by physiological processes. 
"This is what is observed." It is observed in much the same 
manner (to revert to the example of our last chapter) as is 
the continuous process of the flight of the stone into the 
breaking of the glass. And only "a long-outgrown and~ priori 
dogmatism [would] venture to say: Here can be no causation.") 
In short, then, Pratt's answer to the first main argu-
ment against Interaction may be summarized in the following 
way: There is no ~ priori reason for precluding the rela-
tion of causal influence between mental events and bodily 
events. Observation testifies to invariable sequences between 
certain mental events and certain bodily events. These invari-
able sequences seem to involve one and only one continuous 
process. , Invariable sequence is an "excellent test of the 
presence of causation;" continuity of process is the essential 
own. 
1Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 132, 259. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 259, underlining is my 
3Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 259. 
characteristic of causality. Hence, observed invariable 
sequence between certain mental and bodily events seem to 
pass the test, and meet the essential requirement, of 
causation. 
(b) Concerning the second argument, Pratt agrees 
that Interaction~ incompatible with the theory or law of 
the Conservation of Energy. But, he maintains, the fact 
of this antithesis does not justify the conclusion that 
Interaction is therefore impossible. For, reasons Pratt, 
before any conclusion is reached regarding the actual implica-
tions of Conservation of Energy for Interaction, the truth of 
the theory must be established. And "if this theory is 
demonstrable, plainly it must be demonstrated like anything 
else, in one of three ways. Either it must be a necessary 
logical truth, or it must be an observable fact, or it must 
be a law deducible empirically from the sum total of observed 
and relevant facts.nl But, Pratt answers us, not even the 
most "enthusiastic propounder" of Conservation of Energy 
would argue that either it is a necessary logical truth or 
that it is verifiable by direct observation. Hence, if tt 
is demonstrable at all, it must be so on the basis of 
empirical verification, that is to say, on inductive grounds. 2 
1 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 148-149. 
2 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 149i 
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However, the question arises, where are we to look 
for this empirical verification? Is there any way of prov-
ing empirically that in the relations between mind and body 
"no energy is ever created or destroyed?" Indeed not, 
answers Pratt. There is not even conclusive empirical evi-
dence to establish constancy of energy throughout the inor-
ganic or entire non-psychical world. In each case, the con-
servation of energy is only a postulate which most of us are 
willing to make. 1 And, adds Pratt, even if we were to grant 
that throughout the inorganic and entire non-psychical world, 
"no new energy ever comes into being or ceases to be," certain 
basic questions would still remain: "What reasons have we 
for believing that this quantitative identity also obtains 
in those physical bodies that have the unique character of 
being somehow connected with consciousness?" "Is there any 
empirical or experimental evidence in its favor?" To each of 
these questions, Pratt's answer is "None whatever!" So, he 
concludes, "Why ••• hold such a view?" 2 
In other words, then, Pratt is quite willing to admit 
that there is an incompatibility between the theory or 
postulate of Conservation of Energy and alleged mind-body 
Interaction. If it is the case that energy can never be 
1 Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 149-150; Personal 
Realism, p. 262. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 262-263. 
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created or destroyed, then the contention, for instance, that 
the physical energy of the brain can influence the mind and, 
in so doing, involve a loss or destruction of energy, is in 
clear opposition. But, Pratt maintains, the admission of 
this theoretical incompatibility does not preclude the truth 
of Interactio~ For Conservation or Constancy of Energy.as 
neither an~ Priori truth nor an a posteriori, empirically 
verifiable, fact. It is, even at the inorganic, non~ychical 
level, only a postulate and not an empirically demonstrable 
certainty. Hence, to dism1ss the Interaction hypothesis on 
the basis of the postulate of Conservation of Energy would 
constitute, from Pratt's point of view, an arbitrary, 
empirically unwarranted, action. 
(2) Ducasse. 
(a) To the first objection that the disparity 
between mind and body makes inconceivable any causal inter-
action between them, Ducasse 1 s answer is both pointed and 
perspicacious. "I submit," says Ducasse, "that the question 
whether an event A can be what causes another event B under 
certain circumstances C is not to be decided ~ nriori by 
asking whether A, B, and C are all in some specified sense 
'physical,' nor by asking oneself whether the supposition 
h{llppens to titillate one's private sense of the ludic~ous." 
Rather, says Ducasse, the only way to ascertain whether A 
caused or can cause B in given circumstances, c, is "by 
asking whether the relation observed to exist between A, B, 
and C, is of the~ form which makes us anywhere else 
describe a given relation as a causal relation." 1 
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What Ducasse is saying here, then, is that the causal 
relation is entirely neutral in respect to the nature of the 
events serving as terms in it. Whether the relation between 
two events is a causal one does not, in any way, depend upon 
the kind or kinds of events they are, but solely and entirely 
upon the form of the relation which actually obtains between 
them. And, as we have seen in our earlier chapter on Causa-
tion, that form is described in Mill's canon of the experi-
mental method of Single Difference. 2 
Thus, from the point of view of Ducasse's hypothesis 
on causality, the first objection is hardly significant. 
While this objection is based on apparent disparity between 
the kinds of events involved in the alleged causal relation-
ship between mind and body, Ducasse's view of causality is 
emphatically indifferent to the kinds of events figuring in 
the causal relation. For Ducasse, the causal relation is 
causal because of a specific form it expresses, irrespective 
of the nature of the terms related. 
(b) As regards the second objection that the 
principle of Conservation of Energy precludes causal 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 239. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 431. See also 
sec~ion 6, Chapter XIII, of Ducasse 1 s forthcoming work, The 
Belief in ~ Life After Death. 
interaction, Ducasse 1 s position is similar to the stand 
taken by Pratt. The "conservation of energy," asserts 
Ducasse, is far from having the status of an established 
fact." In the first place, he maintains, the expression is 
marked by ambiguity. The term "conservation" might refer to 
"constancy of sum," "identity of substance," "convertibility," 
"equivalence of manifestations," or "correlation of manifesta-
tions ... The term "energy" might mean "a substance," "a 
property of a substance," "a property of a system," or "a 
relationship between phenomena." In the second place, as 
Keeton has pointed out, "no possible experimental evidence 
could add one whit to the probability of the theory in any 
one of several of the forms in which it is generally used."l 
"This indicates," Ducasse continue3, "that the conserva.-
tion of energy is a postulate, and more particularly a defin-
ing postulate;" that is to say, conservation of energy is some-
thing demanded by the materialistic ontology of physics, "if 
~ ~ to be able to conceive the physical world as wholly self-
contained, independent, 'isolated.'" Accordingly, affirms 
Ducasse, when observation seems to indicate dissipation rather 
conservation of energy "conservation seems to be saved by postu-
lations ad hoc; for example, by postulating that something 
else, which appears when the energy one observed disappears--
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 240. 
170 
but which was not until then conceived as energy--is energy 
too, in 'another form. 1 " 1 
These observations enable Ducasse to get to the heart 
of his rejoinder: Conservation of Energy would eliminate the 
possibility of two-way causal interaction between mind and 
body if and only if it were known to be a universal fact. 
However, Conservation of Energy 1 is not known, but postulated 
--"and postulated only to save the universality of the Con-
servation of energy." Hence, the so-called principle of 
Conservation of Energy is no obstacle to the possibility of 
psycho-psychical interaction. And the burden of proof that 
there is no such interaction is on those who, by appealing 
steadfastly to a postulated universality, deny the empirical 
evidence (e.g., willing to raise my arm) in favor of inter-
action. To see the matter from a slightly different perspec-
tive, "what need, other than a doctrinaire one, have we to 
postulate a physical cause, when observation reveals a psychi-
cal one?• 2 
It may now be recognized that Pratt and Ducasse, 
generally speaking, handle the two basic difficulties associ-
ated with Interactionism in much the same way. In regard to 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 241. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 241-242. 
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the first objection, both writers argue (1) that the dis-
parity between mental events and bodily events does n£1 
represent an ~ priori reason for precluding causal influence 
or interaction between them, and (2) that there is ~ 
posteriori evidence from which to infer the relationship of 
causality between them. In short, both authors agree with 
Laird's contention that the view that mind and body cannot 
affect one another is a •myth" which survives from the 
"gratuitous dogma" that a cause must be like its effect.l 
As regards the second objection, the two authors agree that 
Conservation of Energy is only a postulate, and, as such, 
does not stand in the way of Interaction. There is ~ 
~ priori reason to accept Conservation of Energy as a 
universal fact. There is, however, observed~ posteriori 
evidence which testifies against the universality of Con-
servation of Energy. Hence, the two writers conclude: 
"Postulated Universality" does not warrant the dismissal of 
Mind-Body Interaction. 
5. The two views in contrast. We began our chapter 
by inquiring into the nature of the mind-body problem as 
conceived by Ducasse and Pratt. We found that for both 
authors the problem concerns the ontological relation between 
a mind and the material object called its body. The question 
then arose as to whether or not Ducasse and Pratt view "mind" 
1 Laird, Our Minds and Their Bodies, p. 65. 
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in the same manner. An examination of their views showed 
that, although the two authors frequently disagree concern-
ing the details, they both look upon mind as a kind of 
psychical substance, and refuse to submit mind to physio-
logical or materialistic reduction. Next, we turned to the 
actual conception of the mind-body relation offered by each 
author. We found that, generally speaking, both Ducasse and 
Pratt advocate a two-way causal interaction between mind and 
body, cite experiences of sensation and volition as confirming 
instances of this causal influence, and meet the main objec-
tions to Interaction in much the same manner. 
But, it seems to me, the inquiry cannot come to a 
halt here. Granted these general similarities, the question 
may still be asked, are Ducasse and Pratt in fundamental 
agreement concerning the mind-body relation? In other words, 
granted the similar terminology in which the two authors 
answer the mind-body problem, are they saying the same thing1 
Or could it be that, although their verbal expression is 
similar, they are speaking in two different "postures" and 
not saying the same thing at all? 
In answer to this important query, let us first look 
again at the approach which each author takes to the problem 
of ascertaining the ontological relation between mind and 
body. Pratt's approach is, once more, the approach of an 
"empiricist," in Pratt's own indicated sense of the word. He 
asks, "What ••• has experience--experience rather than 
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theory--to say on this matter?Ml His appeal is an appeal to 
some of our "commonest experiences" {e.g., volitions and 
sensations) to "the things that we human beings are initially 
sure of." 2 To put the matter in a slightly different way, 
Pratt, as a self-defined empiricist, begins with indubitable 
personal experience and tries to explain (not define) the 
mind-body relation as it is "felt" directly in that experience. 
Ducasse, on the other hand, does not begin at the 
level of direct, immediate, personal experience. His approach 
is characteristically semantical rather than experiential. 
More specifically, he confronts the problem by asking the 
meaning of the question as to the relation between a mind 
and its body. He maintains, however, that the meaning of 
this basic question cannot be explicated until another inti-
mately connected question is first answered, namely, the 
"semantical question as to just what it means to refer to a 
particular human body as 'one's own. 111 3 And he contends that 
an inquiry into this latter question makes it clear that the 
former question has the following meaning: "How is a mind 
related to the particular human body with which alone it 
immediately interacts? 114 This being so, mind-body interaction, 
1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 138-139. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 2. 
3Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 424. Underlining 
is my own. 
4 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 429. 
as we have seen, is asserted to be true as a matter of 
conceptual or semantical analysis. 
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It must be pointed out, however, that although 
Ducasse•s approach to the mind-body problem is basically 
semantical, it is not, strictly speaking, unrelated to per-
sonal experience. In fact, to the contrary, in trying to 
discern the meaning of my calling one particular human body 
"my own," Ducasse makes much of the experiences o:f volition 
and sensation, for instance. I call "my own" the only body 
in which, for example, my mere volition to raise an arm 
does, in normal circumstances, cause the arm to raise. This 
experience of volition and the sequent experience of my 
arm 1 s movement represent an important basis on which I call 
a particular body "my own." And, of course, any criterion 
by which I call a body "my own" is directly relevant to 
"the semantical question as to just what it means to refer 
to a particular human body as 1one 1 s own.'" In other words, 
for Ducasse, my usage of the expression "my body" constitutes 
part of the data available for the semantical inquiry into 
the meaning of calling a particular body "one's own;" and 
this usage, as I have tried to show, is grounded in personal 
experience (e.g., volition). 
But this point must not be misconstrued. In no way 
is it to imply that Ducasse's approach to the mind-body 
problem is at the level of direct or immediate experience. 
For, here, as in his treatment of Existence and of Cause, 
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Ducasse begins by asking the meaning of words, not experi-
~. And, for him, as we have seen, it is a semantical 
inquiry into the mind-body question that makes evident the 
answer to the question. The point is, rather, that the 
verbal data which Ducasse sets out to analyze do have a basis 
in experience. To use again our illustration above, it is 
precisely because of my experiences of volition and sensa-
tion~ for instance, that I refer to a particular body as 
"my own." That is to say, the use of the words "my own" in 
reference to a specific human body does represent what might 
be called the "verbal stabilization~ of certain of my direct, 
personal experiences. We must repeat, however, that it is 
at the level of words--words which represent stabilized 
experience--and not of direct personal experience, itself, 
that Ducasse meets, and comes to grips with, the mind-body 
problem. 
Again, then, we see that while Pratt's approaGh to 
the mind-body problem is experiential and existential in 
nature, Ducasse's approach is primarily semantical. In 
other words, while Pratt views the problem from the perspec-
tive of indubitable existential experience, Ducasse, once 
more, sees the problem from the posture of language; while 
Pratt meets the issue on the level of direct acquaintance 
with the mind-body relation, Ducasse, more indirectly, sets 
forth to answer the problem by analyzing the meaning of the 
question as to the relation between a mind and "its•• body. 
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It is, I believe, in the light of these two different 
approaches that the hypotheses of the two authors must be 
understood. Pratt turns to personal experience, locates 
instances of mind-body interaction there, and, from this 
psychological level, attempts a general hypothesis concern-
ing the relation. He maintains, however, that experience 
can only be understood by living through it, can only be 
known by acquaintance, and that any attempt to define it 
falsifies it by transforming its dynamic character into a 
static essence. So it is with the mind-body relation. The 
relation is sui generis and can be known only by being 
directly experienced. Any attempt to define it would fail, 
would miss its vital, dynamic nature; any attempt to explain 
it would come short of the relation~ it is experienced, so 
to.speak. Indeed, it is for this reason that Pratt is 
reluctant to say very much as to how the mind and body inter-
act. The personal experience (e.g., volition and sensation) 
with which he begins and with which he is directly acquainted 
provides, he feels, an authoritative basis for asserting 
that the mind and body interact, but not for expressing how 
the mind and body interact. He says: "The very essence of 
the doctrine of Interaction is the assertion that there is 
interaction."1 "The kind of self-examination which does not 
cut to pieces, the sort of thing Bergson refers to as 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 273. 
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1 intuition," reveals the "thatness" of interaction. But, 
again, according to Pratt, any attempt to give the details 
of this "felt" experience would be at the expense of falsify-
ing the experience. For this reason, Pratt offers but sug-
gestions as to how mind and body interact, and he makes it 
clear that his hypothesis, based on direct personal experi-
ence, that there is interaction between mind and body, does 
not stand or fall with these suggestions. 2 
Ducasse, on the other hand, having approached the 
mind-body problem at the semantical level, (all the theoreti-
cal problems of philosophy are, for him, essentially seman-
tical)3 sees and answers the problem from this perspective. 
Beginning with the stabilized data of ordinary language 
rather than with direct personal experience, he sets out to 
analyze "the meaning of the question as to the relation between 
a mind and 'its' body." He concludes that his analysis of 
the meaning of the question provides a "scientific"4 basis 
for his hypothesis concerning the mind-body relation. More 
specifically, as we have seen, he maintains that a methodo-
logical inquiry into the meaning of the question makes 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 267. 
2 Pratt, lersonal Realism, p. 269. 
3
see Chapter I of this dissertation~ 
4 
"Scientific" in the sense employed by his methodology. 
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evident the answer to the question; for, upon analysis, the 
very question as to the relation between mind and body is 
seen to involve the tacit ass·umption of mind-body interaction. 
Hence, it may be said that Ducasse's mind-body hypothesis 
represents, essentially, his answer to a basically semantical 
concern and inquiry, and that his treatment of the mind-body 
problem begins and ends in this posture of language. 
Once more, then, the hypotheses of the two authors, 
although terminologically similar, are framed within two 
different universes of discourse. As such, they do not 
directly refer to, take into consideration, or account for, 
the same data. , The data on which Ducasse builds his hypo-
thesis are the data of language; the data on which Pratt 
maintains Interaction are the data of personal experience. 
Ducasse 1 s hypothesis emerges from an alleged analysis of 
what "ordinary language" means in asking the question of the 
mind-body relation; Pratt 1 s hypothesis results from a kind 
of "self-examination• or "intuition• of direct experience. 
For Ducasse, the nature of the mind-body relation can be 
ascertained by studying ordinary language; for Pratt, ordi-
nary language fails to convey the basic, existential mind-
body relation, which refuses to be objectified by language 
and which can be known only by direct experience. And, 
indeed, Ducasse's hypothesis is speaking of the nature of 
the mind-body relation as implied by ordinary language, 
while Pratt's hypothesis is talking of the relation as it is 
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"fel t 1' directly in, for instance, the experience of volition 
or sensation. 
In brief, then, Ducasse,and Pratt are neither talking 
from the same perspective, nor in the same ~' nor (to 
speak loosely) about the same thing. Ducasse, as a seman-
tical inquirer, speaks from the posture of language and hypo-
thesizes about the usage of words--words which, for him, 
have extra-linguistic import and represent "stabilized" 
experience; Pratt, as a personalistic empiriGist, assumes 
the posture of direct experience and tries, frustratingly, to 
exhibit instances of the mind-body tnteraction with which he 
is existentially acquainted and which he knows "by apprecia~ 
tion," so to speak. 
One final observation may be made. Not only do these 
two Interactionist hypotheses reflect two different universes 
of discourse and relate to two essentially different kinds 
of data, but they share words which within the respective 
postures have different meanings. The word "causal" is a 
good example. Ducasse and Pratt agree that the interaction 
between mind and body is causal. Ducasse calls direct 
causal interaction "the basic relation between a mind and its 
body;" 1 Pratt says explicitly that "causality is most origi-
nally and concretely an experience of relations between body 
1 4 Pucasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 29. 
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and mind." 1 But, as observed in the preceding chapter, 
Ducasse and Pratt offer two basically different conceptions 
of causality. For Ducasse, "cause" is viewed phenomenally 
and semantically, and is taken to be the "only observable, 
antecedent change in a state of affairs." Pratt, on the other 
hand, finds cause at the personal, existential level, and 
characterizes it as "a continuity of process carried on 
within or between substances." Clearly, the two writers 
are neither talking from the same realm of discourse nor 
saying the same thing. Hence, the fact that Ducasse and 
Pratt agree that mind and body are "causally" related is of 
no basic significance; for, upon examination, the similarity 
is seen to be a superficial verbal similarity rather than a 
fundamental agreement concerning the nature of causal inter-
action. 
As we have seen, 2 the case is similar, in fact, as 
regards the basic word "mind" itself. "Mind" does not have 
the same connotation for both Ducasse and Pratt. For Ducasse, 
11 mind" is primarily a 11 psychical substance," the meaning of 
which can be ascertained by examining "ordinary language" 
usage of the word; for Pratt, "mind" is essentially a stream 
of consciousness, a self acting, a "center of dynamic force," 
whose nature can be known only in immediate, living, personal 
1
see, for example, Matter and Spirit, p. ~4a._ 
2
see section 2 of this chapter. 
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experience. And even the fact that both authors are willing 
to acknowledge mind as a •substance•1 does not represent a 
basic agreement between them. For, their conceptions of 
"substance" also differ. While Pratt approaches "substance" 
at the level of personal experience, Ducasse views "substance" 
from a semantical perspective. While Pratt sees in substance 
an element of existential, non-rational givenness which 
defies a definition of substance, Ducasse attempts to define 
substance exhaustively in terms of properties and the rela-
tion between properties. 
Hence, the fact that, within their mind-body hypo-
theses, Ducasse and Pratt employ similar terminology does 
not mean fundamental agreement; for, as we have seen, Pratt 
and Ducasse view topics like "cause," "mind," and "substance" 
--as they do the larger topic of the mind-body relation--from 
two essentially different postures. In doing so, they dif-
fer in respect to their choice of data to be explained and, 
accordingly, in regard to their ensuing hypotheses. 
6. Critical Comments. 
i. Ducasse. My initial intention is to question 
the manner by which Ducasse arrives at his mind-body hypothesis. 
It seems to me that his treatment of this issue bears an 
element of arbitrariness which his accepted methodology 
should have refused to tolerate. 
1Ibid. 
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First of all, a word of reminder concerning Ducasse's 
"scientific method in semantical inquiry" or "empirical 
inquiry into the meaning of terms" is in order. For Ducasse, 
1 it will be remembered, a philosophical problem becomes 
authentic and "capable of scientific solution" only when one 
takes as data a list of statements which employ the term (or 
terms) whose meaning is in question and which constitute 
"representative samples of the particular usage of it to be 
analyzed." The basic question of the inquiry then becomes 
"What does the term (or terms) mean as employed in the 
listed data?" Then, "the validity of any definition is tested 
by observing whether [or not] the definition is substitutable 
for the term [or terms) in those statements without altering 
any of their standard implications."2 
There is no doubt that, as a semantical inquirer, 
Ducasse is interested in ascertaining the meaning of the 
question as to the relation between a mind and "its" body. 
But, having expressed this concern for meaning, Ducass~, I 
maintain, gives little or no evidence of loyalty to his 
proposed method. Nowhere, for instance, does he present a 
list of statements which he regards as the "data" for his 
problem; or to put the matter in a slightly different way, 
nowhere does Ducasse explicitly offer representative samples 
1
see Chapter I of this dissertation. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
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of the usage of the expression •relation between a mind and 
1its• body." Without data before him, Ducasse's reader, of 
course, has no explicit assurance that Ducasse has asked 
the question basic to his methodology, namely, Wrhat do the 
terms mean as employed in the listed data? This being the 
case, the reader has no guarantee that, from the perspective 
of Ducasse's own proposed methodology, the mind-body problem 
can be called "genuine." 
It is interesting to note, moreover, that the major 
portionl of Ducasse's treatment of the mind-body issue·is 
concerned with "the semantical question as to just what it 
means to refer to a particular human body as 1 one 1 s own, 1 '' 
and not directly with the meaning of the question regarding 
the relation between a mind and 'its' body. How a seman-
tical inquiry intended to explicate the meaning of the ques-
tion as to the mind-body relation can concentrate on a seman-
tical analysis of what it means to call a particular body 
'one's own' is not easily understood. Ostensibly, from the 
standpoint of Ducasse's own proposed methodology, the pro-
cedure is questionable. It appears, in fact, that, within 
the framework of one intended inquiry, Ducasse arbitrarily 
embarks upon another. Certainly, Ducasse offers no methodo-
logical basis or justification for his dominant consideration 
of the meaning of calling a human body "one's own." And, 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 424-429. 
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certainly, given his methodology, the reason for his pre-
occupation with the latter issue within the context of the 
former is neither ~ priori nor self-evident. 
Of course, Ducasse does use his scruitiny of the 
question, Which human body is one's own?" 1 as a basis for 
his important assertion that analysis of the meaning of the 
mind-body question "makes evident the answer to the mind-
body question." 2 That is to say, Ducasse's hypothesis con-
cerning the mind-body relation is, by his own admission~ 
influenced by his answer to the question as to just what it 
means to call a particular human body "one's own." But the 
fact of this influence or relation does not exp~in how, 
within the bounds of his own defined method of semantical 
investigation, Ducasse is allowed to answer one proposed 
theoretical problem in terms of his answer to another problem, 
without providing a methodological justification for the same. 
On the contrary, in fact, this admitted, but methodologically 
unwarranted, procedure induces the reader to suspect that 
Ducasse's semantical inquiry into the meaning of calling a 
body "one's own," considered from the perspective of his 
empirical inquiry into the meaning of the mind-body question, 
is completely ad hoc. 
1Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 424. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 429. 
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Further, we may note that even if, within his seman-
tical scrutiny of the mind-body issue, Ducasse had demon-
strated methodological grounds for delving into the question 
of what it means to call a body "one's own," his investiga-
tion into the latter problem would, from the perspective of 
his prescribed "semantical inquiry," remain methodologically 
wanting. For, once again, Ducasse fails to make evident the 
data of the problem; that is to say, he does not offer a list 
of statements in which the expression to be analyzed is employe~ 
In fact, having expressed the problem as "the semantical ques-
tion" of 11 just what it means to refer to a particular body 
as one's own, 1 " Ducasse does no more than to present the 
four criteria by which one claims ownership of the particu-
lar human body one calls "one's own;" he does not indicate 
the manner or steps by which he has arrived at these criteria. 
And, the data of the problem not having been presented, 
Ducasse 1 s reader is without the assurance that Ducasse 1 s 
hypothesis either did or can pass Ducasse's own test of 
"substitutability."1 
In retrospect, then, one cannot refrain frcm asking 
the question, What has Ducasse done with his own prescribed 
method during his handling of the mind-body problem? He 
appears to have, arbitrarily, turned a semantical inquiry 
concerning the meaning of the mind-body question into an 
inquiry regarding the meaning of calling a body "one's own;" 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
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from the point of view of his methodology, he offers no 
basis or justification for this procedure. Further, he has 
given his answer to both the mind-body question and the 
·question of the meaning of referring to a body as ttone's 
own" without any explicit formulation of their "data" or 
expressed exercise of his methodology. What, indeed, has 
Ducasse done with his prescribed method? Methodology seems 
to have given way to the arbitrary. And we are reminded, 
again, of Ducasse•s own caution that"it is one thing to be 
able to describe scientific method ••• and quite another 
thing to practice it in the field of philosophy."l 
Finally, for the sake of emphasis, one last comment, 
already brought out in the preceding chapter, may be reite-
rated here. Irrespective of whether or not Ducasse has 
maintained a loyalty to his scientific methodology (and we 
have reason to believe that he has not!), one wonders on 
what basis, for instance, a proposed semantical inquiry into 
the meaning of the question as to the mind-body relation may 
be said to disclose the nature of that relation. Here, as 
in the case of Causality, Existence, Substance, Ducasse 
seems simply to assume that his semantical inquiry has 
extra~semantical import. Indeed, this assumption appears to 
be an arbitrary presupposition of Ducasse•s chosen methodology. 
1 Ducasse, Causation and the Types of Necessity, p. 
122. In this connection, see alsop. 382 of Mundle 1 s critical 
notice of Nature, Mind, and Death, in Mind 62(1953). 
And I challenge this presupposition. More explicitly, I 
challenge Ducasse 1 s assumed prerogative of deducing meta-
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physical inferences, ~.e., inferences concerning the essential 
nature of things, from an inquiry or investigation which is 
exclusively semantical (and, thus, phenomenal)l as regards its 
data, intent, and scope. For, again, the procedure which I 
am calling into question involves, I contend, the "fallacy 
of mixed postures," 2 that is to say, the fallacy of con-
founding two very different universes of discourse. 
ii. Pratt. I have but one main comment to make, 
here, concerning Pratt's treatment of the mind-body problem. 
In the course of affirming that the relation between a mind 
and its body is sui generis unique and that it can be known 
only by being directly experienced, Pratt, as we have seen, 
makes the following statement: "And if you wish further 
knowledge of it, you must turn to your own body and your 
relation to it and see. That is what the relation is like!" 
It is the word "see," in co~ection with "further 
knowledge," which I find troublesome here. Pratt seems to 
be talking as though one is able to look at one 1 s "experi-
encing" of mind-body relation during one's actual experi-
encing of it, and in so doing, gain further knowledge of the 
relation. But in the words of Marcel, doesn't any "present 
1 I use "phenomenal", of course, in contrast to "meta-
physical." See, for example, Bowne's Metaphysics. 
2 See point iii of section 4 of the preceding chapter. 
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moment" or present "experiencing" ••• "slide into the 
mediate as soon as I try to completely understand it, to 
.exhaust its content?" Or, to use the similar words of Royce, 
hasn't this moment "ceased to be this moment before,I have 
observed its contents or written down its name?" 1 If so, 
does what I "see" (to revert to Pratt 1s terminology) when I 
attend to my body and my relation to it really constitute 
"further knowledge" of the relation, or have I already, in 
looking at the relation, lost my "present acquaintance with," 
or "immediate" knowledge of, the relation? 
This point becomes serious when one looks at Pratt 1 s 
philosophy from a broader perspective. For, as we have 
already seen, Pratt approaches and, allegedly, "finds" 
existence, relations, causality, and the mind-body relation, 
for example, at the level of direct, immediate, personal 
experience. Each,of these, he maintains, can be known only 
by direct acquaintance with it. 2 But the question now 
arises: If Marcel and Royce are right, can Pratt ever, 
philosophically, come to grips with present, momentary, 
immediat~, experience? That is to say, in turning to personal 
experiences--"the things we human beings are initially sure 
of"3--in order to answer the problems of philosophy, can 
1 Both quotes are taken from G. Marcel, Royce 1 s Meta-
Physics (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956), p. 34. 
2 See respectively, pp. 57, 33, 119, 269, Personal 
Realism. 
3 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 2. 
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Pratt ever get at, observe, or examine, an immediate experi-
ence of causality or an immediate instance of mind-body 
interaction, for instance? Or is it not the case that any 
lmmedia te experience n slides into the mediate,'' is already 
a completed experience, so to speak, as soon as one tries to 
observe or explain it? 
Moreover, to look at this matter from a slightly dif-
ferent perspective, does Pratt have any justificatior for 
speaking in terms of an immediate experience of interaction? 
Is it not the case that interaction represents an interpreta-
tion of sequences, and does not come in the form of a single 
experience? If this be so, then must not one say that to have 
!NTEH-actlon is to have left behind the immediao~ of individ-
ual experiences and to have become involved in an interpreta-
tive system about a sequence of experiences? 
Of course, as we have previously indicated, there is 
no doubt that Pratt distinguishes emphatically between the 
realm of constructed •percepts" and "concepts," on the one 
hand, and the realm of "living experience," on the other ha.nd.l 
And there is no denying the fact that Pratt's appeal is to the 
realm of dynamic experience rather than constructs, to the 
existential rather than the static. But, again, what remains 
to be questioned is whether one, as Pratt sometimes implies, 2 
can actually observe the content of the moment. For doesn't 
1 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 267. 
2 See, for example, Personal Realism,pp. 33, 269. 
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living experience become lived experience when I try to com-
ment upon it? Doesn't the content of the present moment dis-
appear into the "flow" of experience as soon as I try to 
observe it? And if so, must it not be acknowledged that 
Pratt, technically speaking, is confined to the posture of 
the "immediately experienced" rather than of "immediate 
experience." Moreover, could it be, as Royce seems to sug-
gest, that empiricism (in Pratt's sense) might have to 
accept the content of the moment as an object of infinite 
search, and, in so doing, become an absolute idealism? 1 I 
leave this matter in the form of a question. 
?. Recapitulation. In retrospect, we may now feel 
justified in asserting that, as regards Substance, Existence, 
Causality, and the Mind-Body relation, Pratt and Ducasse 
adopt two different approaches to the problem, hypothesize 
about two different kinds of data, speak in two different 
philosophical postures or universes of discourse, and despite 
occasional terminological similarities, do not make the same 
basic contentions. Or to go in a converse direction, we are 
now able, on the basis of the critical study and comparison 
above, to maintain that the essential differences between 
Ducasse and Pratt concerning at least four historically sig-
nificant problems of metaphysics, stem from the two basically 
different postures which the two authors assume. Ducasse 1 s 
1 See Marcel, Royce's Metaphysics, p. 34. 
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philosophizing is, thus far, restricted to the scope of 
language; Pratt's philosophizing begins and ends in the con-
text of "felt" experience. And, as we have seen, it is in 
terms of this difference that the differences between the two 
sets of hypotheses examined can, by and large, be accounted 
for. 
But our critical comparison of Ducasse and Pratt does 
not end here. Having contrasted the two authors on topics 
traditionally acknowledged as belonging to the area of meta-
physics, we shall, in the next two chapters, turn to the 
general areas of ethics and religion. Again, we shall not 
only be interested in comparing critically the respective 
views of the two philosophers, but also in continuing to 
locate the source of their differences. And, specifically, 
we shall be eager to determine whether or not, as might be 
anticipated, their differences may be understood in the same 
manner as above. 
However, before turning to the next chapter, we may 
simply note that, despite the different universes of dis-
course in which Ducasse and Pratt subsequently speak, both 
authors make it clear, in their acknowledgment, formulation, 
and treatment of the mind-body problem, that they accept an 
ontological distinction between mind and body. 1 Ducasse 
distinguishes between "mind" and "the world of material 
1 See, for instance, parts 1 and 2 of this chapter. 
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events and things" (which includes body); 1 Pratt, between 
the realms of "psychical existents" and "physical existent~" 2 
Pratt says explicitly: "If Interaction be true, there are 
at least two kinds of processes in the world--the physical 
and the mental."3 In the same vein, Ducasse may be said to 
contend: If Interaction be true, there are at least two 
kinds of substances in the world--the physical and the mental. 
In short, both authors recognize, as a condition for their 
Interaction hypothesis, an ontological dualism. 
We shall carry this observation to the considerations 
of the next two chapte~s. More explicitly, in our critical 
comparison of Ducasse 1 s and Pratt's general views on ethics 
and religion, we shall, within the bounds of our stated inten-
tions, take note of any influence which ontological dualism 
appears to have on the hypotheses under examination. And in 
view of this added concern, it is, I think, advantageous to 
begin our next chapter with a more detailed characterization 
of the specific type of ontological dualism which Ducasse 
and Pratt, respectively, represent. 
1 Nature, Mind, and Death, 401. Ducasse, p. 
2 Personal Realism, 222. Underlining Pratt, p. is mine. 
3Pratt; Personal Realism, p. 272. Underlining is mine. 
CHAPTER V 
DUALISM AND NORALITY 
We turn, next, to a short account of the ~ of 
ontological dualism accepted, individually, by each author. 
Then, having distinguished between these two interpreta-
tions of mind-body dualism, we shall, with the advantage of 
the distinction, focus our critical scrutiny on the ethical 
views offered by the two writers. In our continued attempt 
to account for the differences between the two authors, we 
shall doubtless test the assertion of Pratt that mind-body 
dualism "is pregnant with decisive consequences for our whole 
1 
view of life and of religion.n 
1. Dualism of 1Substance 1 and Dualism of 'Process•--
a significant distinction~ Part 2 of the preceding chapter 
showed us that for Ducasse mind is as genuinely a substance 
as are entitities such as human bodies, wood, trees, etc. 2 
That is to say, we have already seen that, for Ducasse, the 
nature of mind, like the nature of any other substance, 
analyzes into the properties and the relations of properties. 
The basic difference is that while material things (e.g., 
human body, wood, tree) are defined in terms of facts 
1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 167. 
2 See also Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 400. 
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perceptually observable, and are Physical substances, mind, 
for Ducasse, is conceived in terms of facts "introspectively 
observable," and is a psychical substance. 1 
To put the matter pointedly, Ducasse's "interaction-
istlc dualism" is, by his own explicit admission, a dualism 
between two ontologically different kinds of substance--
mind and body, psychical and physical. For this reason, we 
may appropriately characterize the dualism.involved in 
Ducasse 1 s interactionism as an ontological dualism of 
substance. 2 
Although Pratt, on the other hand, admits that his 
doctrine of Interaction involves the acknowledgement of an 
ontological dualism, he is quick to point out that this 
dualism is "not necessarily a dualism of substance.") More 
positively, he affirms, rather, that it is a "dualism of 
process'1 --a dualism which-js "as compatible with Idealism as 
with Realism." 4 What exactly Pratt means by this "dualism 
of process" is brought out sharply in his own words: 
"Whether reality is made up of one kind of stuff or whether 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 424. 
2 Ducasse uses much of this terminology in a chapter 
entitled "Lamont's Attack on Mind-Body Dualism," in his 
forthcoming book, The Belief in ~ Life After Death. 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 183; Personal Realism, 
p. 272. 
4 Ibid. 
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there are two or more kinds of being within it, there are at 
any rate two kinds of laws, two kinds of processes to be 
found in the activities of the real beings of the world." 1 
To put the issue another way, Pratt's contention is 
that we cannot explain the world in terms of a "single 
formula" or of "purely physical laws." 2 Throughout the 
"physical world," made up of matter and energy, the laws of 
physics and chemistry, admittedly, have dominion. Here 
energy is neither created nor destroyed, regularity of 
"mechanical sequence" holds, and precise predi·ction is pos-
sible. "But," asserts Pratt "matter and physical energy do 
not constitute the whole of reality." Within the "immensities 
of space," there are beings who are not entirely under the 
dom~nion of the laws of matter and motion. We know these 
beings as persons--persons who have their own "ways of act-
lng," their own "laws," if you like, and these "ways of 
acting" or "laws" are not reducible to the physical. 
Although not themselves parts of the physical world, personal 
beings are, Pratt maintains, "organic" to parts of the physi-
cal world; that is to say, they live in their bodies. 3 Hence, 
Pratt asserts that "it is in the activities of the human body 
• • • that the two forms of nrocess, the two kinds of law 
meet." Or, to speak more explicitly, "the determining power 
1 Pratt, Matter> and ipiY>it, pp. 184-185. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 273. 
3 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 269. 
in some of the acts of human body is to be found not in the 
physical and chemical processes of the body but 1n pro-
cesses of gn utterly different nature, namely, those of the 
rational and purposive will." 1 
Pratt makes it clear, then, that for him there is 
nothing sacrosanct about Monism. Loyalty to truth, he 
declares is more important than loyalty to the name of 
Monism. And although, by his own admission, "the world is 
taken to be one" in many different ways," Pratt maintains 
that "an impartial investigation of facts points to the con-
elusion that the world we live in possesses two "kinds ••• 
of processes." 2 For, to add another substantiating point 
which he offers, if the "self" or mind or personal being 
be actually capable of transcending itself in such 
fashion as it plainly seems to do in every judgment 
which it makes concerning the future and the past, 
it is altogether a different sort of being from all 
material things and its ways of acting are as far 
removed from mechanical causation and sequence as the 
heavens are above the earth.3 
In short, Pratt's dualism is a "dualism of process 
between the material and the thinking world."4 And, again, 
in contrast.to the ontological dualism of Ducasse, Pratt 1 s 
1 Unless otherwise stated all quotes in this paragraph 
are taken from Matter and Spirit, pp. 185-186. Underlining 
is mine. 
2 Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 273. Underlining is mine. 
)Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 188. 
4Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 195. 
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species of ontological dualism is not necessarily of sub-
stance. It asserts that "there are at least two kinds of 
1 processes in the world,~ but it refuses to commit itself to 
a duality of "substances." Unlike Ducasse who insists on 
a dichotomy between "physical" and "psychical .. substances, 
Pratt is able to say that his dualism is compatible with 
both "the idealistic and realistic interpretations of the 
physical world." 2 
This distinction having been made, we shall, as 
indicated earlien be prepared to take note of any influence 
which these two different types of ontological dualism appear 
to have on the views concerning ethics advocated, respec-
tively, by the two authors. 
2. Ethics and the Scientific Method. 
i. Ducasse's approach. Ducasse brings to his 
consideration of ethics) the same scientific methodology that 
he has proposed for the solution of all theoretical problems 
of philosophy. However, as regards ethics, it must readily 
be admitted that Ducasse's basic concern is not primarily with 
the presentation of any one particular ethical theory, but, 
rather, with the nature of ethical theory in general, with 
whether or not, for example, theorizing in ethics is 
1 Pratt, Personal Reaiism, p. 273. Underlining is mine. 
2Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 272. 
3see, especially, Philosophy~ a Science, Chapter XIII 
also, "Scientific Method in Ethics" Phil. Phen. Res., 14 
( 1953) ' 72-88. 
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fundamentally the same kind of enterprise or has essentially 
the same type of functions in its field as physics, for 
instance, has in its area of invest1gation. 1 Although Ducasse 
answers in the affirmative, 2 we are not, here, mainly inter-
ested in his ethical metatheory. Yet it is precisely within 
the framework of Ducasse's ethical metatheory that we now 
try to draw out his views on morality, that is to say, his 
ethics. 
(a) The primitive facts ~data of ethics. "The 
facts primitive for a given science ••• are," Ducasse 
asserts, 11 the sort of facts apout which (directly or 
indirectly) are all the questions asked by science, and by 
appeal to which also the theories constructed by the science, 
are finally tested empirically.•) Similarly, Ducasse affirms, 
the primitive facts of ethics are the kind of facts about 
which (directly or indirectly) are the questions asked by 
ethical science, and by appeal to which ethical theories are 
tested emp1r1cally. 4 In each case, Ducasse adds, these facts 
are value statements which are "beyond question." And, as 
1 
c. J. Ducasse, "The Nature and Function of Theory in 
Ethics" Ethics, 51(1940), 22. See also Philosophy as a 
Science, p. 174. 
p. 28. 
2 Ducasse, "The Nature and Function of Theory in Ethics," 
3nucasse, Philosophy ~ ~ Science, p. 174. 
4 Ducasse, "The Nature and Function of Theory in 
Ethics," p. 28. 
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we saw in our chapter on Ducasse's methodology, value state-
ments are "beyond question" if and only if they constitute 
"definitions-by-type" or "defining instances" of what a per-
son P means and intends to mean by the appraisive or value 
terms used. 1 
Specifically, then, the facts primitive for ethics are 
standard statements of moral evaluation by person P or persons 
P, Q, R. They would be expressed, for instance, in such 
statements of approval or disapproval as "This act is wrong;" 
That act is good;" or, more explicitly, "This act, which is 
one of parricide, is a sample of what I call an immoral act;• 
"That act, which is one of alleviating sorrow, is a sample 
of what I call a moral act.• 2 Essentially, Ducasse contends, 
these value statements are commitments of will--that is to 
say, commitments on the part of P to approve and promote, or, 
contrariwise, to condemn and discourage, acts which to him 
generically resemble the particular act which he adopts as a 
"definition-by-type" of what he means by a "morally right" 
or a "morally wrong" act.3 Only a collection of such state-
ments, representing samples of the usage of "moral" and 
"immoral" by P (or P, Q, R) is the type of datum from which, 
1 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 75. See 
also Chapter I of this dissertati en. 
2 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 37. 
3nucasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics, p. 75. 
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in conformity with Ducasse 1s proposed scientific methodology, 
it is possible, inductively, to obtain a generic definition 
of what "moral" or "immoral" means when used by P (or P, Q, 
R).l 
(b) Formulation of the problem. Again it is to be 
stressed that, for Ducasse, a problem becomes "genuine and 
capable of scientific solution" only when, as in the above 
manner, one takes as "data" or "primitive facts" a list of 
statements in which the term under consideration is used 
representatively. For then, as we have seen in connection 
with earlier topics, the question is no longer the bare and 
insoluble question of the meaning of the term, but the 
empirically verifiable question of the meaning of the term 
as employed in the representative samples. 2 
More explicitly, the ethical problem for Ducasse is 
not the problem of ascertaining the meaning of the terms 
"right" and "wrong," "moral" or "immoral," ..1.n vacuo, but the 
problem of dete,:'mining the meaning of these terms as they are 
employed in the data of the problem. In other words, the 
question is not simply"What do the terms 'moral' or 1 immoral 1 
mean?" but "What do the terms 'moral' and 1 immoral 1 mean when 
applied in the following cases by person P or P, Q, R, for 
example?"3 
1 Nature, Mind, and Death, 37. Ducasse, p. 
2Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
3Ducasse, Philosophy~~ Science, p. 177; Nature, 
Mind, and Death, p. 55. 
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(c) Characteristics of ~ answer. Any answer to 
this question, Ducasse emphasizes, will, consequently, be 
both descriptive and normative; descriptive because, resembling 
any other genuine scientific hypotheis, it will represent an 
inductive generalization regarding the data or ethically primi-
tive facts; normative because the primitive facts from which 
the law or generalization will be "inductively distilled con-
sist of statements that are paradigmatic, i.e., normative 
applications by groups or individuals of the predicates 
"moral" and "immoral?"1 
Being descriptive and normative, any such hypothesis 
or inductive generalization concerning the meaning of morality 
may, accordingly, be said to be relative. That is to say, 
the hypothesis will always be relative to the paradigmatic 
statements of a particular person or group in particular 
sets of circumstances, and will always be formulated by a 
person or group belonging to a particular culture. 2 
But, Ducasse is quick to add, the fact that the "para-
digmatic application" of the terms "moral" and "immoral" 
differ, to some extent, from group to group or individual to 
individual does not necessarily imply that the meaning of 
these terms is essentially relative to particular times and 
1 C. J. Ducasse, "Philosophy Can Become a Science" 
Rev. Inter. Eh!l., 4?(1959), 13. 
2 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. ?6. 
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places. "Rather, the possibility is left quite open that a 
single criterion of morality and immorality exists, which is 
implicit alike in such diverse regional or individual moral 
standards as are capable of rational justification." In 
other words, despite the elements of relativism involved in 
any hypothesis concerning morality, Ducasse does not pre-
elude the possibility of their being a criterion of morality 
"able to account equally for the fact that a given kind of 
act is held moral in a given society, but held immoral in 
another." However, Ducasse admits, whether there actually 
is such an all-embracing criterion of morality depends 
entirely on whether there are paradigmatic applications of 
the term "moral" held universally by all men--that is to say, 
by all except those who are mentally retarded, insane, 
rationally defective, or, in some other way, morally "incompe-
1 tent" or "perverse." 
What, indeed, is Ducasse's "criterion" of morality, 
and does he look upon his "criterion" as being universally 
applicable? Keeping in mind the background of the above con-
siderations, we may now attempt to answer these questions, and, 
as indicated earlier, proceed with the optimism that Ducasse 1 s 
own ethics may be drawn out of his ethical metatheory. 
1Ducasse, "Philosophy Can Become a Science,'' p. 13. 
i1. 1 A Utilitarian 'criterion' of morality. 
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Before looking at the "criterion" of morality suggested 
within Ducasse's ethical metatheory, we may well, in view of 
our subheading, make clear the meaning of "Utilitarianism." 
J. s. Mill, in his famous essay on the subject, states that 
Utilitarianism is the "creed ••• which holds that actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." By 
happiness, Mill says explicitly that he means "pleasure and 
the absence of pain;" by unhappiness, pain and the privation 
of pleasure." And he is quick to add that the Utili tar ian 
standard "is not the agent 1 s own greatest happiness, but the 
greatest amount of happiness altogether." 2 Similarly, Sidg-
wick describes Utilitarianism as the ethical theory "that 
the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objec-
tively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount 
of happiness on the whole." And he, too, is quick to point 
out that by "the greatest amount of happiness" he means "the 
greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain." It is 
precisely with this consideration in mind that Sidgwick offers 
the expression "universal hedonism" as a synonym for 
1Why I place "criterion" in quotes, here, will come 
out clearly in the critical comments which follow this sub-
heading. 
2J. s. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representa-
tive Government (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1951), pp. 
8, 14. Underlining is mine. 
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1 Utilitarianism; and it is certainly on this specific con-
notation of Utilitarianism, made evident by both Mill and 
Sidgwick, that we proceed. 
Ducasse, in his paper entitled "Scientific Method in 
Ethics," offers substantial indication of what he accepts as 
his "criterion" of morality. While tracing the steps involved 
in ethical theorizing, (i.e., while ·presenting a meta-ethics) 
he makes the following comment: 
••• Persons of a scientific turn of mind reject as 
ultimately irrelevant any test of validity ••• based 
on faith in the authoritativeness of custom, or of 
alleged commands of God, or of the pronouncements o{ 
one's own conscience as against the differing con-
sciences of others. They insist that the only consider-
ation, in terms of which an objective and rational test 
of the morality or immorality of a mode of conduct can 
be defined, is that of the probable effects of the con-
duct in view upon the welfare of such sentient beings 
as are affected by it.2 
Similarly, in his more recent article, 11 Philosophy Can Become 
a Science," Ducasse makes, generally speaking, the same 
assertion. He says: 
••• If, as we are assuming, what P seeks is a 
scientific, not a blindly conformist or fideistic 
criterion of morality or immorality, then about the 
only sort of criterion that will qualify will be one 
consisting of the QU the whole favorable or unfavor-
able effects which actions, or beliefs, or feelings, 
etc., of particular kinds, are likely to have on the 
1H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1922), pp. 411, 413. Underlining is mine. 
2 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 77. Under-
lining is mine. 
welfare of the sentient beings--be they himself only, 
or a few, or many, or all--about whose welfare he 
does in fact care in some degree.l 
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Given Ducasse's proposed scientific methodology for 
philosophical inquiry, combined with his use of ethics to 
illustrate the workability of the scientific method in phi-
2 losophy, there is no question that Ducasse has a "scientific 
turn of mind," is seeking a "scientific ••• criterion of 
morality," and, in fact, endorses the "criterion" of Utili-
tarianism or universalistic hedonism to which he refers in 
the above quotes. This last point is further substantiated 
when he defines morally good and evil capacities of man as 
those which, respectively, "promote, or on the contrary sub-
vert, the welfare of the sentient beings affected by their 
exercise,• and when he explicitly says that, in his opinion, 
this so-called "welfare• or Utilitarian principle is the 
"only one capable of getting scientifically established.") 
Moreover, what Ducasse means by the "Utilitarian 
criterion" of "welfare principle" is brought out even more 
explicitly both (a) in his discussion of "welfare" and (b) 
in one of his criticisms of Murphy. As regards (a), Ducasse 
points out that the very constituents of the word 11 well-faren 
1 Ducasse, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," p. 12. 
Underlining welfare is mine. 
2see, for instance, Chapter XII of Philosophy~ a 
Science; also, "Scientific Method in Ethics." 
3Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 81. 
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themselves make evident the essential notion of nwell" vs. 
"ill," of a good condition in contrast to an evil one. And 
he maintains that the notion of "welfare" must ultimately be 
defined in terms of "intrinsic goodness." "Intrinsic good-
ness," Ducasse submits emphatically, is to be identified with 
.. pleasantness;" that is to say, intrinsic goodness and pleasant-
ness "are one and the same thing. 111 This being so, welfare, 
for Ducasse, turns out to be a condition or state of pleasant-
ness, and Ducasse's version of the Utilitarian "criterion" 
(i.e., the welfare principle) becomes essentially related to 
pleasantness. 
As regards (b), Ducasse calls into question Murphy's 
admission that, within the framework of his moral judgments, 
he approves of some acts (for example, retributive punishment) 
from which more pain than pleasure {or pleasantness) will 
result. Assuming a "utilitarian theory," Ducasse argues that 
retributive punishment, for example, is not morally justifiable 
unless "it produces or tends to produce in the long run less 
of painful than of pleasurable experience." 2 
Now, taking the considerations of (a) and (b) together, 
what Ducasse seems to be saying is that his formulation of 
the Utilitarian principle of morality acknowledges no mode 
of action as moral unless its effects produce or tend to 
1 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 85. 
2Ducasse, 1'Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 83. 
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produce in sentient beings a balance of pleasantness (or 
11 intrinsic goodness," or "positive intrinsic value," or 
"pleasurable experience") over unpleasantness (or "intrinsic 
evil," or "negative intrinsic value," or "painful experi-
ence"). To put the matter in a slightly different way, 
Ducasse seems to be maintaining that morality has to do, 
essentially, with consequences or (perhaps to speak more 
accurately) viewed, probable consequences, of conduct; that 
intrinsic good and evil can be understoo~ respectively, only 
in terms of pleasantness and pain; that the morality of 
modes of action can be gauged only in terms of whether the 
modes of action promote the welfare, i.e., the pleasant con-
dition, of "the sentient beings affected by their exercise. 
In short, as we mentioned earlier, Ducasse's so-called wel-
fare principle of morality is his own version of the principle 
of universal hedonism. 
In respect to the question of whether or not Ducasse 
regards his welfare principle as being "universally applica-
ble" or the "single criterion of morality," very little, if 
anything at all, is said explicitly in Ducasse 1 s writings. 
Nevertheless, a number of indirect comments scattered through-
out his ethical meta-theory, as well as personal communication 
with the author, would lead me to contend that he does regard 
his principle as a single, universally applicable, "criterion'' 
of morality. For example, as we have already seen, Ducasse 
submits his view that the welfare principle is the "only one 
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capable of getting scientifically established."l This 
statement is strong, and is not qualified by any restriction 
as to time or place. In reading it in its context, one gets 
the distinct impression that Ducasse includes within his 
connotation of "getting scientifically established," the 
element of universality. 
Moreover, when speaking about the qualifications for 
a universal principle of morality, Ducasse indicates that such 
a principle would have to "account equally for the fact that 
a given kind of act is moral in a given society but immoral·. 
in another." 2 Ducasse, it seems to me, implies, and would 
argue, that his "welfare principle" meets this requirement. 
The welfare principle, he would say, takes into account the 
possibility that, in view of the triadic nature of causality 
(i.e., cause, effect, and circumstances "the very same kind 
of act which, in the circumstances present in a given society, 
has effects felicitous for the social welfare, may on the 
contrary have disastrous ones under the different circumstances 
existing in another society."3 In each society, he would 
say, the morality or immorality of conduct can be defined in 
terms of whether it, on the one hand, promotes, or, on the 
other hand, subverts the welfare (or pleasantness) of the 
1Underlining is my own. 
2 Ducasse, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," p. 13. 
3Ibid. U d li i i n er n ng s my own. 
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sentient beings affected; yet, because of the differences in 
circumstances, what might cause welfare, and hence be moral, 
in one society, might bring about unpleasant effects, and 
hence be immoral, in another society. Hence, the hedonic 
principle of welfare holds, though always in relation to the 
particular circumstances of a society; and whether it be in 
society X, Y, or z, the "moral" action is always the one 
whose consequences will induce rather than repress the wel-
fare or pleasantness of sentient beings. 
iii. The notion of 'moral obligation.' The ques-
tion might now arise, "Is it possible for a person to be 
aware, for example, that a specific mode of action is detri-
mental to human welfare, and yet not feel impelled to make 
that consideration govern his judgments and conduct?w This 
question has to do with moral obligation and its basis. To 
Ducasse's view regarding this general topic, we now turn. 
First, it is to be noted that the welfare of sentient 
beings is only one among many considerations which ethical 
theorists have used as norms for moral appraisals. Whether 
or not conduct "violated the customs or laws of a particular 
social group," "violated what were believed to be divine 
commands," or violated the 'conscience' of the agent or of 
the appraiser of agents• action, are examples of other norma-
tive considerations. The specific question which Ducasse 
addresses is as to the "ultimate sour·ce of the normativeness 
of any of these considerations." "Why," he asks, "does any 
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moral obligation--any 1 ought 1 --arise out of attention to 
them?" What, in fact, accounts for the leverage which these 
considerations actually have on human conduct?l 
Ducasse 1 s reply is pointed. "I submit," he says, 
"that the answer lies in a certain bare fact in the psycho-
logical constitution at the time of the person who holds one 
or another of those considerations normative--the bare fact, 
namely, that he does ~whether the conduct of himself or 
of others ~eets the test defined by that particular considera-
tion."2 Fcrifthe awareness, on the part of a person, that a 
particular mode of action is, for example, contrary to the 
demands of custom or his individual "conscience," does not 
induce him to ~' then it will have no leverage on his 
conduct; that is to say, it will n£1 cause him to feel the 
obligation of governing his conduct according to such consider-
at ions. 
What Ducasse is say~ng here, essentially, is that the 
notion of moral obligation upon a person entails that the 
"obligating consideration" does, in fact, exercise leverage 
on the behavior of the person obligated, and that where there 
is no such de facto leverage, there is no obligation at all. 
1Quotes in this paragraph are taken from "Scientific 
Method in Ethics: pp. 71-78. 
2Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 78. Unless 
otherwise stated, all subsequent quotes within the discussion 
of this subheading iii are taken from "Scientific Method in 
Ethics," pp. 77-80, which I follow rather closely, here. 
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So, given the welfare principle, for instance, the stubborn 
fact remains that if the awareness by a person P that a 
given act would probably bring about a balance of intrinsic 
goodness does not in fact arouse in him any impulse to act 
accordingly, then he does not feel any moral obligation at 
all. 
It is to be noted, further, that, for Ducasse, moral 
obligation, like physical obligation, is essentially causal. 
The only difference is that while the causative factor in 
physical obligation consists of the "application of physical 
force," the causative factor in moral obligation consists of 
"advertence by the person concerned" to what has been called 
a "moral consideration" (e.g., welfare of sentient beings). 
Or, to put the matter another way, in any genuine moral obliga-
tion--in contrast, for instance, to any external expectation 
or demand uttered in the name of "morality"--there is actual 
causation of an effect upon the person involved. And to 
repeat, the effect, Ducasse maintains, consists always of 
occurrence in the person."of the particular feeling which 
the word 1 ought 1 designates, and of an impulse, whether 
strong or weak, to conduct himself accordingly." 
Ducasse's analysis of moral obligation can best be 
summarized by indicating what, in the light of the above dis-
cussion, it means for Ducasse to say that a man is "moral." 
To say that a man is "moral" is, indeed, to say that consider-
ations of the kind Ducasse has called "moral" (e.g., the 
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commands of conscience or the welfare of sentient beings) do, 
in fact, •have leverage upon his conduct, 11 in the sense 
specified above. Or to put the matter yet another way, we 
call "moral" those persons who "are in fact so constituted 
that considerations of the kinds described, which they call 
'moral grounds,' do generate in them a certain kind of feeling 
and of impulse, and that this feeling and this impulse are 
what the word 'ought' and the expression 'moral obligation' 
respectively designate." Moreover, the fact that, in vary-
ing degrees, most men are so constituted is, for Ducasse, 
the only source of what ethical theorists have called norma-
tiveness in ethics. 
In passing, we may simply note the fact that in our 
attempt to distract and understand Ducasse's basic ethical 
conten~ions, it was not necessary to appeal to Ducasse 1s 
dualism of substance. Nor did we notice any relevance or 
relation of any of Ducasse's ethical views to his conception 
of the ontological relation between mtnd and body. Whether 
or not this observation can also be made in respect to 
Pratt's ethics remains to be seen. A number of criticisms 
of Ducasse's ethical views precedes our consideration of 
Pratt's ethical position. 
J. Critical comments: Ducasse. 
1. My first criticism of what I, perhaps pre-
sumptuously, call Ducasse 1 s "ethics," concerns the philosophical 
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status of what Ducasse labels his "welfare principle." X 
should like to submit that Ducasse uses this principle both 
as theory (or definition) of morality and as criterion (or 
test) of morality, that he treats the two notions as though 
they were one and the same, and that, actually, he is 
entitled to say only that his welfare principle is his 
definitibn or theory of moral action. 
It is true that the distinction between criterion 
and definition has, generally speaking, gone unnoticed 
in contemporary philosophy·. However, as Ewing has so 
well pointed out, 1 the fact that this separation has not 
been made in no way implies that it should not be made. 
For, clearly, the question, for instance, of what truth 
is (question of defining truth), is to be distinguished 
from the question of how we are to ascertain whether or 
not a proposition is true (question of being able to test 
truth). To define truth in terms of correspondence with 
reality, for example, does not, in itself, provide a 
criterion for determining whether or not a given proposi-
tion does correspond with reality (i.e., is true); nor 
does it preclude the possibility that correspondence with 
1A. c. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 59-60. 
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the real might be tested only by coherence, that is to say, 
indirectly, by observing whether or not the alleged "truth" 
coheres with the system of already accepted truths about 
reality. 1 Similarly, the question as to the nature of 
morality is not to be equated with the question of testing 
whether or not a particular act is moral. To define morality 
is one thing, and to be able to determine whether or not a 
particular act conforms to that definition is quite another; 
to provide a definition of morality is one thing, but to 
provide a means of testing that defined morality quite 
another. 
That Ducasse employs his welfare principle both as a 
criterion and definition of mora~ action, and uses the two 
notions interchangeably, comes out, I think, in a passage on 
page 177 of his article, "Scientific Method in Ethics." He 
says here, as we have already seen, that for any scientifi-
cally oriented person "• •• the only consideration in terms 
of which an objective and rational test of the morality or 
immorality of a mode of conduct can be defined, is that of 
the probable effects of the conduct in view upon the welfare 
of such sentient beings as are affected by it. 112 And this 
fact that he lumps together the defining of moral action 
1Ibid. See also E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to 
Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), pp. 46-
47. 
2 Underlining is my own. 
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with the very different matter of testing the moral+ty of 
modes of action is, I think, the basis for his oscillating 
1 references to the principle of welfare as both a criterion 
and a theory or definition2of morality. 
Moreover, I want to say that, despite Ducasse 1 s refer-
ence to the welfare principle as a "scientific criterion11 3 of 
morality and immorality, the welfare prlnciple is not a 
criterion at all. Specifically, it is my contention that to 
say that a mode of action is moral if and only if it promotes 
the welfare or pleasantness of sentient beings, is nQt to 
provide a test for determining the morality of a mode of action 
at all. For clearly, the statement does not provide a method 
by which one can measure the welfare or "ill-condition," the 
pleasantness or unpleasantness, effected by a given action. 
Rather, the statement involves only a definin&, a theorizing, 
a hypothesizing of what it means, for Ducasse, to say that a 
mode of action is moral. It is, essentially, a definition and 
not a criterion of morality. 
Also, it may be added tha~, to the best of my knowledge, 
Ducasse does not, anywhere, offer any suggestion-as to how the 
welfare or pleasantness about to result from a possible, or 
even a given, course of action can be gauged. And, in private 
1see, for example, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," 
pp. 12-13; "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 77. 
2see, for example, "So ientific Method in Ethics," pp. 
81' 83. 
3oucasse, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," p. 12. 
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communication, he has, in fact, admitted to me that the 
problem of how to measure pleasantness or "intrinsic good-
ness" remains unsolved. 
By virtue of these considerations, I am left to main-
tain that, although his terminology explicitly suggests other-
wise, Ducasse 1 s principle of welfare represents only a defini-
tion, and not a criterion of moral action. 
ii. Secondly, I should like to question the basis 
on which Ducasse asserts that the welfare principle is the 
"only one capable of getting scientifically (vs. fideistically) 
established." He speaks here as though, in contrast to such 
"tests of validity"l as conformity of conduct to alleged .9.Q.!!!-
mands of God or conformity of action to pronouncements of 
one's ~conscience, the welfare principle may function as 
a scientifically operable criterion of morality. But is he 
justified in doing so? For, as we noted earlier, Ducasse 
does not offer any way of measuring pleasantness (= welfare 
=intrinsic goodness). And, indeed, is not pleasantness an 
intensive rather than an extensive. quality; is not pleasant-
ness a non-additive quality about which (in the :'1ords of Cohen 
and Nagel) "questions of how much or how many times become 
meaningless1" 2 If this be the case, as I believe it is, then 
1 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 77. See, 
also, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," p. 12. 
2Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, Logic and Scientific 
Method (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1934), p. 296. 
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I maintain that the contention of Ducasse under considera-
tion is not only fideistic, but unsound. For it speaks as 
though the intensive, subjective quality called "pleasant-
ness" were extensive and additive, as though questions of 
how much could be asked meaningfully of it. 
iii. Thirdly, my intention is to criticize the 
procedure by which Ducasse arrives at his welfare principle, 
and, in so doing, to call again into question his loyalty to 
his proposed methodology. After giving the reader illustra-
tions of the standard moral evaluations which go to make up 
the "data" or "pri~itive facts" of ethics, Ducasse does not 
lay bare the particular data from which he derives the wel-
fare principle. Or, to express the matter in a different 
way, after cautioning the reader that the problem of 
morality is not the scientifically vacuous problem of ascer-
taining the meaning of "moral" and "immoral" in vacuo, so to 
speak, but the different problem of determining how these 
terms are used in paradigmatic statements by a person or 
group P, Ducasse, himself, fails to list the statements, 
i.e., the standard, normative applications of the terms, 
from which he induces his generalization or definition of 
morality. To this extent, it would ~ that Ducasse has, 
once more, neglected to take seriously the demands of his 
own methodology, and has, in relation to his view of moral-
ity, left himself open to the charge of being needlessly 
arbitrary. 
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We proceed now to.an examination of Pratt's ethical 
views. 
4. Ethics and Rationality. 
i. Pratt's approach. In his main work on ethics, 
Reason in the Art of Living, 1 Pratt suggests "that we attack 
the ethical problem by asking ourselve.s the definite question, 
How can any given action be justified?" In other words, 
Pratt chooses to begin his ethical theorizing by considering 
the general question, "How, as a matter of fact, do we justify 
our actions when they are challenged?" 2 
To answer this question, Pratt turns immediately to 
common, everyday, illustrations. Suppose somebody asks me 
why I went to college or why I married; suppose somebody asks 
you why you bought a car or why you ate only two meals yester-
day. How do you and I invariably answer such questions? It 
is obvious, Pratt maintains, that in each case our answer 
will represent an attempt to demonstrate how our action, given 
the circumstances, was the reasonable one. For ultimately, 
Pratt asserts, this is the only way in which a person can, 
explicitly or implicitly, justify his action to another. In 
other words, the only way in which the questioned "rightness" 
of an act can be supported, according to Pratt, is by appeal-
ing to reason. Hence, early in his ethical theorizing, he 
1J. B. Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1949). 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 142. 
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affirms that every discussion of right and wrong action ~­
supposes that the only Justifiable way of acting is the 
reasonable way, that is to say, that all participation in 
ethical discussion tttacitly or explicitly admits that moral 
conduct and rational conduct are identical. 111 
But what does it mean, Pratt asks, to presuppose the 
identity of moral conduct and rational conduct? What does 
it mean to say that moral conduct is rational conduct, that 
rational conduct is moral conduct? What, indeed, is rational 
conduct? 
To answer, specifically, the last question, Pratt 
turns, once more, to Common Sense--to "the common and uni-
versal ways in which everyday men and women . . . seek to 
show that their conduct is rational • n2 Take the 
• • 
example of a juryman. By what manner does he try to establish 
that a verdict he rendered was a rational one? One of the 
ways in which he does so, Pratt submits, is by trying to 
indicate that his verdict was impartial, was as free as pos-
sible from all personal prejudice. Or take the case of the 
scientist. The scientist, too, can justify his experimental 
work as rational if and only if he has not allowed personal 
desire or anticipation to influence his resu~ts. In fact, 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 142-143. 
Quote is from p. 143. Underlining is mine. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 147-148. 
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Pratt contends, there seems tc be a "universal human realiza-
tion" of the fact that if conduct is to be rationally justi-
fiable, it must be impartial. For, indeed, in every field, 
rational conduct means, first of all, impartial, unprejudiced, 
disinterested conduct. This, then, Pratt maintains, is the 
first characteristic of rational action. 1 
A second, more positive, characteristic of rational 
conduct may also be discovered by observing the way in which 
we try to justify our actions. It is not. enough simply to 
show that we acted impartially. We must further attempt to 
indicate how "some recognized good or value" was to be gained 
from a given choice of action. Why did I go to college? Why 
did I get married? I would, at once, be condemned to irra-
tionality if I were not able to point to one value or recog-
nized good that was to emerge from, or be increased by, my 
respective acts. That is to say, ''the creation or preserva-
tion of scme value" is, according to Pratt's analysis, 
"essential to the rational justification of conduct." 2 
But this is not all. The fact that a certain recog-
nized good was to be gained by a specific course of action is 
not in itself a "proof" of its rationality. In addition to 
this, one must be able to demonstrate "that the value for 
which one acted was the greatest value to be gained under the 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 148-149. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 150. 
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circumstances; for to act in behalf of the lesser of two 
values would be, Pratt insists, to act irrationally. 1 And 
the only condition which would permit such a justification is 
the condition of his having taken into consideration not just 
some of the consequences which might follow from a proposed 
action, but all of the values relevant to it, that is to say, 
all of those effects or consequences which are either intended 
o~ reasonably foreseen as probable whether intended or not." 2 
Pratt concludes, then, that an action is rational, and justi-
fiable in terms of reason, if and only if (as a second essen-
tial characteristic) it has taken into consideration "all 
the values affected' and represents a choice of the greatest 
value attainable in the circumstances. 
It is very interesting to note that Pratt's appeal to 
Common Sense here is, in a manner reminiscent of Ducasse's 
approach to the theoretical problems of philosophy, largely 
an appeal to common, ordinary language. Pratt says: "If 
anyone should challenge my assertion that rationally justi-
fiable conduct necessarily involves values and means the 
choice of the greatest relevant good or combination of goods, 
I for one should feel the same difficulty in responding that 
I should experience if someone should challenge me to prove 
that the color of this paper is white and not black. 11 Such 
1 Ibid. Underlining is my own. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 187. 
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a "queer' question, he maintains, would obviously be a "matter 
of language," and the only thing one could do would be "to 
point out the universal usage of the English tongue." And 
the same thing, he argues, is true regarding the meaning of 
rationally justifiable conduct. "The English language uses 
the phrase reasonable or sensible action--and all tongues use 
their corresponding and equivalent phrases--to mean action 
ltrhich seeks, with as much knowledge as the actor can muster, 
to bring about good rather than bad results." 1 
Hence, to go back to our earlier question, "What does 
it mean to say that moral conduct is rational conduct?", we 
may now answer that to say that moral conduct is rational 
conduct is to say that it is unprejudiced and impartial con-
duct, and that it involves the choice of the greatest of the 
relevant values foreseen within the given circumstances. And 
this identification of moral action with rational action, of 
moral action with disinterested action consciously directed 
at bringing about the greatest relevant good, becomes for 
Pratt, the fundamental principle of his ethics--namely, the 
Principle of Rationality and Value. 2 
ii. A Utilitarian 'theory' of morality? There is 
no question that Pratt's Principle of Rationality and Value 
represents his definition or theory of moral conduct. For, 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 151. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 211. 
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as we have seen, this principle emphatically defines moral 
conduct as that conduct which springs from an impartial con-
sideration of all relevant values and involves "acting for 
the sake of the largest value or combination of values at 
stake." 1 Mo~eover, it is worthy of note that Pratt, himself, 
sometimes refers to his principle as "the theory of Rationality 
and Value. "2 
That Pratt's Principle is at least a quasi-Utilitarian 
theory of moral action is also, I think, undeniable. For, 
clearly, moral action is said to be always sensible, unprej-
udiced action for the sake of the greatest good QL combination 
of goods available. Or, to express the matter somewhat dif-
ferently, Pratt's theory of Rationality and Value says very 
pointedly that, if I am to act rationally and rightly, I am 
required, for instance, to deny the "isolated longing" • 
for the sake of "the larger organization of desires.'r3 
• • 
For 
I can justify my action only if I can show that it was chosen 
for the sake of a greater rather than a lesser good. It is 
with this in mind that Pratt says: 
If then I acted in such a way as to destroy a greater 
good of yours for the sake of some lesser good of my 
own, I am shut off from every rational defense of my 
conduct. To plead that my lesser good was really 
greater than your (admittedly) greater good just because 
1 Reason in the Art of Llving, 201. Pratt, p. 
2 Reason in the Art of Llving, 185. Pratt, p. 
3Pratt, Reason in the Art of Li vi;gg, p. 196. 
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it was mine is of course to throw reason to the win~s-­
it is, indeed, to attack reason's very foundations. 
Hence, in being fundamentally concerned with conse-
quences of actions, 2 in always favoring the greatest value 
or combination of values to be gained within a given situa-
tion, in subordinating the less inclusive system of values to 
the more inclusive, and, finally, in making the "good man" 
the man whose "fundamental aim" and actions are for "the 
production of the greatest balance of good over evil•"3 
Pratt's principle of Rationality and Value is unequivocally 
Utilitarian in certain of its emphases. And we may simply 
note, in passing, that this view of Rationality and Value 
is strikingly similar to Ducasse's principf of welfare. 
Yet, lest the reader draw the inference that Pratt's 
theory of moral conduct is 
.1n every pp. rt a Utilitarian 
theory, an important point to the contrary must be noted. 
In his detailed consideration of Hedonism, Pratt disavows 
the view that pleasure is the only value or good. 4 That is 
to say, despite the fact that Pratt accepts the Utilitarian 
view that moral action must always be done for the greatest 
amount of value to be gained within the given circumstances, 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 188. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 217. 
3Pratt, Reason in the Art of L1 ving, p. 204. 
4Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, Chapters X-XIII. 
See especially pp. 131, 138, 149. 
he refuses to adopt the further Utilitarian position that 
this value1 is one and the same with pleasure. In other 
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words, Pratt accepts the universal altruism, but rejects the 
hedonism, of Universal Hedonism. And, in view of this, we 
are warranted only in concluding that Pratt's theory or defini-
tion of morality is quasi-Utilitarian, and not thoroughly 
Utilitarian, in nature. 
iii. A Utilitarian 'criterion' of morality? Close 
examination of Pratt's ethics makes evident, I think, Pratt's 
intention to make Rationality and Value not only his defini-
tion, but also his criterion or test of morality. In judging 
an act, says Pratt, "we must ask ourselves, what is the 
character of the act in all j_ ts bearings; is it a good act or 
.a bad one? 11 To answer this question, an 11objective standard" 
is required; and the principle of Rationality and Value 
obviously intends, he asserts, to provide such a standard. 2 
More pointedly, Pratt later maintains that the 
doctrine of Ratlnnality and Value does represent "a criterion 
by which we may judge of moral situations." "It tells us, 
he says, "what the morally good means. It points out the 
wise way to act, and the wise way to live. It may be used 
with ••• practical advantage in the effort to live wisely 
and well." 3 
1 Pratt's view of "value" will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 203. 
3Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 217. 
226 
And, in another directly relevant passage, Pratt 
argues for the applicability of Rationality and Value as a 
criterion of moral conduct, in the following manner: 
In nearly every case where the problem of moral 
choice arises, it will be found very helpful to sit 
down and calculate as well as one may the probable 
effect of rival courses of conduct on the highest 
welfare of society and of all the individuals who 
may be affected by one's action.l 
That Pratt's Principle is intended also as a criterion 
or test of moral conduct, that it is, again, partially Utili-
tarian in emphasis, and that it is meant for use by all of 
us, comes out, I think, clearly in these passages. But 
whether or not the Principle is actually a workable criterion 
for moral action, is, I submit, a consideration which merits 
additional attention. 
For the question arises here, as in the case of 
Ducasse's welfare principle, Is to say that "an action is 
moral if and only if it involves an impartial choice of the 
greatest of all relevant values" really to offer a method 
by which one can arrive at the choice of such an action? 
How, in fact, can I ever determine what action, amongst many 
possibilities, represents the greatest value to be attained 
under the circumstances? It is this question which, given 
Pratt's definition of moral conduct, I feel any workable 
criterion should answer. And I am not at all sure that 
Pratt's Principle does so. 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 215. 
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Pratt, himself, seems to be aware of the problem con-
nected with his attempt to use Rationality and Value as a 
criterion when he says: "The difficulty in applying it • 
• • 
centers in our human ignorance of some of the forces, present 
and future, which will influence consequences, and also in 
the problem of how to determine the relative importance of 
rival values." In other words, Pratt seems to recognize the 
fact that his principle does not offer a method by which one 
can determine the relative importance of the values relevant 
to any particular situation. But this point does not appear 
to trouble him. For (a) he reaffirms Stace 1 s remarks that 
"even if you cannot measure pleasures and pains, this does 
not prevent you from knowing that some pleasures or pains are 
greater than others. A man does not need a thermometer to 
know that he is being frozen to death or boiled alive." And 
(b) he tells us that "it is not the aim of ethics to teach 
one exactly how to act in every situation in life."1 
However, as regards (a), it might well be the case 
that our inability to measure pleasure and pai~ does not pre-
vent the possibility of our knowing that ''some pleasures or 
pains are greater than others." But all that this indicates 
is that a criterion or "measure" of morality might not be 
necessary. Pratt, however, maintains that there ~ a 
criterion of moral conduct (namely, his Principle); and my 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 193-194. 
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point is simply that if it does not enable one to measure 
values, and, hence, to determine the proper "moral" course 
of action, then it ought not to be looked upon as a work-
able criterion of morality (regardless of whether or not a 
criterion is necessary). 
In regard to (b) I should just like to point out that 
this comment seems to be in contrast to an earlier remark by 
Pratt that "the function of ethics is to provide a principle 
upon which one may distinguish between wise and foolish 
actions." 1 And if Pratt means what he says in (b) one wonders 
why he is so interested in turning his principle of Rationality 
and Value into a criterion of Rationality and Value! 
Thus, in specific answer to the question of this sub-
heading, I should like to submit that, although Pratt intends 
it as such, the Principle of Rationality and Value, by fail-
ing to give a method by which its defined "greatest value" 
can be measured, does not represent a workable "criterion" 
of moral conduct. 
iv. The meaning of 1value. 1 Throughout our 
examination of Pratt's ethical views, thus far, we have been 
using the term "value" in its unexamined form. Although, 
at times, we have followed Pratt's lead by using the word 
interchangeably with "good," we have not, as yet, made clear 
the sense in which he is employing either of these terms. 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 151. 
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So as to insure an accurate interpretation of Pratt, let us 
now do so. 
"Value," says Pratt, 11 is a character possessed by an 
object, event, or experience in virtue of the fact that some 
sentient being likes it tAJhen he gets it; or would like it if 
he got it." 1 Or, to express this definition in only a 
slightly different way, value is "a quality possessed by a 
thing, event, or experience in virtue of the fact that some 
• subject likes it. 112 Essential to both formulations is 
the point that, for Pratt, "value" depends entirely on 
whether or not somebody likes a proposed experience or thing 
when he gets it, and not (as some writers would maintain) on 
the extent to which somebody desires it. And this, argues 
Pratt, is precisely the connotation which "the bestand com-
monest English usage" ordinarily gives to the term.3 
It must be noted, however, that Pratt is here talking 
about "value 1' in a general sense, and not specifically about 
moral value. And he makes it clear that moral value is not 
to identified with the simple value defined above; for many 
bad things may be said to possess the quality value. 11 Moral 
value," says Pratt, "presupposes simple value, but not all 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 175. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art .Qf. Living, p. 179. 
3Pratt, Reason in the Art of Ll,ving, p. 175. 
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simple values are moral values." Let us look further into 
this matter. 1 
Pratt's point here is that while simple value (or sim-
ple good, or intrinsic good) is the quality which a thing, 
event, or experience possesses by virtue of its being liked 
by some sentient being, moral value is a quality possessed 
only by acts of the will, and, specifically, by the act of 
will called 11 choice." That is to say, acts of will, alone, 
are morally good or bad, ttand of these acts of the will none 
are either good or bad save choice." Moreover, as the only 
moral act, choice is a choice between simple values or goods, 
and, hence, no choice would be possible unless there were 
goods between which to choose. This is exactly what Pratt 
means when he says that "moral value presupposes simple value." 
In other words, although not all simple values are moral val-
~, (because they do not belong to choice) the very meaning 
of morality presupposes the simple values or goods from 
which to choose. 2 
Hence, we may say that while simple value, for Pratt, 
is expressed by the definitions quoted above, moral value is 
always the "quality of a good choice,"3 i.e., of a choice 
made for the sake of the greatest relevant value. 
v. The concent of 'obligation. 1 According to the 
principle of Rationality and Value, the notion of "obligation" 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 175-1?6. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 181. 
3I.l21.£. 
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or "ought," refers always to values. And "for it, as for 
Kant's ethics," Pratt says, "obligation is a command arising 
from one's rational nature; a command which one recognizes 
as fitting, but which may run counter to and may be resisted 
by, one's inclinations."1 More explicitly, it is a command 
which says, in effect, that "if you are going to act as a 
rational being, you must act impartially and for the highest 
values." 2 
We may assert, then, that Pratt's view of "obligation" 
is grounded in the very nature of man. It is a sense or 
feeling experienced, characteristically, by homo sapiens, 
regardless of the social, cultural, or environmental influence 
which conditions him. It is the "innate sense of recognition 
that it is supremely fitting for a rational being to act 
rationally;" it is a feeling of natural discontent with incon-
sistency of character; it is a kind of innate, natural "urge" 
to act rationally and consistently since one ~ a rational 
being; it is, we might say, the "inborn voice of Reason." 3 
And, hence, to say that "I am under obligation to do this" 
or "I ought to do this" means that only by doing this can I 
satisfy my innate imperative to act rationally, and thus be 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 206. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 207. 
3Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 206-208. 
Underlining of innate is my own. 
able to justify or defend my conduct before the "court of 
1 
reason." 
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vi. Do Pratt's ethical views reflect his 1 dualism 
of process'? We have now completed our scrutiny of Pratt's 
basic views regarding morality. In brief, we have found that, 
for Pratt, moral action is rational action, that moral choice 
is always directed at the maximum amount of value, and, hence, 
(by implication) that the moral life of individuals is marked 
by the attempt to aehieve the most important and greatest 
values of humanity. 2 However, before proceeding to (a) a 
short critical commentary on Pratt's views and (b) a compari-
son of the contentions of Pratt with those of Ducasse, we 
must first consider the question in which we expressed inter-
est both at the end of the preceding chapter and the beginning 
of th.i.s one--namely, Does Pratt's ethics show the influence 
of his ontological dualism? 
In Lecture VI of his earlier book, Matter and Spirit, 
Pratt declares that nthe bearing of Dualism upon morality 
and ethics is . . . obvious enough."3 He elucidates his 
allegation by arguing that moral action is not possible with-
out responsibility, and that responsibility, in turn, is not 
"without some form of spiritual freedom and spiritual 
1Pratt, Reason in the Art of Llving, p. 208. 
2 Reason in the Art of Living, 202. Pratt, p. 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 197. 
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efficiency. 111 Furthermore, he contends that neither spiritual 
freedom nor efficiency is possible within the framework of 
any philosophy which denotes the existence of free, efficient, 
unpredictable, personal spirits. And his conclusion is that 
this concept of a "free and efficient self 11 is provided only 
in a Dualistic philosophy, 2 that is to say, only in a phi-
losophy which acknowledges "processes" or "ways of acting" 
not reducible to physical laws and not dominated by mechanical 
sequence.3 
However, it must be said that although, in Matter and 
Spirit, Pratt spells out the bearing of Dualism on ethics, 
he does not, in the actual development of his ethical posi-
tion,4 either explicitly appeal to, or indicate the influence 
of, his Mind-Body dualism. In this connection, it is inter-
esting to note, moreover, that despite the preceding emphasis 
on responsibility, Pratt nowhere, in the presentation of his 
ethical views, develops this notion. 
Nevertheless, it is true that, given Pratt's remarks 
in Matter and Spirit, certain traces of his dualism might be 
re·::d into his ethical views. For instance, one might well 
argue that Pratt's notion of choice (which was considered in 
1Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 198. 
2Ibid. 
3see section I of this chapter. 
4Pratt, Reason .211 the Art of Living, especially. 
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subheading iv of the foregoing section) presupposes the 
notion of a "free and efficient," self or person and, hence, {to 
use Pratt's own line of reasoning) a dualistic philosophy 
which does not relegate the whole of reality to matter and 
physical energy. But, as I suggested, this would involve 
a "reading between the lines," and, I might add, the kind of 
"reading between the lines" which one would have difficulty 
in reconciling with Pratt's allegation, in Reason in the Art 
of Living, that 11 the ethics of Rationality and Value has the 
considerable advantage of b~ing dependent on n£ special form 
of metaphysics. 111 
It is this particular conflict between what, on the 
one hand, Pratt 1 s ethics seems, necessarily, to presuppose 
and, on the other hand, what Pratt actually says in the pre-
ceding quote, that provides the basis for our turning to a 
brief critique of Pratt's position. 
5. Critical comments: Pratt. 
i. I wish to begin by maintaining that, in the 
light of his own ethical vie~rs, Pratt 1 s statement that the 
ethics of Rationality and Value is dependent "on no special 
form of metaphysics" is unsound. For it seems to me clear 
that the ethics of Rationality and Value would not hold or 
make sense without the metaphysical presuppomtion that man 
is, by nature, rational, inclined to act consistently with 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 218. 
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his characteristic rationality, 1 and free to choose and act 
for the greatest good attainable under the circumstances. 
Indeed, without man's freedom to will and, more specifically, 
to choose, Pratt's conception of moral value would not make 
sense. So need I ask whether the ethics of Rationality and 
Value could ever stand beside, or fit coherently into, a 
deterministic or a mechanistic philosophy; or, more partic-
ularly, whether such an ethics could possibly emanate from 
a deterministic, materialistic metaphysics? I think not, 
for the answer, I feel, is strikingly obvious. 
Hence, I say with the Pratt of Mind and Soirit that 
the ethics of Rationality and Value does presuppose, and is 
dependent on, a particular type of metaphysics, and that 
Pratb's subsequent statement to the contrary is surprisingly 
unwarranted. Of course, I should still want to maintain, as 
I have in the preceding subheading, that Pratt does not, in 
the presentation of his ethics, make any explicit appeal to 
his "dualism of process." 
ii. Secondly, I wish to criticize the approach 
which Pratt uses to arrive at his view of morality. Specifi-
cally, I want to call into question his initial appeal, here, 
to Common Sense and linguistic convention. 
In approaching and attempting to solve the problem of 
morality at the level of language, Pratt, it seems to me, 
l See, for instance, Pratt, Reason in the Art Q! Liv-
ing, pp. 206-208. 
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subjects himself to some of the same basic questions which 
we have raised against Ducasse 1 s ordinary language approach 
to the theoretical problems of philosophy: for even though 
he does not share Ducasse 1 s scientific methodology, he very 
clearly allows "the universal usage of the English tongue" to 
determine his hypothesis concerning morality. 
Accordingly, we must ask Pratt, as we have frequently 
asked Ducasse, the basis on which he permits himself to draw 
his conception of the nature of morality from an examination 
of the usage of the word "moral acti on 11 in our language. 
Surely, a distinction is to be made between morality, on the 
one hand, and language which employs the word "morality," on 
the other hand. Does Pratt, like Ducasse, assume that lan-
guage has extra-linguistic import? If so, on what grounds? 
If not, how can he justify his procedure in respect to his 
treatment of morality? Neither of these questions is answered 
clearly within Pratt's work on ethics. 
To put the matter another way, Pratt's view of moral 
action seems to amount to a description of the way in which 
":noral action11 is employed in the ''best and commonest 
English." But, I am arguing, there is no reason to assume 
a priori that a description of the common usage of a term is 
tantamount to a description of the nature of that to which 
the term refers. In fact, to approach morality at the level 
of language is to approach it at a level once removed from 
the actuality or reality of moral conduct. And certainly, one 
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may, a priori, distinguish between the fundamental ethical 
concern for the nature of morality, on the one hand, and the 
meta-linguistic or semantical concern for the usage of the 
term moral, on the other hand. 
Of course, one might wish to argue that moral terminol-
ogy represents the statilization in words of moral experience 
and hence that an analysis of moral terminology might reveal 
the characteristics of morality. But, Pratt has neither 
presented the bases for nor offered such a contention. His 
apparent assumption of the extra-linguistic import of lan-
guage is, then, markedly gratuitous. 
6. The ethical views compared. At the conclusion of 
our preceding chapter, we indicated our desire to find out 
whether or not, as in the case of the preceding topics 
examined, the differences in Ducasse's and Pratt's ethical 
positions could be understood in the light of the two differ-
ent postures in which Ducasse and Pratt have been seen to 
approach and view the problems of philosophy. Moreover, we 
resolved to take note of any influence which their differing 
ontological dualisms might appear to exercise on their sub-
sequent ethical views. 
In respect to the latter consideration, we have already 
taken the stand that, as regards the ethics of both Ducasse 
and Pratt, there seemed to be no direct appeal to an antecedent 
solution of the Mind-Body problem. However, we did hasten to 
add that, in respect to Pratt's ethics, in particular, one 
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might, with substantial sup?ort, argue that there are tacit 
metaphysical presuppositions (at least, partially, along the 
line of his Mind-Body dualism) 1 on which his ethics rises or 
falls. And, certainly, we would be willing, ultimately, to 
make the same kind of contention in reference to Ducasse 1 s 
ethics. 
So we are left now with the former of the two con-
siderations mentioned above, namely, as to whether or not 
the differences in the two positions under scrutiny can again 
be accounted for in terms of basically different philosophical 
postures. But there is an aspect of irony related to this 
task, for as regards the two ethical schemes under examina-
tion, one is struck more by the similarities than by the 
differences between them. Let us look at these similarities. 
1. First of all, we may note tha~ for the first time 
in the scope of this dissertation, Pratt, showing semblance 
of Ducasse, appeals directly to common, ordinary, language 
to help solve a problem of philosophy. In trying to ascer-
tain the meaning of "value," as we have seen, Pratt turns 
directly to the way in which the word is used in "the best 
and commonest English;" and, it may be added, in trying to 
defend his definition against the possible charge of being 
arbitrary, he argues against its arbitrariness solely on the 
ground that it does conform to the way in which ordinary 
1see section I of this chapter. 
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1 people use the term. Although Pratt is not explicitly fol-
lowing the steps of Ducasse's scientific methodology, there 
is no question that, in respect to the meaning of "value," he 
confronts the same kind of "ordinary language" data as does 
Ducasse. 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that Pratt's 
specific approach to the "ethical problem" bears a greater 
resemblance to Ducasse 1 s general approach to philosophical 
problems than it does to the approaCh that he himself takes 
to the preceding topics of this dissertation. Pratt 1 s approach 
here, is not at the level of immediate, personal experience. 
Rather, he turns to Common Sense, to "the common and universal 
ways • • • of everyday men and women," to the manner in which 
people try to justify their actions. Again, although Pratt's 
procedure is by no means identical with Ducasse's methodo-
logical approach to paradigmatic applications of the term 
"moral" in ordinary language, it shares a concern for the 
way in which people ordinarily express themselves, 2 and 
represents a marked departure from Pratt's earlier and con-
sis tent appeals to "direct, personal experience.'' 
Indeed, for the first time in this dissertation, one 
gets the impression that Ducasse and Pratt, perhaps with dif-
ferent emphases and interests, see a philosophical topic from 
the same general perspective. 
1 Pratt, Reason in the· Art of Living, pp. 175, 172. 
2 See elaboration of this point at the end of part i, 
section 4, of this chapter. 
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ii. Secondly, as I have tried to show earlier 
under separate subheadings, both Ducasse and Pratt espou3e, 
as their fundamental ethical principles, definitions of moral 
action which are, at least partially, Utilitarian in nature. 
Each is interested in, and labels "moral," that conduct which 
is acted for the greatest "good, 1' "value," or combination of 
"good" or "value." And each gauges "good" or "value" in terms 
of the consequences that actions have on "sentient beings." 
Ducasse says that good actions promote the welfare or "good 
condition" or "pleasantness" or "positive intrinsic value" of 
sentient beings. Pratt says that moral action involves the 
choice of the greatest value or combir.ation of values in rela-
tion to the "highest welfare of society," 1 and that, as we 
have seen, value always depends on the "liking" of some 
sentient being. 
Hence, we may say that in defining ~oral action in 
terms of efforts on sentient beings and in maintaining that 
moral action must be done in behalf of "the widest grouping 
2 
of human values," Ducasse's principle of welfare and Pratt's 
principle of Rationality and Value are similarly Utilitarian 
ir .. nature. 
iii. Thirdly, we may note that each author 
attempts to make his individual principle of morality serve 
1 Pratt, Reason and the Art of Living, p. 215. 
2 Pratt, Reason and the Art of Living, p. 198. 
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both as a definition and as a criterion of morality. In 
each case, however, I have argued that, on the contrary, the 
respective principle does not provide a workable method of 
testing the moral tty of relevant courses of action, that is, 
of determining what action, among various alternatives, pro-
duces the maximum amount of "value" or "good" for sentient 
beings. 
iv. Finally, it is to be noticed that both 
writers use the terms "value" and "good" interqhangeably, 
and, on my interpretation, get their clue for the synonymous 
use of terms from common,ordinary usage. 2 
Now, it seems to me that, in view of these marked 
similarities in Ducasse 1 s and Pratt 1 s treatment of 11 the 
ethical problem," the above question as to whether the dif-
ferences in the two positions can be accounted for in terms 
of basic differences in "philosophical posture," loses much 
of its force and significance. For even though we have not 
as yet considered the main differences in the two theories 
under examination, we have already seen, in point (i) above, 
that, for the first time in this dissertation, Ducasse and 
Pratt approach the subject from the same general perspec-
tive, address the same kind of data, and seem to speak in the 
same general universe of discourse. Hence, in view of the 
1
see Pratt, Reason and the Art of Living, p. 181, and 
Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics," p. 85. 
2 Ibid., Pratt, p. 152, and Ducasse, p. 85. For Ducasse 
it would be more correct to say that he uses "good" and "posi-
tive intrinsic value" interchangeably. 
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fact that Ducasse and Pratt do not appear to differ basically 
regarding the philosophical postures which they have here 
assumed, the question posed above is divested of much of its 
appropriateness and import. All the same, let us, now, Jook 
at some of the differences which emerge from the foregoing 
scrutiny of Ducasse's and Pratt's ethical views. 
i. First, we may note that the synonymous usage 
of "value" and "good" by both Ducasse and Pratt should not 
be taken to mean that the two authors have identical con-
ceptions of value or good. For, as we have seen, whereas 
Ducasse takes "intrinsic goodness" to be one and the same 
with "pleasantness," Pratt prefers to characterize it as a 
quality possessed by a thing, event, or experience by virtue 
of its being liked by some sentient being. Although one 
might want to argue that pleasantness also fits Pratt's 
characterization of ''intrinsic goodness" or "value, 11 Pratt 
himself makes it clear, by :repudiating the hedonlc equation 
of value with pleasure, 1 that he is unwilling to make such 
an identification. And it is precisely this difference which 
has prevented us from acknowledging Pratt's view of morality 
as being thoroughly Utilitarian, and has induced us to refer 
to his position as being only quasi-Utilitarian. 
ii. Secondly, it may be seen that the views of 
"moral obligatioti' offered by Ducasse and Pratt are conspicu-
ously different. For Ducasse, moral obligation is understood 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 138, 149. 
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entirely within the framework of whether or not certain 
"moral considerations" (e.g., promoting the greatest welfare 
for society, obeying the accepted "mores" of a certain group, 
etc.) induce or cause a person to~ about governing his 
conduct according to those considerations. For Pratt, obliga-
tion is understood as a kind of imperative or command, innate 
in man as a rational being, to act according to his basic 
rationality, and, hence, "to act impartially and for the 
highest values." 
iii. Thirdly, we may recognize that there is in 
the ethics of Pratt a more general and permeating emphasis 
on rationality than there is in Ducasse 1 s position. In Pratt, 
moral conduct is explicitly said to be "rational,'"'rationally 
justifiable" conduct, and moral obligation turns out to be a 
kind of "innate sense of recognition that it is supremely 
fitting for a rational being to act rationally." 1 For Ducasse, 
on the other hand, neither moral action nor moral obligation 
is specifically d2fined in terms of reason. ·However, in at 
least two places, Ducasse does stress the need for devising 
a theory of ethics that would be acceptable to rational 
persons and would provide a "rational test of the morality 
and immorality of a mode of conduct. 112 But, as I suggested, 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 206. 
2 Ducasse, "Scientific Method in Ethics,n p. 77. See, 
also, "Philosophy Can Become a Science," p. 11. Underlining 
is mine. 
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Ducasse's ethics is by no means the "reason-oriented" ethics 
that Pratt's is. 
These, then, are the main differences between the two 
ethical theories. But we cannot stop here. The question now 
arises, If, as we indicated earlier, it is the case that 
Ducasse and Pratt are viewing the questions of ethics from the 
same general postures, and, hence, that their differences can-
not be accounted for in terms of basic differences in phi-
losophical approach and perspective, how~ their differ-
ences to be aocounted for? In an effort to answer this ques-
tion, let us try to understand each of the differences 
enumerated above. 
As regards (i), it is clear, as we saw earlier, that 
Pratt appeals to the ttcomrnonest English usagen for the mean-
ing which he ascribes to "value" or 11 goodness. 11 Moreover we 
,:;, 
can assume that if Ducasse 1 s approach to the meaning of value 
is comparable to his approach to morality, and is consistent 
with his proposed scientific methodology for all philoso-
phical inquiry, he too induces his meaning of 11 goodness" 
from standard applications of the term in ordinary language. 
Assuming that such is the case, then I should think that the 
fact that Ducasse equates value or intrinsic goodness with 
pleasantness and Pratt does not, could emanate only from 
either (a) a difference in the·data accepted as being exem-
plary of ordinary-language usage or (b) a difference in the 
interpretation of the data selected. However, the combined, 
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relevant writings of the two authors do not provide enough 
details to enable a substantial argument in favour of either 
{a) or {b). 
In reference to (ii), it appears to me that the dif-
ference between Ducasse and Pratt concerning moral obligation 
can be accounted for completely in terms of an assumption 
made by Pratt and not made by Ducasse. Specifically, whereas 
Pratt insists that man's nature includes an innate sense of 
moral obligation, 1 Ducasse makes no such an assumption. 
Ducasse, rather, seems to draw his meaning of moral obliga-
tic'n from his very inquiry into what it means, in ordinary 
language, to caE a person "moral." For to call a person 
"moral," he says, means that "certain 1moral 1 Qonsiderations 
do in fact have leverage upon his conduct," in other words, 
means that he is morally obligated. 
It is interesting to note, at this point, that Pratt's 
assumption about man's nature does not alter any previous 
contention that, as regards ethics, Pratt and Ducasse 
approach problems from the same general posture or perspec-
tive. For I wish to state, here, that Pratt's view of moral 
obligation comes only after a conside:!:'ation of "ought" asser-
tions, and is submitted as a characterization of what we mean 
1vhen, in ordinary language, we use the term "conscience." 2 
1 Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, p. 206. 
2Pratt, Reason in the Art of Living, pp. 205-206. 
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In respect to (iii), it is not difficult to understand 
why there is, in Pratt's ethics, a much more distinct emphasis 
on reason. For, as we have observed earlier, while Ducasse 
proposes to meet the problem of illOrality by ascertaining the 
meaning of the te">."m "moral 11 and "immoral" as used repre-
sentively in ordinary language by person or group P, Pratt 
"attacks" 1 the problem by turning to Common Sense and asking 
specifically how everyday men and women justify their actions 
when called upon to do so. Ducasse 1 s answer is, quite 
expectedly, an inductive generalization regarding the "defin-
ing instances" of rtmoral" and 11 immoral.n Pratt's answer is, 
briefly, that ordinary men and women always seek to justify 
a given action by trying to show that it was the reasonable 
one. But this answer, in turn, leads to other questions 0uch 
as: What constitutes a reasonable action? Why do people 
want to act rationally?, etc. And it is precisely because 
of questions of this order, which Ducasse is not prompted to 
ask, that Pratt's ethical theory, in contrast to Ducasse 1 s, 
places so much emphasis on 11 reason" and 11 rationality." 
But again it is to be observed that, even though there 
are differences of emphases within the two approaches, the 
two approaches still reflect the same philosophical posture--
namely, the posture of assuming that the ethical problem can 
1To use his own expression! See Pratt, Reason in the 
Art of Living, p. 142. 
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be solved by viewing the "ways" of Common Sense, in one form 
or another. 
7. Final remarks. Our intention in this chapter was 
not only to compare critically the ethical theories of Ducasse 
and Pratt, but to determine whether or not, as in the previous 
chapters, the basic differences between the views could be 
accounted for in terms of fundamentally different philoso-
phical postures or universes of discourse as3umed by the 
two authors. Moreover, we were interested in learning 
whether or not the different types of dualism endorsed by the 
two writers could explain their differences in ethical views. 
But, contrary to our expectations, we have found, here, that 
the similarities between Ducasse and Pratt are more note-
worthy than are the differences; that the distinction between 
"dualism of substance" and "dualism of process" does not seem 
to effect fundamental differences in their ethical theories; 
that, for the first time in this dissertation, Pratt does not 
begin his philosophizing at the existential level of direct, 
personal experience; that the two authors concur rather than 
differ in respect to general approach and perspective (i.e., 
posture); and that an analysis of the differences in the two 
ethical theories confirms what is logically entailed by the 
preceding observation--namely, that these differences are not 
to be accounted for in terms of fundamentally different 
postures, for the postures are not fundamentally different. 
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Hence, in ending, we may say that, as regards ethics, 
Ducasse and Pratt, for the first time in this dissertation, 
seem to be talking in the same universe of discourse and 
about the same thing. 
CHAPTER VI 
BELIGION 
The final topic with which we may concern ourselves in 
this dissertation is the topic of religion. In this chapter, 
we shall compare the views offered by Ducasse and Pratt regard-
• 
ing various aspects of the general subject. We shall, of 
course, be interested in learning whether or not, as in the 
case of the preceding topic alone, Ducasse and Pratt are, 
once more, making the same general contentions within the 
same universe of discourse or posture. And in our continued 
attempt to understand the basic differences between Ducasse 
and Pratt, we shall again give some attention to the allega-
tion made by Pratt, and cited at the beginning of the fore-
going chapter, that mind-body dualism "is pregnant with deci-
sive consequences for our whole view ••• of religion." 
1. Ducasse 1s Examination of Religion. 
i. The problem and Ducasse's apnroach to it. 
Ducasse makes it clear that, for him, the central problem 
regarding religion is the problem as to the "essential nature" 
of religion. What is there about religion, he asks, that 
differentiates it from every other kind of characteristic 
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human activity? What set of characteristics differentiates 
a "religious" faith from a "non-religious" one?1 
In meeting this problem, Ducasse, once more, endeavours 
to conform to the demands of his proposed methodology. Once 
more he turns,to ordinary language. As a matter of semantic 
convention, he points out, Mohammedism, Judaism, Christianity, 
Jainism, Buddhism, is each referred to as a 11 religion;u that 
is to say, ordinary language applies the word "religion" to 
Christianity and Buddhism, for instance, but not to the 
Engineering Society or to the Country Club. These standard 
applications of the word "religion," constitute, Ducasse main-
tains, the vary data of the problem as to the essential nature 
of religion. Hence, the problem concerning "the essential 
nature of religion"· turns out to be the problem of defining 
I 
what the term "religion" means in paradigmatic applications 
of it in ordinary language. And the problem is solved only 
by the discovery of a definition which fits all the listed 
data, that is to say, which fits all the faiths that standard 
ordinary-language usage terms "religions," but which fits none 
of the faiths to which normative usage firmly denies the name 
1religi on. 1' 2 
It is to be stated immediately, however, that although 
Ducasse formulates his problem within the framework of an 
1c. J. Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion 
(New York: The Ronald Press Co., 19.53), pp. 16-18. 
2 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 18. 
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ordinary-la.nguage approach, he does not come to grips with 
the problem at this level. That is to say, he does not try 
to meet his formulated task of' defining the "essential 
nature" of religion by analyzing explicitly the aforementioned 
paradigmatic usages of the term "religion." Rather, he turns 
to an examination of what he calls "the more plausible defini-
tions of religion which have been offered," 1 "the more pains-
taking attempts which phiiorophers have made to formulate a 
really generic conception of religion." 2 In other words, 
instead of dealing directly with the generating question of 
his proposed methodological inquiry, namely, What does the 
term "religion" mean as used representatively by person or 
group P in the listed data?, Ducasse attempts to accomplish 
the task before him by analyzing selected generic definitions 
of "religion" offered by fellow philosophers. A critical 
scrutiny of such definitions, he maintains, permits the 
opportunity to formulate a generic conception of the essence 
of religion which will avoid the shortcomings and yet incorpo-
rate the positive features of some of the most significant 
and comprehensive attempts to differentiate religion from the 
other great dimensions of human experience.3 
ii. Religion 1.§. to be defined only .1n terms of 
its functions. Upon first reflection, says Ducasse, the most 
1 Ducasse, A Philoso:Qhical Scrutin:£ of Religion, p. 21. 
2 Ducasse, A Philoso:Qhical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 414. 
3nucasse, A Philoso:Qhical Scrutin:£ of Religion, pp. 94, 
130, 414. 
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plausible way of defining religion in general would appear 
to be in terms of certain identical beliefs shared by all 
religions--primitive or advanced, theistic or non-theistic. 
But, Ducasse is quick to add, even a ncursory examination" 
of the many and diverse systems of religious beliefs seems 
to obliterate anY hope for accomplishing such a task. The 
great diversity of religious beliefs suggests not that the 
essence of religion can be formulated in terms of a common 
content but, rather, that it may be conceived only in terms 
of certain important functions which it is the distinctive 
business of religion to perform. And only a definition 
which takes into account this functional aspect of so-called 
"religious" systems of belief is, according to Ducasse, 
comprehensive enough to fit all sets of "religious" belief. 1 
With this understood, Ducasse proceeds to.offer his own 
definition of religion. 
A religion, he submits, is any set of overbeliefs, 
~.~., beliefs which exceed available evidence--"together with 
the observences, modes of conduct, attitudes, and feelings 
connected with the overbeliefs--which, in so far as theyare 
operative in a person, operate to perform two important func-
tions; one for him personally; and the other, through him, 
for society." 2 The latter, social function is precisely "to 
1 C. J. Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion?" 
Cent. Rev., 3 (1960), 120; 'tChristianity, Rationality, and 
Faith11 Rev. Rel., March (1958), 134; A Philosophical Scrutiny 
of Religion, p. 130. 
2 Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion?", p. 121. 
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provide motivation for the individual to conduct himself 
altruistically on occasions when his individual interest con-
flicts with that of society" and when neither public opinion 
nor any other form of social pressure provides such motiva-
tion.1 The former, personal function consists explicitly 
11 in giving to the individual some degree of serenity and 
steadiness in the ups and downs of life, especially on occa-
sions when nothing else avails to do so. 112 
To illustrate the functions which, according to his 
hypothesis, essentially characterize religion, Ducasse offers 
a number of helpful examples. The belief, for instance, that 
magnanimous, unselfish conduct earns an eventual Heaven for 
those who practice it provides, in so far as the belief is 
strong in a pe~son, the motivation for the person to behave 
altruistically and benevolently, not simply when his behaviour 
is open to the eyes of society but even when it is being 
exercised 11 in the dark, 11 tha.t is to say, even when egoistic 
or malicious conduct would remain undetected by society. And, 
Ducasse contends, it is specifically by virtue of providing 
this social motivation that the belief under consideration 
may be termed "religious."3 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, pp. 
135, 415. 
2 Bucasse, "Christianity, Rationality, and Faith, 11 
pp. 134-135. 
3oucasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion?", p. 121. 
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As regards the personal function, Ducasse points out 
that the belief, for instance, in an omnipotent, omniscient 
God who knows best what is ultimately good for each man, has 
the capacity to detach the believer frm1 the superficial or 
surface aspects of his existence and to give him an inner joy 
and assurance in the face of the so-called adversities and 
vicissitudes of life. That is to say, genuine religious 
belief, of the type illustrated here, can, according to 
Ducasse, bring to the devoted believer "calm in time of 
danger, endurance in time of despair, self-respect and dig-
nity in time of obloquy or frustration. 111 
But Ducasse is careful to add that the personal func-
tion of religion is not restricted to times of hardships and 
tribulations. It extends also to times of prosperity and 
good fortune, where it operates as a sedative rather than a 
tonic. Belief in Karma, for example, fosters moderation and 
conscientiousness in any devotee whose decisions are fateful 
for the psychological or physical welfare of fellow human 
beings. In mitigating arrogance, harshness, snobbishness, 
conceit and materialistic obsession, firm religious belief 
can give to those "high on the ever shaky summit of worldly 
life" a measure of inner peace and serenity. That is to say, 
the personal function of religious beliefs consists not only 
in the fostering of personal equanimity and stability in times 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
144. 
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of existential stress, but also in the maintaining of per-
sonal humility in times of success, prudence in moments of 
optimism, and a sense of responsibility in the exercise of 
power over fellowmen.l 
However, Ducasse 1 s recognition of religion as being, 
at least in part, a kind of "psychotherapeutic forcett 2 must 
not be taken to suggest an 11 opium of the people 11 view of 
religion. For Ducasse emphatically disowns the view that 
religion, like opium, brings beautiful visions and that these 
visions 11 distract those who believe them from doing what they 
could do to remove the causes of their earthly wretchedness. 
He does so on two grounds: first, by contending that the 
human being in his human predicament is frequently tormented 
by conditions over which he has little or no control, and, 
thus, that there ~ occasions on which he must simply undergo 
pain with whatever resignation he can muster; and, secondly, 
by insisting that religion "does not merely bring dreams, but 
also has the capacity to deaden pain; and the helpless indi-
vidual does desperately need an anaesthetic to alleviate the 
pains which the situations just referred to impose on him."3 
In short, then, we may say that, for Ducasse, the dif-
ferentiating feature or essential nature of religion is 
1 Ibid., also "What Has Science Done to Religion?", 
pp. 122, 123. 
2 Ducasse himself uses these words on p. 146 of A Phi-
losophical Scrutiny of Religion. 
3nucasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 143. 
Underlining is mine. 
conceived in terms of two specific functions; namely, the 
social function of inducing the devotee, on the frequent 
occasions when his interest conflicts with that of society, 
to subordinate his interest to the interest of society's 
welfare, and the uersonal function of maintaining in the 
believer a sense of tranquillity and stability both in times 
of adversity and good fortune. 
iii. The importance of 'belief' in religion. The 
fact that Ducasse makes the social and pe::-·sonal functions of 
religion its distinctive business, and indeed its differentia, 
should not be taken to mean that he undermines the significance 
of belief. For Ducasse makes it clear that although religion 
can be comprehensively defined only in terms of functions, 
the functions themselves presuppose a system of beliefs. 
His definition of religion pointedly states that religion is 
to be characterized by a set of beliefs (or, to be more 
exact "overbeliefsn) which tend to perform for the individual 
the essential functions Ducasse has stated.· 
Moreover, Ducasse contends, man 1s very "rationality,tt 
which differentiates him from the other animals, consists 
precisely in his ability to act QU the basis of reasons, that 
is to say, on the basis of conceptualized "beliefs" and 
"remote goals," rather than from peculiarly animalistic 
"drives, 11 "habits," or "concretely present stimuli." And to 
the extent that, in matters involving religion, man operates 
rationally as a human being, a "conceptualizer," rather than 
• 
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blindly as an animal, conceptualized belief may, indeed, be 
said to be the central element in his religion. More 
explicitly, man's religious beliefs, are said, by Ducasse, 
"to function in him as reasons or at least rationalizations 
••• for his religious practices and feelings and for the 
conduct and attitudes prescribed by his religion." 1 That is 
to say, man's conceptualized beliefs are fundamental to his 
religious life in the precise sense that they are what give 
meaning to the other aspects of his religion, namely, to his 
feelings and his acts. 2 Minus these beliefs, man p:rhaps 
could go through the motions of religion, but only as a kind 
of automaton, as a kind of chimpanzee who had been trained 
to kneel and cross himself.3 
iv. Religious beliefs ~ultimately matters of 
faith. We saw earlier that Ducasse's definition of religion 
conceives of religion in terms of a set of "overbeliefs" dif-
ferentiated by specific functions. At that time we noted 
s1I;J'lply that ''overbeliefs" are "beliefs which exceed available 
evidence.'' But the centrel role which beliefs have been seen 
to play in religion induces a closer examin2tion of the 
epistemological status of religious beliefs. 
1Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, pp. 
130-131. 
2 Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion? 11 , p. 120. 
3oucasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
132. 
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In calling religious beliefs "overbeliefsr Ducasse is 
intending to say that religion rests essentially on faith 
rather than knowledge. 1 And while knowledge, for Ducasse, is 
"belief warranted by evidence and limited in degree and in 
content to what the evidence warrants," faith is belief, which 
in degree or in content or both, goes beyond what the evidence 
possessed, if any, rationally warrants." 2 That is to say, 
faith differs fundamentally from knowledge by going beyond the 
available evidence in support of it; and, hence, the concep-
tion of the nature of religion offered by Ducasse regards the 
beliefs of religion as being either insufficiently supported 
or not.supported at all. Faith is not knowledge, and religious 
beliefs, as matters of faith, must not, Ducasse insists, be 
called 11 knowledge." To speak of 11 religious knowledge 11 is to 
mean nknowledge only of the fact that faith sometimes can 
'move mountains;' and religious faith is belief in the power 
of belief to do so."3 
To look at this matter from a slightly different per-
spective, Ducasse is here implying, and later states, that 
religious beliefs need not be objectively true to be effica-
cious. For even though they laok sufficient evidence to 
establish their truth, and thus cannot be classified as 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of 3.el igi on, p. 
148. 
2 Ducasse, 1tChris tiani ty, B.ationali ty, and Faith," pp. 
132-133. 
3 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
148. 
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1 knowledge, religious beliefs can still operate effectively, 
in the fervent devotee, as a personal "tonic" and "sedative," 
and as a "stimulant" to altruistic concern. That is to say, 
for religious purposes, the only things which matter about a 
given belief are that, on the one hand, it 11 be psychologically 
believable by the particular persons to whom it is. offered,'' 
and, on the other hand, that it function in the persons hold-
ing them in the two-fold manner described earlier. 2 Again, 
then, what is important about a religious belief is not that 
it be objectively true, but only that, by the performance of 
its personal and social functiom:,,itte pragmatically true. 
And it is on this basis that Ducasse asserts, for instance, 
that the "ambiguity," "vagueness," "internal inconsistencies," 
insufficient evidence of Christian beliefs--"in short the 
irrationality which, on critical examination of them, becomes 
patent, and which for scientific purposes would radically 
vitiate them,--is, for religious purposes, of little Qr nQ 
importance." 3 · 
Hence, we may say that, for Ducasse, religious beliefs 
have the philosophical status of "faith" rather than "knowledge,"· 
and that their religious significance rests essentially in 
their functional, rather than their epistemological, value. 
1 C. J. Ducasse, ''Facts, Truth, and Knowledge, 11 Phil. 
Phen. Res., 5(1945), 328. 
2 Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion? 11 , p. 
123. 
3nucasse, "Christianity, Rationality, and Faith,'tt p. 
132. Underlining is mine. 
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v. Belief in God not necessary to Ducasse 1 s view 
of religion. It is to be noted that, in defining religion 
in terms of overbeliefs and their functions, Ducasse does not 
make belief in, or worship of, a God a necessary part of 
religion. To the contrary, in fact, he criticizes as inade-
quate and limited any so-called "comprehensive" definition of 
religion which fails to take into account those sets of 
beliefs which, even though exclusive of a concept of God, 
are ordinarily called "religious. 1' He offers Buddhism and 
Jainism as outstanding examples of religions in which worship 
of a God has no part, and he repudiates Max Muller's "God-
includedn characterization of religion as being manifestly 
inapplicable to these non-theistic religions. He affirms, 
moreover, that Buddhism, as one of the noblest and most 
influential religions of all mankind, "constitutes one of 
the most important touchstones by which to test the adequacy 
of definitions of religion that attempt to apply to all 
religions." 1 And, it may be added, by this criterion there 
is no doubt at al+ that Ducasse 1 s definition passes the 
test! 2 
We may note, in passing, that the point made within 
this subheading is clearly consistent with Ducasse 1s conten-
tion that the differentia of religion consists not in an 
1 A Philoso:Qhical Scrutiny of Religion, 23. Ducasse, p. 
2 A Philoso:Qhical Scrutiny of Religion, Ducasse, pp. 
21-24, 109. 
identical content or system of beliefs found in every 
alleged religion, but in the functions which it is the 
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distinctive business of every so-called "religionu to per-
form. 
vi. ' Religion vis-a-vis science. In contrast to 
religious beliefs which, as we have seen, turn out to be 
matters of faith rather than knowledge, Ducasse speaks of 
"scientific beliefs," which, he claims, are matters of 
knowledge rather than faith. Unlike religious beliefs, 
scientific beliefs, he maintains, are the products of a 
strict methodological inquiry involving observation, experi-
mentation, demonstration and verification, and do not go 
beyond "what available evidence rationally warrants." Now, 
the question might arise: In view of the availability of 
scientific beliefs or knowledge, ought not mankind to give 
up the incompletely supported beliefs of religion? 
Ducasse's answer to this question is of a two-fold 
nature. On the one hand, he makes i-t clear that, in his 
opinion, knowledge, when available, is always preferable to 
faith.l 
. 
And he maintains that the only conceivable sub-
stitutes for the "functional articles" of religious faith 
would be "items of verified knowledge" which had the same 
capacity to perform the two distinguishing functions of 
religion. Such substitutes, he affirms, would represent a 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
417. 
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noteworthy improvement over faith "because faith • • • is 
never as secure as verified knowledge, and is seldom as firm, 
clear or precise, or therefore as potent." 1 
On the other hand, however, Ducasse offers a kind of 
justification for the continuance of religion as well as a 
criticism of what the advance of scientific knowledge has 
done to religion. In the process of ridding religion of 
many of its antiquated, religiously functionless myths, 
science has cultivated in man the custom of requiring verify-
ing evidence for all beliefs offered for his acceptance; and 
this, Ducasse contends, has induced many persons to reject 
religious overbeliefs solely on the inadequate ground that 
there was not evidence for them--completely disregarding the 
' 
unavailability of evidence against them, as Nell as the crucial 
fact that religious beliefs are to be gauged in terms of their 
functions rather than their truth or falsity. This 
scientifically-motivated practice amounts, Ducasse adds, to 
throwing out the baby with the bath water. 2 
But the baby should not be thrown out with the bath 
water, and science is open to criticism in so far as it 
encourages just that! For, Ducasse insists, there are 
innumerable occasions which arise on which the knowledge and 
power of science are not sufficient to meet man's needs at 
l Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
420. 
2 
Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion," p. 124. 
that time, but on which religious beliefs continue to per-
form their much needed functions. To repeat in just a 
slightly different way, the very moments at which the 
religious functions are operable, are precisely those moments 
at which science would be powerless anJ inadequate to meet 
the need of the moment. 
For Ducasse, then, religion and science, religious 
beliefs and scientific beliefs, are not mutually exclusive; 
they simply represent different methods of belief, have dif-
ferent values, am operate at two different "times'' of human 
experience. Hence, Ducasse argues firmly that religion has 
"a legitimate place and a vastly important function" even in 
the lives of scientifically trained people. 1 And to the ques-
tion as to whether, in view of the availability of scientific 
beliefs or knowledge, mankind should give up all religious 
faiths Ducasse 1 s answer is unambiguously, "No! For so long 
as these sets of religious overbeliefs are not disproved, 
and perform the beneficial functions necessary to the essence 
of religion, they "are at least as legitimate as, and psycho-
logically more helpful than, the overdisbeliefs that have 
today been induced in many persons by the influence of 
science." 2 
With this consideration we conclude our presentation 
of Ducasse 1 s main views on religion. However, before 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 418. 
2Ducasse, "What Has Science Done to Religion?", p. 125. 
Underlining is mine. 
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proceeding to the related views offered by Pratt, we may, 
once again, take note of the fact that none of the preceding 
contentions made by Ducasse involved an explicit appeal to 
his rHnd-Body dualism. That is to say, we did not observe 
here, any more than in his ethical views, any evidence of 
the "decisive" influence of ontological dualism. On the 
contrary, in fact, we might now say that Ducasse's attempt 
to formulate the essential nature of religion seemed totally 
irrelevant to such a dualism. However, out of fairness to 
the allegationl of Pratt alluded to here, it must also be 
noted that we have concerned ourselves almost exclusively 
with Ducasse 1 s views on religion, and not with his religious 
views. Although it is not our intention to provide such 
now, perhaps an analysis of Ducasse 1 s religious views (if 
these could be discovered) v-.rould indicate the dualistic 
repercussions of which Pratt speaks. 
2. Pratt's Consideration of Religion. 
i. His approach. Pratt's interest in religion2 
is, manifestly, the interest of a psychologist rather than 
of a philosopher. Unlike Ducasse, Pratt is not primarily 
interested in either systematically discerning the dif-
ferentia of religion, or in determining the bases for the 
1 See introductory remarks to chapters .5 and 6. 
2 See, especially, J. B. Pratt, The Religious Conscious-
~ (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), and J. B. Pratt, 
The Psychology of Religious Belief (Nevv York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1907). 
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validity or non-validity of religious beliefs. His aim is, 
rather, "to describe the workings of the human mind" in so far 
as those workings are influenced by religion. Or, in other 
words, Pratt's intention is "to study the religious con-
sciousness just as any other science studies its object." 
And tovJards that end, he assures us, he is willing "to probe 
the most sacred depths of private experiences, ••• to ran-
sack the public records of social religious practices • 
• • 
and ideas, 1' and, then, to describe, compa.re, and generalize 
the results as thoroughly as possible. 1 
However, this description of Pratt's'general approach 
to the subject of religion is by no means characteristic of 
his approach to the task of defining religion. For, in 
respect to the latter, Pratt does not appear challenged to 
offer a scientifically supported hypothesis concerning the 
essential nature of religion. Rather, beginning with the 
assumption that ••• "all definitions of religion are more 
or less arbitrary and should be taken ••• as postulates," 2 
he simply states arbitrarily what he means by the term 
"religion." And, in proposing such a definition, he makes 
it clear that he does so only because of its possible assist-
ance to his reader, and not because of any importance which 
he attaches to definitions of religton. "This definition," 
1Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 31-32. 
2Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 1. 
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he says, ui propose for what it is worth, and if it is found 
in several ways defective, I shall not be surprised, nor shall 
I greatly care." 1 
Let us now look at his definition. 
ii. Religion~ ~n •attitude. 1 "Religion," sub-
mits Pratt, "is the serious and social attitude of individuals 
or communities toward the power or powers which they con-
ceive as having ultimate control over their interests and 
destines. 112 In calling religion an "attitude," he means that 
it belongs to the responsive rather than to the content side 
of consciousness; that is to say, it covers such things as 
attention, interest, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to 
reaction, etc., rather than 11 the relatively passive element 
in sensation, the accepted and recognized." Moreover, an 
"attitude" is characterized by the fact that it always pre-
supposes some kind of object and involves a content of some 
sort. But as a "relatively active state of consciousness," 
an attitude is not the given, but is always the "subjective 
response to the given.") 
In calling the religious attitude a 11 social" attitude 
Pratt makes it clear that he is not advocating the necessity 
for a personal object in religion. He employs the term 
1 Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 2. 
2Ibid. 
3Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. ). 
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"social," he says, mainly to indicate that the attitude 
distinctive of religion is neither mechanical nor coldly 
intellectual. Rather, 11 it must have some faint touch of that 
social quality which we feel in our relations toward anything 
that can make response to us.'' And it is in this sense alone 
that Pratt's connotation of religion is necessarily social. 1 
Again, then, religion for Pratt is neither an intel-
lectual system nor a hypothesis but an attitude--and, more 
specifically, an attitude toward a power or powers believed 
to be in control of one's destiny. This manner of defining 
religion has, he insists, certain distinct merits. For one 
thing, it includes the element of truth contained within the 
historical attempts to equate religion with feeling, belief, 
or will, without confining religion to either one or all of 
the three. That is to say, while recognizing .that religion 
is 11 immediately subjective," this way of characterizing 
religion does not limit religion to the subjective: it also 
acknowledges that religion both "involves and presupposes the 
acceptance of the objective." For, as we have seen, the 
attitude which essentially differentiates religion is always 
the attitude of response or expectancy in relation to an 
oblect in which the self sincerel~ belie~es. 2 
Rurther, Pratt asse~ts, this definition of religion 
in terms of ttattitude" possesses the additional merit of 
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being neither too narrow nor too broad. On the one hand, by 
stipulating as an essential condition of religion the con-
scious, responsive acceptance of a determiner of one's 
destiny, it resists the tendency to assume that al~ men are 
religious. And, on the other hand, this proposed definition 
is broad enough to find considerably ~ore religion in some 
agnostics then in many a church-goer. That is to say, a con-
cerned agnostic who, for instance, "lived" the conviction 
that some unspecified power had ultimate control over his 
destiny would, on this definition, be more "religious" than 
would be an unconcerned, uncritical theist whose belief in 
God "is not sufficiently real even to be doubted. 111 
iii. Does Pratt ignore~ 'functions' of 
religion? Given the fact that Pratt does not differentiate 
religion in terms of certain functions, we might now, in 
view of our earlier aquaintance with Ducasse 1 s functional 
view of religion, wonder whether Pratt has completely ignored 
the functions of which Ducasse speaks. Two considerations, 
I think, enable us to answer this question in the negative. 
First, as regards the personal function, one relevant 
quote seems to leave no doubt that Pratt recognizes a kind 
of psychotherapeudic force in religion. He says: 
When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual 
person with the best and bravest of those who are not 
religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the 
former possesses something which the others lack. It 
1 Pratt, The Religions Consciousness, pp. 5-6. 
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is not that he is any better morally than his non-
religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty 
and love nor any braver. It is, rather that he has a 
confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the 
other lacks. He is, perhaps, no more at home in this 
world than the other (perhaps he is not so much at home 
here), but he seems more in touch, and he acts as though 
he were in touch with a larger environment.l 
Besides, Pratt adds: 
••• He has an inner source of joy and strength which 
does not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which 
in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of 
strength and promise fail. He is, therefore, able to 
shed a kind of peace around him which no argument an~ no 
mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce. 
That is to say, for Pratt, as for Ducasse, religion is seen 
to perform the highly important function of giving to its 
adherents a sense of inner serenity and tranquillity in all 
the experiences of life. 
There is no such pointed and incisive passage avail-
able to indicate Pratt 1 s regard for the alleged "social 
function" of religion. But, it seems to me, Pratt says 
enough, on the one hand, to indicate that he has not ignored 
the issue, and, on the other hand, to show his disfavor with 
any attempt to make the "social function" part of the 
essence of religion. For instance, he disavows Ames• ident-
ifica ti on of religion with "the most intimate and vi tal 
phases of the social consciousness." "There is," he says, 
1Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 35-36. For 
repetition of this idea, see also J. B. Pratt, Can We Keep 
the Faith? (New Haven: Yale Univer'Sity Press, 1941), p. 
205. 
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"in most human lives an attitude toward the Determiner of 
Destiny which simply is not to be identified with social 
righteousness II And, in another of his infrequent . . . 
appeals to ordinary English, he argues that his characteriza-
tion of religion as an attitude much more closely approximates 
the 11 common meaning of the English word religion than does 
the view which equates religion with a kind of social 
rnorality. 1 
However, it is true that, although Pratt disclaims 
religion as social righteousness, he acknowledges the func-
tion which religion seems to fulfill in inducing social 
morality. 11 0ne of the great functions of religion," he says, 
"is to keep alive in man the cosmic sense." The conscious, 
religious attitude 11 opens up to him broader vistas and wider 
realms." 2 Religion is, indeed, Pratt says, "one's greatest 
help towards [social] righteousness."3 It invariably pro-
vides society with a 11 central and common loyalty11 and inhibits 
the "egoistic tendencies 11 of the individual. 4 And surely 
all this is "something more than the 'consciousness of the 
highest social values. 1 "5 
1 Pratt, ~Religious Consciousness, p. 9. 
2 J. B. Pratt, "The Function of Religion in Modern Life," 
Hib. Journ. 34(1936), 427. 
3Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 9-10. 
4 Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 206. 
SPratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 10. 
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Hence, we may say that Pratt recognizes the beneficial 
functions which religion exercises on both the person and 
society, but, unlike Ducasse, refuses to incorporate these 
functions into the essential nature of religion. 
iv. The significance of'belief' in religion. 
Little reflection is required to perceive that Pratt's defini-
tion of religion necessarily involves belief. For, if reli-
gion is "an attitude toward the powers in ultimate control 
of one's destiny, "then it follows necessarily that religion 
involves belief in such powers, that is to say, belief in 
the object in relation to which the devotee has the specified 
attitude. Moreover, it goes without saying that the belief 
involved is, of necessity, a belief in a particular kind of 
power--namely, the kind of power believed to have ultimate 
control over the destiny of the believer. For this reason, 
then, religion, for Pratt, "always and necessarily involves 
some sort of theology, some sort of belief about the ultimate 
Determiner of Destiny."l 
Thus, it may be said that although religion itself is 
not a theory, is not a system of beliefs, it necessarily 
involves a theory or set of beliefs. Religion is an attitude 
rather than a theory, yes, but it is an attitude toward a 
power in which the individual genuinely believes. And this 
belief entertained by the religious devotee is precisely 
1 Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 7. See also 
p. 224. 
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what Procter, for instance, calls the "intellectual element" 1 
in Pratt's conception of religion. 
v. Belief in God not essential to Pratt 1 s yiew 
of religion. There is no question that, were we justified 
in equating the term "God" with "Determiner of Destiny, 11 we 
should be required to say that Pratt's conception of religion 
presupposes belief in God. For, as we have observed in the 
preceding subheading, Pratt's religious attitude necessarily 
involves belief in a power (or powers) having ultimate con-
trol over one's destiny. But, Pratt notes, for some people 
"Godn necessarily connotes a personal power; and on this 
meaning of "God," belief in God is certainly not essential 
to religion. Buddhism in its original form is an outstand-
ing example of a prominent religion which does not involve 
belief in a personal God. 2 Its "very conscious attitude 
towards Karma!' as Determiner of Destiny, gives it, according 
to Pratt, the status of a genuine religion.3 
In other words, if by "belief in God" is meant belief 
in a pe~sonal God (and this most frequently is the case), 
then Pratt's definition of religion cannot be said to neces-
sitate such a belief. For, as we have seen earlier, Pratt 
insists that religion does not necessarily have a personal 
lT. H. Proctor, "Pratt's Philosophy of Religion" Rev. 
Bel. 9(1945), 138. 
2 Religious Consciousness, 3-4. Pratt, The pp. 
3Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 20-21. 
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object; and, in so contending, he intends to be so broad, in 
his characterization of religion, as to include non-theistic 
Buddhism among the important religions of the world. 
vi. Religious beliefs ~ ultimately matters of 
'rational faith.' In his eloquently written book, Can We 
Keep the Faith?, Pratt makes the following pointed assertion: 
To take any philosophic stand, to go beyond logic and 
mathematics and the immediately experienced facts and 
the various tautologies, means taking a chance, appeal-
ing to probability rather than to complete certainty, 
making some kind of faith venture • • • This is ••• 
true of religious beliefs. 
And, in another relevant passage in The Religious Conscious-
~~ Pratt says unequivocally: 
Where reason and evidence can reveal to us the truth 
they certainly should be relied upon to do so. But in 
questions upon which they cannot give a decision yet 
towards which ~ must take ~attitude, ••• the 
faith venture while not logically required may be 
morally demanded. 'The wise shall live by postulates,' 
says Professor Royce; and surely there is at least this 
much of truth in St. Paul's words, 'The just shall live 
by faith. 1 2 
Certainly, the perusal of any~ of Pratt's books on 
religion would be sufficient to convince the reader of Pratt's 
conviction that the beliefs involved in religion are essen-
tially articles of faith rather than knowledge. For time and 
again, in his writings, Pratt uses the words "religion" and 
"faith" interchangeably, and contends, as in the manner 
1 Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 83. Underlining 
is mine. 
2Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 222. Under-
lining is mine. 
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illustrated above, that the religious attitude represents a 
venture in faith. 
But it is clear that the "faith" of which Pratt speaks 
is, to use his own words, a "r<:1tional faith. nl "No belief," 
he affirms, "can long stand which is inconsistent with 
reason, and he who leaves reason out of his reckoning in 
rearing his faith edifice is building upon the sands." For 
reason must at least be able to show that the religious 
object is possible, and, hence, that one has the right to 
believe. 2 Moreover, Pratt adds bluntly, to deny the ultimate 
authority of reason is to withdraw oneself from the circle 
of rational beings; for even "to enter into a discussion is 
tacitly to presuppose the ultimate and sole authority of 
reason and the evidence."3 
It is to be noted, further, that in recognizing 
religious beliefs as matters of faith rather than knowledge, 
Pratt is not intending to ignore the truth aspect of beliefs, 
in favour completely of, say, their functions or pragmatic 
consequences. In fact, on the contrary, Pratt maintains 
that religion "is not satisfied with being simply comforting 
4 
and 'useful; 1 it means to be also true." For "to believe" 
1Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 84. 
2Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 222-223. 
3Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 73. See also 
entire chapter, "The Place of Reason." 
4Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 7. 
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is, indeed, !Q believe 1Q be true; and, as Proctor has 
pointed out, "if there is any meaning at all in this claim 
to truth, it means the acknowledgement of, and submission to, 
common standards of truth." That is to say, when Pratt mai.R-
tains that religion intends to be true, he means that religion 
intends for the beliefs presupposed by it to be supported by 
relevant evidence, to be consistent amongst themselves, and 
to represent inferences based on valid reasoning. 1 
Hence, we may say that although religion, for Pratt, 
is primarily something to be lived rather than reasoned about, 
a venture in faith rather than in knowledge, it is concerned 
with 11 reason and the evidence" and has its eyes on truth. 
And it is, doubtless, with this consideration in mind that 
Pratt affirms that religion is the type of faith which is 
" ••• reasonable but not coldly abstract, courageous yet 
never self-deceived nor disloyal to truth, calmly confident 
but never blind tt2 . . . 
vii. Religion vs. Science. In contrast to Nhat 
we found in Ducasse, the question of the status of religion 
in relation to science is not systematically considered in 
Pratt. However, scattered throughout his writings are 
enough relevant comments to enable Pratt 1 s reader to gain a 
rather distinct impression regarding this topic. 
1Proctor, Pratt's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 138-139. 
See also Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 187. 
2 Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 223. 
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First of all, we may note that while religion,for 
Pratt, is essentially an attitude towards the Determiners of 
Destiny, science is characterized as ttany systematic descrip-
tion of the verifiable facts of human experience. 111 ·That is 
to say, while religion, for Pratt, is essentially attitudinal, 
science is fundamentally descriptive. And (to make use also 
of our discussion of the preceding subheading), while science 
has access to "verifiable facts" (=knowledge), the religious 
"attitude" involves, and, indeed, presupposes, beliefs which 
have the status oftaith rather than "verifiable fact." But, 
as we have seen, this faith is called reasonable faith; that 
is to say, even though religious beliefs cannot be demon-
strated as knowledge or established as fact, they.are to be, 
Pratt insists, sup9orted by "reason and the evidence," and 
llQi contrary to either. However, by virtue of their being 
concerned vJi th "basal cosmic matters 11 they cannot be completely 
suppo~ted by reason and evidence, for the simple reason that 
the evidence is not completely within human grasp. 2 
This last consideration goes far, I think, in suggest-
ing the status of religion vis-a-vis science. The point is 
that there are, for Pratt, "matters of ultimate ••• con-
cern11t which cannot be settled "in the light of such reason 
and such knowledge as we possess. 11 Yet these matters demand 
/ 
1Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 29. 
2 Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 84. 
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our attention, evoke in us a response, develop in us an atti-
tude, and make us "feel the need of some decision."l And the 
"decision" ~~de constitutes religion rather than science, is 
of faith rather than of verifiable knowledge, and involves 
the "whole man" 2 rather than the intellect alone. 
From this perspective, then, Pratt sees no conflict 
between religion and science, provided of course that science 
does not apply its criteria of knowledge to religious faith.J 
The matters of cosmic and ultimate concern induce a religious 
response, not a systematic description of verifiable facts; 
they are in the domain of religion rather than science; and, 
despite the incompleteness of the human evidence available 
in support of them, they represent, to use James' expression, 
a kind of "forced option"--that is to say, they evoke in many 
people a sense of necessity to make a decision in "reason-
able faith." And, Pratt says, "faith is not the only important 
requisite for a justifiable decision and for a life that can 
be justified, but its place .Q.§11 be taken .ill[ nothing else"--
not even science.4 
With this consideration, we terminate our scrutiny of 
Pratt's general conception of religion. Although, in exposi-
tion, many of the points of comparison between Ducasse 1 s and 
1 Ibid. 
2 Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. ). 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 215. 
4 
is mine. 
Pratt, Can We Keep the Faith?, p. 84. Underlining 
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Pratt's view of religion have been made obvious, we shall, 
subsequently make a more explicit and more pointed comparison. 
However, before doing so, we shall (l) examine Ducasse 1s 
criticism of Pratt's notion of religion, and (2) consider the 
possible influence of Pratt's dualism on his view of religion. 
3. Ducasse's criticism of Pratt's yiew. Although 
Ducasse commends Pratt's notion of religion for its attempted 
comprehensiveness, he finds serious -fault with its particular 
allegation that religion ''must have a faint touch of that 
social quality which we feel toward anything which can make 
response to us. 11 This requirement, says Ducasse, represents 
an endeavour to rescue from illogicality, by use of the word 
11 faint, 11 11 a compromise between on the one hand making the 
definition comprehensive enough to apply to the non-theistic 
religions as well as to the theistic, and on the other, making 
it such as to differentiate the religious from the scientific 
[i.e., mechanical or objective] attitude." But the truth of 
the matter, Ducasse maintains, is that even to require that 
the religious attitude be only faintly personalistic is 
incompatible with "the nature of the Determiner of Destiny 
as conceived by the non-theistic religions." Particularly, 
such a demand is incompatible with the Determiner of Destiny 
conceived as Karma. For Karma is essentially the law of 
causality operating between "one's acts, thoughts, and feel-
ings," on the one hand, and the resulting changes in one's 
individual character or capacities, on the other hand; and 
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the causal connection, here, is just as impersonal and n&n-
social "as it is in the phenomena of gravitation, magnetism, 
or electricity. 111 Hence, by making na faint social quality" 
a necessary ingredient of the "religious attitude," Pratt 1 s 
conception of religion, according to Ducasse, precludes the 
recognition of Buddhism, for instance, as a "religion," and, 
thus defeats its own aspiration to be comprehensive enough to 
include non-theistic religions. 
It is important to observe that Ducasse•s criticism of 
Pratt's view of religion assumes the identification, at least 
in part, of the word "social 11 with the word 11 personal." But 
that this identification or interchanging of terms is highly 
questionable is evidenced by the fact, already seen, 2 that 
Pratt refuses to make belief in a personal God a criterion 
of religion. 
However, it cannot be denied that Pratt is vague in 
his use of the expression "social quality." And inasmuch as 
he qualifies this expression only by indicating th::t it is 
something "we feel in our relations toward anything that can 
make response to ill!," he certainly suggests the personal, 
and leaves the way open for Ducasse to make the kind of 
criticism he does. 
1 Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, pp. 
108-109. For discussion of the causality involved in Karma, 
see also pp. 43-44. 
2 See subheading ii of preceding section. 
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4. Religion and Pratt's mind-body dualism. In a 
chapter in Matter and Spirit entitled "Consequences of Dualism, 11 
Pratt attempts to elucidate his contention that an ontological 
dualism between mind and body has marked consequences for one's 
11 whole view ••• of religion. 11 His fundamental point is that 
only a dualistic philosophy, only a philosophy which recog-
nizes that "the world of matter and the world of spirit are 
not made of the same stuff," only a philosophy which does not 
reduce the activities of the spirit to the laws of matter and 
motion, can "safeguard man's spiritual interests" and "satisfy 
the demands of the religious consciousness." 1 For only such 
a philosophy, he maintains, acknowledges the "supernatural" 
order of "mind and personal activity" as well as the ttnatural" 
order of "mechanical causation, 112 and only such a philosophy 
is "compatible with any significant form of personal immor-
tality.") Says Pratt: 
Without some form of dualistic philosophy, I do not 
see how we can have any personal hope at all. If the 
soul be an epiphenomenon of the brain, it will perish 
when the brain ceases to function. If it is merely a 
stream of consciousness, it lacks that identity and that 
character which are needed to give meaning to immor-
tality. If it be merely a 1peephole 1 in a Bo~anquetian 
universe, it is of the essence of transiency. 
1 Pratt, Matter and SQirit, pp. 215, 217, 227. 
2Pratt, Matter and SQirit, p. 225. 
3Pratt, Matter and Spirit, p. 227. 
4 Matter and Spirit, 226. Pratt, p. 
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Now,the question in which we are here interested con-
cerns whether or not Pratt's accepted dualism has, as he has 
led us to expect, 1 influenced his view of religion considered 
in this chapter. And the first point to be noticed is that 
the preceding emphasis on the advantages of dualism has to do 
directly with the relation of dualism to Pratt's implied 
religious views (e.g., belief in immortality), and not with 
his conception of religion, that is to say, not with his 
views Qll or about religion. However, it should now be clear 
that the basic interest of this chapter has been in the two 
authors' views about religion, in what might be called their· 
meta-religious views, and, hence, that the foregoing "con-
sequences of dualism," relating specifically to religious 
beliefs, are not directly relevant to the views under examina-
tion in this chapter. 
Next, having noted that Pratt's treatment of the 
implications of mind-body dualism shows only the consequences 
of dualism for religious views, and not for views Qll the 
nature of religion, we may ask again the question posed 
above; namely, Does Pratt's mind-body dualism affect his 
view of the essential nature of religion? And, in answer to 
this question, we can simply observe here, as we did in rela-
tion to Ducasse, that Pratt's consideration of "religion" 
makes no explicit appeal to a mind-body dualism, and that his 
l See Pratt, Matter and Soirit, p. 167. 
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approach to the task of differentiating the essence of reli-
gion appears completely unrelated to his solution to the 
mind-body problem. For, as we have seen, in attemp~ing a 
definition of religion, Pratt seems mainly interested in 
avoiding 11 both the extremes of narrowness and of excessive 
breadth, 11 is admittedly arbitrary, and does not appear par-
ticularly concerned about the adequacy of his definition. 
In short, there does not seem to be, in Pratt's treatment of 
religion, any definite evidence to establish the influence 
of his dualism of process on his view of religion. 
Of course, to say that there is no explicit evidence 
in support of a dualistic influence on Pratt's view of reli-
gion is not to say definitively that no such influence exists. 
And, indeed, one might want to argue, ~post facto, that 
Pratt's very characterization of religion as an attitude 
presupposes his recognition of a subjective 11 realm of the 
spirit" and hence follows indirectly frcm his so-called 
'liualism of process." It is to be noted, however, that such 
an argument not only involves a "reading into 11 Pratt's view 
of religion, but also offers a conclusion which does not 
follow necessarily from the data. For even if we were to 
allow that Pratt's meaning of "attitude" takes for granted 
a non-materialistic "realm of the s~,irit" or 11 self, .. l we 
would still n£i be in a position to accept the inference 
1 I use this in Pratt's sense. See chapteriV of this 
dissertation. 
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that, therefore, Pratt 1 s differentiation of religion emanates 
necessarily from a dualism of process; since, clearly, a 
monistic idealism could just as well have provided the 
spiritual or mental realm said to be presupposed. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing argument, though not 
necessary in its transition from data to inference, may 
surely be said to be orobable. For, certainly, one could 
gather much evidence to indicate that Pratt, himself, under-
stands "attitude" as an activity peculiar to the spiritual 
realm; 1 and given the fact that this non-materialistic realm 
is acknowledged by both Dualism and Idealism, then it is 
reasonable to assume (if one 1s admission of an activity of 
the spiritual relam must presuppose one or the other) that 
Pratt's acknowledgement of a religious "attitude" takes for 
granted and proceeds from the metaphysical position which 
he so often advocates--namely, a Mind-Body Dualism. 
Of course, the orobability ascribed to this argument 
in no way inhibits a reaffirmation of our contention, above, 
that there is, in Pratt, no explicit and conclusive evidence 
in support of a dualistic influence on his conception of 
·religion. 
5. A review of the oreceding comparison. In our 
effort to ascertain whether Ducasse and Pratt are making the 
same claims within the same philosophical posture, let us 
1
see, for instance, ~he Religious Consciousness, p. J. 
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now review the similarities and differences which the above 
presentation of their views makes evident. 
i. Similarities: 
(a) First of all, it is to be noted that for 
both Ducasse and Pratt, beliefs are significantly involved in 
religion. While for Ducasse religion is characterized by a 
set of beliefs which tend to perform specific personal and 
social functions, for Pratt the religious attitude neces-
sarily presupposes beliefs. And while for Ducasse beliefs 
function as reasons, or sometimes rationalizations, for the 
attitudes and conduct prescribed by religion, for Pratt, 
similarly, the religious attitude is always directed towards 
a power or powers in which one believes. 
(b) Secondly, we may say that both writers see 
religion as having important personal and social functions 
to perform; that is to say, they agree that religion should 
function both to give a sense of inner joy and tranquillity 
to one's personal existence and to impel the individual to 
subordinate his selfish interests to the interests of society. 
But as we have noted before, and shall report in the next 
subheading, this similarity does not allow us to say that 
these functions have the ~ status in both views of the 
nature of religion. 
(c) Thirdly, we may note that Ducasse and 
Pratt concur in the opinion that religious beliefs are 
ultimately matters of faith rather than knowledge. And to 
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express this point in another terminology, we may now say 
that, for both authors, religious beliefs are essentially 
"overbeliefs" which transcend available evidence but which 
do not go contrary to it. 
(d) Fourthly, it may be observed that neither 
author makes belief in a personal God an essential feature of 
religion. Each author, rather, indicates his individual 
satisfaction with a definition of religion which does not 
preclude the recognition of non-theistic Buddhism, or Jainism, 
as a religion. In fact, both authors agree that Buddhism 
represents one of the most significant touchstones by which 
to gauge the adequacy of any definition of religion alleged 
to be comprehensive. 1 
(e) Fifthly, we may say that neither author 
sees any necessary conflict between science and religion, and 
both authors agree that science is not a ·substitute for reli-
gion. According to Ducasse, as we have seen, the functions 
characteristic of relig1on are called into exercise pre-
cisely on those occasions when "the knowledge and power which 
scientific inquiry has yielded up to the moment is quite insuf-
ficient to meet man's needs on those occasions." 2 According 
to Pratt, there are matters of ultima.te and cosmic concern 
1Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 
23; Pratt, Personal Realism, p. 4. 
2Ducasse, A Philosophical . .3crutiny of Religion, p. 
417. Underlining is mine. 
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which, for the simple reason that decisive evi:Jence in their 
support is not wholly accessible to man, cannot be settled 
scientifically, but which induce human beings to respond 
dynamically in religious faith. 
(f) Finally, it may, again, be noted that 
neither writer is particularly concerned with the presenta-
tion and defense of any specific religious views. Both 
authors, rather, seem to be speaking at a level which I 
have, sometimes, arbitrarily called "meta-religious;" that 
is to say, they talk exclusively about religion, without, 
for instance, trying to offer a philosophical justification 
for any given set of "religious beliefs." And, despite 
Pratt's expressed lack of enthusiasm regarding definitions 
of religion, there is, as we have seen, substantial evidence 
to indicate that both writers are seriously interested in 
providing a definition of religion that is comprehensive 
enough to include at least all the major religions of the 
world. 
ii. Differences: 
(a) The first difference we may note in 
respect to Ducasse's and Pratt's treatment of religion is a 
difference in declared interest. While Ducasse makes it 
clear that he is basically interested in locating the "essen-
tial nature" or differentia of religion, Pratt indicates 
that he is fundamentally interested in studying the religious 
consciousness, that is to say, in describing the workings of 
the mind in so far as these workings are affected by religion. 
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(b) The second difference we may observe is 
the difference between the approaches of the two writers. 
I speak both of the proposed approach and of the actual 
approach. While Ducasse proposes to determine the meaning 
of religion by ascertaining how the word is paradigmatically 
applied in ordinary language, Pratt proposes to turn to 
private experience and public records as bases for a scien-
tific study of the religious consciousness. Moreover, 
whereas Ducasse, in actuality, approaches the task of defin-
ing religion by scrutinizing a selected number of other 
academic attempts to define religion generically, Pratt, 1n 
actuality, offers, without any apparent regard for either 
scientific methodology or his proposed data, an admittedly 
arbitrary view of the religious'attitude." 
(c) The third difference to be noted pertains 
directly to the definitions of religion offer~d by the two 
writers. While for Ducasse religion is co~ceived essen-
tially in terms of specific functions of overbeliefs, for 
Pratt religion is defined in terms of a specific type of 
attitude. More explicitly, we may say that for Ducasse the 
differentiating feature of religion is the social and personal 
functions which its overbeliefs distinctively perform, while 
for Pratt religion as an attitude is distinguished from all 
other attitudes by being directed toward a power or powers 
conceived as having ultimate control over one's interests 
and destinies. 
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That is to say, despite the fact, noted in the preced-
ing subheading, that both Ducasse and Pratt see religion as 
performing important personal and social functions, it is 
quite clear that while Ducasse takes these functions to be 
essential to religion, Pratt does not take them to be a part 
of the essence of religion. 
(d) The final difference to be noted concerns 
the relation of religious beliefs to what might be called 
objective truth. Having offered a functional view of religion, 
Ducasse, on the one hand, makes it clear that, for religious 
purposes, the failure to establish religious beliefs as 
objective truths is unimportant. All that is important 
about religious beliefs is, he declares, that they be pragma-
tically true, that is to say, that they function in the 
believer in the two-fold manner described in his definition. 
Although Pratt, on the other hand, admits that religious 
beliefs are not established objective truths, he is not will-
ing to accept them merely as pragmatic truths or psycho-
logical tools. "The religious consciousness, 11 he says, 
"inevitably considers its religion objective as well as 
subjective." Religion is not content to be only "useful" or 
1 
"comforting;" it intends also to be objectively true. 
6. Are Ducasse and Pratt talking in the ~ philoso-
phical posture? The foregoing scrutiny of the similarities 
1 Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. ?. Underlining 
is mine. 
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and differences may now leave the reader to wonder whether 
or not Ducasse and Pratt are, as in the case of the preced-
ing chapter, talking in the same general universe of dis-
course, or whether, as we found consistently in our earlier 
chapters, the two authors are talking in two different phi-
losophical postures and about two different things. For, on 
the one hand, the reader has seen thatfue views of Ducasse 
and Pratt coincide at many points; and yet, on the other 
hand, he has seen that. the interests and the approaches of 
the C::wo authors, as wen as their conceptions of the differentia 
of religion, differ conspicuously. 
In regard to this question, it is my contention that, 
notwithstanding some evidence to the contrary, Ducasse and 
Pratt meet the problem of characterizing religion from the 
same general perspective and in much the same way. In other 
words, despite the fact that their stated interests and pro-
posed approaches are not in agreement, I wish to maintain 
that Ducasse and Pratt ~ here talking in the same philoso-
phical postures and, roughly speaking, about the same data. 
In support of my argument, I should like to turn again 
to what I have called the "actual" approach of Ducasse and 
Pratt, respectively. In an attempt to avoid the inadequacies 
and retain the merits of other definitions of religion, 
Ducasse undergoes a critical survey of a selected number of 
generic conceptions of religion; and his own definition 
develops from this survey. In contrast to Ducasse•s modus 
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operandi, Pratt, sensing a need to inform his reader of his 
meaning of religion, claims only to offer an arbitrary defini-
tion of what he means by the word "religion. 11 But, despite 
the fact that terminology indicates otherwise, I wish to sug-
gest that Pratt's procedure, when analyzed carefully, may be 
shown to be no more arbitrary than the procedure of Ducasse, 
and that, in fact, it app2als to the same kind of data as does 
Ducasse's procedure. An attentive reading of chapter I of 
The Religious Consciousness, for instance, makes it evident 
that Pratt's definition, like Ducasse 1s, evolves out of a 
critical examination of other definitions of religion. More 
explicitly, whereas Ducasse's definition of religion emanates 
from a consideration of the individual definitions of Ferm, 
Wright, Pratt, To~ Leuba, Marshall and Kidd, 1 Pratt's defini-
tion proceeds out of a scrutiny of the views of religion 
submitted by Everett, L. Dickinson, Durkheim, Schleiermacher, 
2 A. C. Watson, Ames, etc. That is to say, each of our two 
authors uses the definitions of other scholars as at least 
part of the data on which to formulate his own definition of 
religion; or, in other words, each of the two authors seems, 
at least partially, to develop his definition of religion 
from a consideration of the same kind of data. 
1 Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, pp. 94-114. 
2Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, pp. 2-ll. 
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In further support of my contention, I wish to call 
attention to the fact that both Ducasse and Pratt point to 
ordinary language as a criterion for gauging the adequacy of 
any definition of religion. Ducasse indicates that no defini-
tion of religion can be termed adequate unless it fits the 
common usages of the word "religion" in ordinary language. 1 
And Pratt not only repudiates Ames' definition for its 
departure from the common meaning of "religion" in the 
English tongue, but also commends his o~m definition for 
its conformity to ordinary-language usage. 2 
Now, it seems to me that the above points--namely, 
(1) that Ducasse and Pratt address the same kind of data, and 
(2) that they both use ordinary language as the test of the 
adequacy of a definition of religion--speak strongly for my 
allegation that Ducasse and Pratt are looking at, and speak-
ing about, religion in the same philosophical posture or 
universe of discourse. For I should think it reasonable to 
assume that both the choice of one 1 s data in one's attempt 
to define religion, and the criterion of religion one selects 
to test "religion," would reflect the philosophical perspec-
tive from which one views and comments upon the topic of 
religion. Moreover, it may now be added that the preponder-
ance of similarities over differences between the two views 
of religion only serves to confirm my contention that the two 
writers are talking within the same universes of discourse. 
1Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, p. 18. 
2Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p. 9. 
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However, my argument must not stop here. For, 
clearly, if Ducasse and Pratt are, as regards religion, 
talking in the same philosophical posture, then the differ-
ences in their views on religion must not be accounted for 
in terms of differences in their postures. Thus, in order 
to test further my contention that Pratt and Ducasse ~ 
talking in the same posture, let us now determine whether or 
not we are able to account for the differences in their views 
without suggesting that these differences emerge from two 
essentially different philosophical postures. 
(a) The first of the differences indicated 
above can hardly be called a difference in views, and, hence, 
for our present purposes, need not be accounted for. Yet we 
may say simply that this difference in declared interest 
occurs precisely because Pratt is given to the primary task 
of developing a psychology of religion, while Ducasse sets 
out to present a Philosophy of religion. 
(b) Similarly, we may say that the so-called 
ndifference between the approaches of the two writersn is not 
a difference in their views of religion, and, hence, need not 
necessarily be examined within the present context. In pass-
ing, however, we may simply note that the difference in 
intended aPProaches may well be understood by the fact that 
Ducasse, in accepting the problem of defining relig:on as a 
theoretical Problem of philosophy, finds himself directed 
towards his own proposed methodology for the solution of such 
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a problem; and Pratt, on the other hand, in embarking upon a 
psychological treatise of the religious consciousness, finds 
himself directed, by virtue of his psychological ambitions, 
towards a consideration of the data of nrivate experience 
as well as of public records. Moreover, in regard to what I 
have called a difference in actual approach, I should now 
want to argue that this difference is no more than a differ-
ence in actual expression; for, as we have contended earlier, 
Pratt's definition of religion, like Ducasse 1 s, is seen, 
upon analysis, to stem from an examination of other academic 
attempts to define religion comprehensively. 
(c) The third difference--that is to say, the 
difference between Ducasse 1 s differentiation of religion in 
terms of specific functions and Pratt's characterization of 
religion as an attitude towards a determiner of destiny--
can, I believe, be accounted for in terms of the different 
definitions which Ducasse and Pratt choose to consider among 
their data. Ducasse, for instance, examines, among other 
definitions, the definitions of Marshall and Kidd; he is 
greatly impressed with the element of social function in 
them; he implies that this aspect of social utility is an 
essential aspect of the ordinary-language connotation of 
religion; 1 and he, thus, makes this function a vital part of 
1It is to be remembered that both Ducasse and Pratt 
have indicated their acceptance of "ordinary-language 11 usage 
as a criterion by which to gauge the adequacy of definitions 
of religion. 
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his definition. Pratt, on the other hand, does not consider 
Marshall's or Kidd 1 s definition, and does not, subsequently, 
include the social function w.tth1.n his differentiation of the 
nature of religion. 
HOi'll'ever, Pratt does examine, for instance, the views 
of the essence of religion offered by L. Dickinson and A. c. 
Watson and his own view of religion as an attitude is 
admittedly influenced by such an examination. Ducasse, on 
the other hand, does not consider Dickinson's or Watson's 
conception of religion, and does not, later, look upon reli-
gion as being essentially an attitude. 
Hence, it would appear that the difference under con-
sideration can be accounted for without assuming a difference 
in philosophical postures between the two authors. 
(d) Finally, the fact that Ducasse is content 
with the pragmatic truth of religious beliefs, and Pratt is 
not, can be understood entirely in terms of the difference 
between Ducasse 1 s functional and Pratt's .D..Q.n-functional 
definition of religion. For Ducasse, the personal and social 
functions are the differentia of religion; they alone are 
what differentiate religion from every other area of human 
culture. Given this definitj_on, it follows that, for religious 
purposes, all that is important about religious beliefs is 
that they function or work, in other words, that they be 
pragmatically rather than objectively true. 
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However, Pratt does not define religion in terms of 
its functions, and, thus, is not impelled to make the infer-
ence that functional efficacy is the all-important thing 
about religious beliefs. In fact, an elaboration of his 
definition makes it c~ear that the religious attitude is not 
satisfied with mere workability, but aims at objective truth. 
Hence, we may say that this final difference, like the 
three preceding ones, can be explained without implying that 
Ducasse and Pratt are speaking in two different universes of 
discourse or postures. And in view of this finding and the 
confirmation which it provides, I wish, in concluding the 
.discussion of this section, to reiterate my contention that, 
in regard to their notions of religion, Ducasse and Pratt are 
talking in the same philosophical posture. Specifically, 
they both come to grips with the task of formulating their 
conceptions of religion through the media of other definitions; 
and they both employ their conception of ordinary-language 
usage as a standard by which to measure the adequacy of their 
own definition. 
7. Final remarks. At the outset of this chapter, we 
expressed our interest in learning whether, as in the case of 
their treatment of ethics, Ducasse and Pratt view religion 
from the same general philosophical posture, and make the 
same general contentions about religion. We also implied 
our interest in inquiring as to whether or not the differences 
in the two types of mind-body dualism advocated by Ducasse and 
Pratt might account for any difference in their views on 
religion. 
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In regard to the latter consideration, we have found, 
in t"le views of Ducasse and Pratt, .n2 explicit evidence of 
an appeal to, or influence by, a particular conception of 
mind-body dualism. Moreover, we may now say that, in our 
attempt to account for the listed differences between the 
two authors, we did not find it necessary to appeal to the 
differences between "dualism of substance" and "dualism of 
process," as brought out in chapter IV. 
In respect to the former consideration, we have found 
that the views of religion offered by Ducasse and Pratt share 
many of the same contentions. Moreover, we have argued that, 
in view of the simil~rity of their perspective (evidenced by 
their similar choice of data), the sameness of their criterion 
for an adequate definition of religion, and the fact that the 
basic differences in the views.of the two authors could be 
understood without suggesting two different philosophical 
postures, Ducasse and Pratt~~ as regards religion, making 
these similar contentions within the ~ universe of dis-
course. In other words, for only the second, and yet final, 
time in this dissertation, Ducasse and Pratt, we have argued, 
are engaged in the same type of philosophical inquiry. 
CONCLUDING COMNENTARY 
In our recapitulation at the end of chapter V, we 
concluded that, in respect to the topics of Substance, 
Existence, Causality, and the Mind-Body relation, Ducasse 
and Pratt are neither talking in the same philosophical 
posture nor making the same basic contentions. Moreover, 
we maintained that the essential differences in the con-
tentions of the two authors derive, in fact, from the 
fundamentally divergent postures in which they find and 
scrutinize their data, and in which they frame their hypo-
theses. More specifically, we argued that, by and large, 
the disagreements between Ducasse and Pratt concerning the 
aforementioned metaphysical topics stem precisely from the 
fact that while Ducasse confines his philosophizing to the 
scope of language, Pratt views and meets these topics at the 
level of "felt," immediate, personal experience. 
But our critical scrutiny of Ducasse and Pratt did 
not end there. Having focused our attention on topics 
generally recognized as belonging to the realm of meta-
Physics, we then resolved to examine the views of the two 
authors on morality and religion. And, in particular, we 
set out to ascertain whether or not, as might be expected, 
the differences between the two writers again proceeded from 
two essentially dissimilar universes of discourse. 
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Our expectations, however, were hardly fulfilled; for 
we readily observed a shift in Pratt's apDroach to philoso-
phical problems. Suddenly, in regard to the "ethical prob-
lem, 11 Pratt, in a manner comparable to the procedure of 
Ducasse, appeals to "Common Sense" rather than to existential 
experience. In fact, in his attempt to determine the mean-
ing of value, he turns directly to the way in which the word 
"value" is employed "in the best and com"~1onest English;" and 
then he tries to justify his definition entirely on the 
ground that it conforms to ordinary-language usage. 
Yes, suddenly, Pratt and Ducasse, we alleged, see and 
ap-oroach a problem from the same general perspective, speak 
in the same philosophical posture, and, we might add, make 
the same general contentions. And our assertion that, as 
regards ethics, Ducasse and Pratt are talking in the same 
philosophical posture, was certainly supported by our finding 
that the particular differences between the two authors can 
be understood without postulating essentially different 
postures or universes of discourse. 
Further, in respect to religion, we found the situa-
tion to be of a similar nature. Once again, we maintained, 
both Ducasse and Pratt encounter the problem at the level of 
language, address the same type of data (academic defini-
tions), adopt the same ordinary-language test for the 
adequacy of their respective definitions of religion, and 
in short, speak within the same posture of philosophical 
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inquiry. Once more, many of their basic contentions are 
similar; and, we argued, the fact that their differences can 
be understood without appealing to two divergent philoso-
phical postures only confirms our contention that they are 
n2i here philosophizing in two different postures. 
To the question then, as to whether or not the dif-
ferences betwesn Ducasse's and Pratt's views on morality 
and religion can again be traced to a difference in basic 
postures assumed by the two writers, our answer must be in 
the negative. For, if our argument is sound, it is not only 
·the case that the differences in the two sets of views can 
be a~counted for other than by positing two different pos-
tures, but, in fact, that the two authors are speaking in 
the ~ universe of discourse. 
Hence, our comparative analysis of Ducasse and Pratt 
has indicated that, as regards Substance, Existence, Causality, 
and the Mind~Body relation, the two authors are neither talk-
ing in the same philosophical posture DQr offering.the same 
general contentions; but that, in respect to morality and 
religion, they are operating and speaking at the sa:ne level 
of philosophical inquiry, and are making many essentially 
similar allegations. To look at this finding from a 
-
slightly different perspective, we may say, on the one hand, 
that where Ducasse and Pratt fail to adopt the same philoso-
phical posture in regard t~ a particular topic, their views 
concerning that topic fail to share any essential accord; and, 
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on the other hand, that where the two philosophers do adopt 
the same posture, their theories concerning the topic share 
many of the same basic contentions. In other words, there 
is general agreement in Ducasse and Pratt regarding the topics 
examined only where the two authors view, approach, and come 
to grips with the individual topic within the same universe 
of discourse; where there is not this coincidence of philoso-
phical postures, there is not general agreement within the 
particular set of views being compared. And, in view of this 
observed correlation, we may submit, as a primary finding of 
this dissertation, that the source of the fundamental dis-
agreements between Ducasse and Pratt is the essentially dif-
ferent postures which they assume in respect to many of the 
problems of philosophy. 
But, having noted the results of o~r comparative 
scrutiny, we must not stop here. For, in conformity with 
our declared intention (in the Preface), this dissertation 
has not only, by way of a point-by-point comparative analysis, 
attempted to delineate and understand the basic similarities 
and differences between selected views of Ducasse and Pratt, 
but has also adjressed itself to a secondary task of comment-
ing critically upon these views. Thus, so as not to over-
look an important aspect of this dissertation, let us now 
endeavor to synthesize the main critical observations made 
within it. 
Our most persistent criticisms of Ducasse were 
related to two main features of his work--his philosophical 
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method,in particular, and his ap9roach to philosophy, in 
general. In relation to the former, we argued not only that 
his methodology is inadequate, but also that his actual pro-
cedure does not conform to his proposed methodology. The 
inadequacy of his method, we maintained, is evidenced by the 
fact that, despite a marked need for each, Ducasse 1 s method 
fails to include either a criterion for the selection of 
representative ordinary-la~~uage usages of a term, or a 
criterion for determining when one has examined sufficient 
representative data to infer the meaning of the term in 
question. Our contention that Ducasse 1 s actual procedure 
fails to abide by the prescriptions of his proposed method-
ology emanated from our analysis of his treatment of Sub-
stance, and was corroborated by our examination of his views 
on Existence, Causality, the Mind-Body relation, and Morality. 
In each case, we questioned Ducasse 1 s loyalty to his method 
on the ground that either he fails to provide the data 
required by his stipulated procedure or he offers a hypo-
thesis unrelated to the data and basic q_ue::;tiun rJf llis 
inquiry. For example, in his treatment of Substance we saw 
that, after providing exam9les of the way in which Substance 
is used in ordinary language and after directing his inquiry 
to the question of the meaning of the term 11 substance 11 in 
these illustrations, he offers a seemingly ad hoc hypothesis 
concerning the nature of substance. Moreover, in regard to 
the Mind-Body problem specifically, we .contended that Ducasse 
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arbitrarily (that is, without methodological warrant) turns 
a semantical inQuiry concerning the Mind-Body question into 
an inquiry regarding what it means to call a particular body 
"one's own." For such failures to adhere to the mandates of 
his own methodology, we accused Ducasse of being a "delib-
erate innovator." 
In respect to the latter of the "persistent criti-
cisms" mentioned above, we frequently questioned the soundness 
of Ducasse's semantical approach to philosophy. Despite his 
belief that semantical discoveries have extr~-linguistic 
import, Ne insisted on distinguishing sharply between the 
level of language and the level of realitx, and refused to 
take a description of a term's usage in ordinary language as 
being equivalent to a description of a term's extension, so 
to speak, in reality. Language, we maintained, is a ~ealm 
once removed from reality; and even though it may be intended 
to express reality, to say something about reality, it is 
not reality. In fact, to draw inferences concerning the 
nature of a thing or things, to deduce "metaphysicalrr c:n-
clusions about reality, from an investigation or inquiry 
which is thoroughly semantical in intent, data, and scope, 
is, we suggested, to confound universes of discourse, to con-
fuse categories, to COII11lit the fallacy of 11 mixed postures." 
In other wor:1s, we expressed serious misgivings con-
cerning Ducasse's manner of philosophizing. Not only did we 
declare Ducasse's procedure from the meaning of words to the 
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nature of things to be unwarranted by £1is own semantical 
methodology, but we also condemned it for advancing fal-
laciously from one universe of discourse to another, that 
is, as tho .. 1gh what is said about the usage of a term in 
ordinary laneuage may, .i:Q§Q facto, be t.al{en to be character-
istic of the term's extension in reality. 
In general, we found less to criticize in Pratt than 
in Ducasse. For one thing, we agreed with Pratt that per-
sonal experience, rather than language, is the right starting-
place for philosophy. There is no level of our existence 
with which we are better acquainted than the level of our 
personal experience. And even if we take language to be 
language about experience or experience stabilized in words, 
so to speak, we must admit that language loses the element 
of existential thatness, of immediacy, of certainty, that we 
"feel" in our direct experiences. Hence, we agreed with 
Pratt that, though not self-explanatory, our diverse experi-
ences are "the thin::::s we human beings are most sure of," 
and, consequently, that they, rc:,_ther than \'lOrds, represent 
the proper starting-place for philosophy. 
Further, having accepted Pratt's view that the data 
of philosophy are experiential rather than semantical, i-Je 
also sympathized with his subsequent refusal to confine 
experience to definition. We agreed that the experience 
with which we are directly acquainted is dynamic and existent 
rather than logical or subsistent, and that any attempt to 
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define it would miss its element of duration, would falsify 
it by turning it into a static essence or concept. That is 
to say, we concurred with Pratt's contention which permeates 
his whole metaphysics, that living experience defies adequate 
expression, analysis, or definition. 
However, given these fundamental agreements, we went 
on to raise an important critical question regarding Pratt•s 
approach to the problems of metaphysics, in particular. 
Pratt frequently talks as though one can "observe" the 
living experience of the moment, as though one can come to 
grips philosophically with the immediate experience of the 
present.l But, we asked, doesn•t my living experience--that 
is, the experience with which I am directly and momentarily 
acquainted--slide into the mediate and become lived.as soon 
as I try to come to grips with it, as soon as I try to 
observe it, as soon as I try to comment upon it? In other 
words, granted the point that philosophy should begin with a 
consideration of my direct, personal experience, yet isn•t 
Pratt mistaken when he gives the impression that I can 
observe the content of the moment? For, again, doesn't my 
living~ experience become 11 ved when I try to "look" at it or 
com~ent upon it? If such is the case, then isn't Pratt him-
self restricte~ philosophically, to the posture of the 
1 See, particularly, his treatment of the Mind-Body 
Relation in chapteriV. · 
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immediately experienced rather than, as he says, to immediate 
experience? \ole left this suggestion in the form of a cri ti-
cal question. 
Our main criticism of Pratt arose in the latter part 
of our dissertat irm--namely, in reference to our explanation 
of Pratt's ethical views. Here, for the first time in our 
study, we found a conspicuous change in Pratt 1 s actual 
approach to a philosophical topic. No longer does he meet 
the problem before him from his proposed experiential per-
spective; no longer does he make an appeal to direct~-
sonal experience. Rather, in a manner strikingly reminiscent 
of Ducasae 1 s approach, Pratt turns to Common Sense, to lin-
guistic convention, to usage in ordinary language, for the 
solution of the problem of morality. 1 Within this posture, 
Pratt, like Ducasse, allows himself the prerogative of draw-
ing conclusions concerning the nature of morality from an 
analysis of the common usage of the term "morality." And, we 
argued, Pratt, in so doing, subjects, himself to one of the 
basic criticisms we levied against Ducasse 1 s semantical 
approach. More specifically, he is proceeding on the arbi-
trary and questionable assumption that an account of a 
1 Note: I speak here of the problem of morality alone. 
In no way am I sugge Gting that his data ''or the problem of 
religion are also taken from common usage. I have argued 
only that, both in case of morality and religion, Prat~ 1 s 
immediate appeal is to language--to "common usage," on the 
one hand, and to academic language, on the other hand. 
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term's usage in ordinary language is tantamount to ~n account 
of the term's extension in reality. To do so, we contended, 
is not only to depart radically from his proposed existential 
starting-place in philosophy, but is also to confound uni-
verses of discourses, to commit what we have called the "fal-
lacy of mixed postures." 
Hence, we may conclude that, although we shared a 
general sympathy for Prat't 1 s experiential or existential 
approach to the problems generally classified as "meta-
physical," we entertained, concerning Pratt's consideration 
of ethics (and, subsequently, of religion), the same funda-
mental misgiving and objection that we raised in regard to 
Ducasse's consistently semantical approach to all of the 
philosophical problems examined in this dissertation. 
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ABSTRACT 
Initial acquaintance with the philosophies of C. J. 
Ducasse and J. B. Pratt gives one the impression that the 
two philosophers are closely akin. This impression, doubt-
less, stems from the fact that both authors are prominent 
Realists, outspoken Dualists, and widely recognized writers 
on religion. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to inquire into 
the very workings of these two ostensibly similar philoso-
phical positions, to ascertain whether or not Ducasse and 
Pratt actually~ in fundamental harmony, and to determine 
the basis for any essential difference which a comparative 
analysis might show to exist between selected views of the 
two authors. Within the context of this investigation, the 
author also intends, as a kind of secondary endes..vour, to 
criticize and assess the general philosophical positions 
under scrutiny. 
The dissertation begins with a comparison of the meta-
philosophies of the two authors. It is found that each author 
adopts an "empirical" view of philosophy, although not in the 
same explicit sense. While Ducasse uses "empirical" to 
designate a scientific methodology to which all philoso-
phical inquiry must conform, Pratt uses "empiricaln to 
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characterize the philosophical position which begins with 
the "many and diverse experiences" of individual human 
iJeings, and attempts to explain rationally the totality of 
experience. 
In an effort to learn whether or not the philosophical 
positions of Ducasse and Pratt are in basic agreement, the 
author turns first to their consideration of the historical 
problems of Substance and Existence. A number of the 
related contentions of the two authors appear to be in marked 
contrast. Take the case of Existence. While Pratt, on the 
one hand, characterizes Existence as a kind of experiential 
brute fact or given tha tness known only "by acquaintance,11 
and declares it to be simple, unanalyzable, and, hence, 
indefinable, Ducasse, on the other hand, designates Existence 
' 
as "having a locus or position in some indication or ordinal 
system, 1' and declares it to be both analyzable and definable. 
The question then arises: What is the basis for this apparently 
fundamental disagreement between the two theories? 
In answer to this question, the author submits the 
thesis that the differences in the two views can be traced to 
the two essentially different "postures" or "universes of 
discourse" from which the two authors see and meet the prob-
lem. Ducasse views "Existence" semantically. Like any other 
theoretical problem of philosophy, the problem of Existence 
is regarded as one of defining what the term means in 
ordinary-language usage. So it is not surprising to find 
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him offering a generic, connotative definition of Existence. 
Pratt, on the other hand, views Existence experientially 
rather than linguistically, and confronts data of personal 
experience rather than of words. And it is on the basis of 
this direct acquaintance with Existence that he asserts the 
indefinability of the "felt 1' existential thatness of thinking 
experience. 
On the note that the apparent disagreement between 
Ducasse and Pratt concerning Existence represents basic 
differences between them, and that these diffe•~ences emanate 
frcm two essentially different realms of discourse, the 
author proceeds to an analytic comparison of their views on 
Causality and Mind-Body problem. In regard to both topics, 
he maintains, again, that the differences between the sets 
of views in contrast are not mere differences in language 
or terminology. Rather, it is argued, the two sets of hypo-
theses emanate from two different postures (semantical vs. 
experiential) of investigation; and, framed within two uni-
verses of discourse, they neither consider nor account for 
the same data, they neither talk about nor say the same 
thing. 
Maintaining that the essential differences between 
Ducasse and Pratt regarding four historically significant 
problems of metaphysics stem from the basically different 
philosophical postures assumed by the two writers, the 
author attempts, next, to ascertain whether or not his thesis 
holds in regard to their general views on ethics and religion. 
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But, in regard to both of these topics, it is con-
tended that, contrary to expectations, both Ducasse and Pratt 
encounter the problems at the level of language, address the 
same type of data, insist that their respective definitions 
are in accord with ordinary-language usage, and, in short, 
speak within the same posture of philosophical inquiry. 
Moreover, it is found that Ducasse and Pratt are, in each 
case, making many fundamentally similar contentions. 
That is to say, there is general agreement in Ducasse 
and Pratt regarding the topics examined only Nhere the two 
authors view, approach, and come to grips with the individual 
topics within the same universe of discourse; and where there 
is not this coincidence of philosophical postures, there is 
not general agreement. 
In view of this correlation, the author submits, as the 
primary finding of this dissertation, that the fundamental 
differences between Ducasse and Pratt can be accounted for in 
terms of the essentially different postures which they assume 
in respect to many of the philosophical proble~s. 
Tw.o persistent criticisms of Ducasse's philosophical 
approach and one basic question concerning Pratt's, are 
expressed in this dissertation. On the one hand, the author 
criticizes Ducasse for his failu~e to abide by his oNn pro-
posed methodology, and for his practice of deducing inferences 
about the nature of things from an inquiry which is thoroughly 
semantical in intent, data, and scope. The latter procedure, 
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it is argued, confounds universes of discourse and commits 
the fallacy of "mixed postures." On the other hand, the 
author, although sympathetic with Pratt's "experiential" 
or "existential" approach to the problems of metaphysics, 
questions Pratt's tendency to talk as though one can come to 
grips philosop:'1ically with the immediate experience of the 
present. 
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